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West Europe Report

No. 1586

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DEFENSE MINISTER BOURGES INTERVIEWED ON DEFENSE MATTERS

Paris AVIATION MAGAZINE INTERNATIONAL in French 1-14 May 80 p 39

[Interview with Minister of Defense Yvon Bourges; date and place not given]

> [Text] Yvon Bourges, minister of defense: "The delay in the Mirage 2000 program at the outset will be largely made up by 1982."

[Question] Despite the increase in the defense budget in relation to other categories in recent years, it is far from the levels reached when the French military aeronautical industry was set up. How should one interpret France's inability to finance, for example, a program such as the Mirage 4000?

[Answer] The purpose of the increase in the defense budget is to provide the French armed forces with the means to take on their missions to guarantee the nation's independence and the country's security.

Among these means, the Air Force is to be given the combat plane that can meet the threats: this is the Mirage 2000: a superior airplane capable of air defense first of all, and then, in its second version, a penetration plane. The Mirage 4000 is an equally remarkable airplane, but one with different capacities; and furthermore, it uses the piloting and combat systems, the materials and the engine of the Mirage 2000. It does not match the immediate needs of our Air Force.

[Question] According to Jacques Cressard, the defense-budget rapporteur to the Finance Committee, the armed forces' buying power has dropped sharply since 1977. In a very disturbing international environment, does the government intend to take special measures in order for the Air Force in particular to obtain the means it needs?

[Answer] First, let us consider the figures: in constant francs, the military budget has gone from 50 million in 1976 to 62.37 million in 1980. This is therefore a 25-percent increase in buying power (124.74 in 1980 for base 100 in 1976).

in current francs, the budget has increased by more than 70 percent (38.8 billion) during the same period.

As regards Air Force equipment in particular, this budget has nearly doubled, in current francs, between 1977 (5.5 billion) and 1980 (10 billion).

Beyond these figures, which speak for themselves, we find confirmation of this effort in the satisfactory progress of the combat-airplane programs: from 1977 to 1980, 101 Mirage F-1's out of the 109 planned for the 6 years of the programming law, and 110 Alpha Jets out of the 144 planned, have been ordered, while 77 Jaguars out of the 84 planned will be delivered. The delay in the Mirage 2000 program at the outset will be largely made up by 1982. It appears that by 1982 the Air Force will have been able to carry out the modernization of its combat fleet and will have a greater transport capacity in the near future thanks to resumed production of the Transall in its new version.

[Question] In recent months, a certain anxiety has been expressed about the difficulties in perfecting the Mirage 2000 that come at a time when the American competition is becoming more severe. Aren't we paying now for the delay in the decision to launch this program?

[Answer] There is no special "difficulty" in completing the Mirage 2000, whose flight tests are proceeding normally.

By comparison with its predecessors, the development of the Mirage 2000 has made very good time, which is all the more remarkable for a plane of such new design. It has been developed in 28 months, while the other Mirages took 50, even 60 months. Let us recall the stages: 1975--decision to launch the program; 1976--beginning of development; beginning of 1979--first flight.

As for the competition that the Mirage 2000 will have to face, it will be of the same kind that its predecessors experienced.

[Question] In any case, hasn't France dangerously put all its eggs in one basket with the Mirage 2000?

[Answer] The same thing was said about the preceding Mirage generations. It is a matter of giving our Air Force the combat means it needs. The choice of the Mirage 2000 was for a very high-performance aircraft, of entirely new design. For the first time, our Air Force will have a combat plane with electrical piloting, equipped with the most modern weapons system and navigation, a pulse-type radar and a high-performance engine, and benefiting from the most recent progress in the area of materials. These characteristics open up the most favorable prospects for this aircraft.

[Question] In order to meet the development costs of the future combat-airplane programs, two ways are open to France: a national approach or a

European-cooperation approach. How do you choose between these two approaches, mainly from the point of view of the future tactical combat plane to replace the Jaguar?

[Answer] The development of the national aeronautical industry has never ruled out cooperation, especially with the countries of Europe. Airplanes such as the Transall, the Jaguar and the Alpha Jet happily testify to this fact.

Regarding the future combat plane, France has proposed to its two usual partners--Great Britain and the FRG--that it be launched as a joint project. The studies on this subject have been started on the basis of the operational needs expressed by the general staffs. It is too early to evaluate the possibilities of carrying out such a program and thus coming to a decision.

[Question] With the favorable development of the Airbus program, the French industry's civilian activity is becoming more and more important. Do you think that this trend can have consequences on the oversight that the Ministry of Defense exercises on this activity and on its organization?

[Answer] This is a happy situation that is the direct consequence of the government's aeronautical policy as it has been conducted in recent years. It is highly artificial to contrast military aviation with civilian aviation, since the development factors are so complementary, if not associated. One sees no reason to modify an organization which, quite obviously, has proved itself.

11267
CSO: 3100

GENERAL BILLOTTE IN FAVOR OF NEUTRON BOMB

Paris LE MONDE in French 29 Apr 80 p 17

[Text] Gen Pierre Billotte, former Gaullist deputy for Val de Marne, believes that the neutron bomb "is, from now on, France's only possibility for mitigating the lack of reliability of the American nuclear umbrella."

General Billotte stated recently before the France-United States Association, in Tours, that "our NATO allies participate in military burdens, but they know nothing of the intentions of their real partner, the United States. This is not logical."

The former deputy added that "France is no longer in that organization. But it is located, nevertheless, in the European theater. Therefore, it is concerned and it is now becoming evident that the United States will not take the risk of using the nuclear weapon, if the USSR attacks Europe with massive conventional forces.

"I propose," General Billotte concluded, "the neutron bomb, whose crushing effects on personnel in armored units on an offensive maneuver would be zero on personnel entrenched in a defensive position and on civilian populations located at a short distance from the points of impact."

(General Billotte, born in 1906, was General de Gaulle's chief of staff in London and was head of the French delegation to the committee of chiefs of staff in the United Nations from 1946 to 1950. After he resigned from the Army, he was an RPF [Rally of the French People] and then UNR [Union for the New Republic] deputy, minister of National Defense in 1955-1956 and minister of State in 1966-1968.)

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CSO: 3100

MINISTER RIKA DE BACKER: FLEMISH AUTONOMY SENSIBLE IDEA

Brussels DE STANDAARD in Dutch 21 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Guido Fonteyn: "Regional Government Studies Flemish Vision: 'Autonomy Is Sensible,' Says Rika De Backer"]

[Text] Since 1974, the members of the Flemish regional government have been meeting around the same table in the chamber of Minister Rika De Backer, at 20 Joseph II Street, in Brussels. The table is long and rectangular. Presumably, more decisions which will thoroughly change the appearance of the Flemish region in the next decades -- or maintain it -- have been made around this table than anywhere else.

The Flemish regional government meets once a week. Under the Martens administration, this occurred 45 times, or approximately every week (not counting vacations) of this government's existence. Between November 1974 and April 1979, the MCVA [expansion unknown] (Ministerial Committee) also met 144 times, so that up to now the Flemish regional government has held 159 meetings. Minister Rika De Backer presided over all of them, which means that since 1974, and at least until 1980, this Flemish community and the Flemish region have had the same -- female -- prime minister.

These meetings take place on Monday afternoons, from 1430 hours until around 1700 hours. The Walloon regional government meets at the same time. The people of Brussels wait until the Flemish and Walloon regional government meetings are over before getting to work, because on the Flemish side State Secretary Steyaert has a seat in both the Flemish and the Brussels regional governments. On the French side, Minister Degroeve is a member of both regional governments.

During the Martens I administration, a double expansion of the authority of these regional governments took place. As a matter of fact, on the Flemish side cultural and person related matters were added to the region, which equally implied a territorial expansion of the authority of the Flemish regional government to include these matters within the region of Brussels.

A legislative power corresponds only in small part to this regional government. Under Perin-Vandekerckhove, the provisional regional councils operated for a few years, but they have long since folded. The cultural councils have authority in cultural matters, but there is no legislative institution for all matters pertaining to the region. Consequently, the regional executive power has to take a detour via the national parliament. This has as yet not caused any political difficulties, because in this regard the national majority has followed the decisions of the regional governments in a sporting manner. However, this situation is certainly not normal.

Work Saved

Minister De Backer says that she personally remains in favor of incapsulating the regional governments in the one national government. If difficulties were to arise, there would then automatically be a discussion platform. On the other hand, the existence and operation of this regional government frees quite a bit of space for the national government. "Indeed, the daily work for each region takes place in the regional governments," says Nika De Backer.

Moreover, since 1974 the members of the Flemish regional government have not had to call a single time on the higher stratum (the national government) for the settling of conflicts. For all decisions, a consensus was achieved within the Flemish region. On the Walloon side -- and particularly on the Brussels side -- this was not the case and several times they requested arbitration at the national level.

It is true that the regional governments are hindered in their work by the lack of their own civil servants. A plan was being developed in this regard during the Martens I administration. Some 7,000 civil servants for all the regions together would be transferred from the national administration. Among these, 3,500 to 4,000 (BTK [expansion unknown] members and related administrators not included) would go to the Flemish region. In time, these people who have been "called" -- but they may decide themselves for or against the transfer -- will be brought together in one building, which would thus house the "Flemish department."

Where this building would be chosen is still an open question, even though it looks as if keeping its location in Brussels has the most advocates -- if only to prevent arbitration among the many Flemish cities, even including Ypres, which felt called to fulfill this function.

Take Care of Ourselves

Thus, the regional governments can already boast of experience -- from 1974 until now. This also applies to Minister De Backer. "Autonomy is sensible," she says. "Let us not listen to those voices which once again praise only the national level. Based on our daily management since 1974, we know that a different policy is called for in many areas." She points in this respect

to an tendency, which already exists in Europe, to shift authority from a national to a regional level, this level "being closer to the citizen." However, every year more and more differences among the parts of the country arise from the exercise of power in Belgium itself.

"Maybe there is an explanation for this," says De Backer. "In the Flanders, we have had to regain everything against the opposition of the national government. We succeeded in making the Flanders Flemish, in defiance of national authority and national patronage. Maybe this struggle led us to the conviction that we have to take care of ourselves, and expect little support from the state. In Wallonia, things happened the other way around."

This is reflected, among other things, in the cultural policy, which in the Flanders is carried out by the municipalities and a number of private institutions, while people in Wallonia apparently put more faith in government centers. On the other hand, the Walloons seem to approach a number of dossiers in a very individualistic -- who said this? -- manner: in the Flemish region it is considered normal that nearly all the regional plans were approved -- in Wallonia, they are nowhere near this point. In Wallonia, people clamor for free radios and free television (and the RTB [Belgian Radio Broadcasting and Television System] was split up on a very regional basis here), while people in the Flanders rather insist on planning. After years of exercising power, Minister De Backer says that these and other examples must be noted; hence her conclusion that autonomy is sensible.

But this says little about the substance of the operation of the Flemish regional government. Every week, something on the order of 10 to 20 issues on the agenda are handled. Thus, any attempt to summarize this would be doomed to failure. One example can clarify a great deal.

Under the impetus of the Flemish regional government, VESOK, the (ugly) abbreviation for the Flemish Economic and Social Consultative Committee, has been in operation since 28 February of this year: 8 employers, 8 workers, 4 representatives of the Flemish regional government, who set in motion consultations with regard to employment. De Backer says that providing jobs in government service on an informal basis (employment of the unemployed, BTK members) cannot in time solve unemployment and youth unemployment. Here again, the Flemish mentality may differ from the Walloon mentality. Unanimous VESOK recommendations cannot be ignored at the national level, just as decisions made by the Flemish regional government are no longer discussed at the national level, but only acted upon.

[illegible]
CSO: 3105

BRIEFS

AIR FORCE LACKS FUEL--A spokesman for the Belgian Air Force declared yesterday that the 18 Mirage jet fighters will not be able to participate in NATO maneuvers to be held in Turkey in September because there are no funds for fuel and the defense budget is exhausted. That does not sit so well with NATO circles because such incidents clearly destroy the credibility of the NATO alliance, and the Belgian Ministry of Defense should have foreseen price increases for fuel. Maybe not officially, but certainly backstairs, this will certainly become the subject of some hot debates during the coming NATO top conference in Brussels. By that time resistance against the installation in Belgium of new missiles with atomic warheads will also have gained momentum. The Flemish Committee for Action Against Atomic Weapons (Vaka), under the auspices of the International Organization of Antiwar Groups, will then organize a day of study against atomic weapons at the Brussels Free University. [Text] [Brussels KNACK in Dutch 9 April 80 p 25] 10319

WEAPONS TO URUGUAY, SOUTH AFRICA--Because of disagreement between Minister of Foreign Affairs Henri Simonet (PS) and his development cooperation colleague Mark Eyskens (CVP), who openly criticized the sale of Belgian arms to Uruguay, and in particular because of the meeting of the UN Committee Against Apartheid, the newspaper DE MORGEN reverted last week to the sale of weapons and parts by Belgium to South Africa, already denounced in December 1978 by BRT-PANORAMA. It concerns especially munitions for a new artillery system which the Brussels firm Space Research Corporation International (SRCI), an affiliate of the Belgian munitions factory Poudries Reunies de Belgique (PRB), and the American-Canadian arms manufacturer Space Research have been promoting for several years. We have been informed that in the United States and Canada a judicial investigation has been under way for 2 years to determine how Space Research is evading the UN arms embargo against South Africa. It seems that Belgian laws have also been cleverly bent. The paper asks what has been done about it in Belgium since Minister of Foreign Affairs Henri Simonet declared on 2 October 1979 that he had transferred the case and its files to Minister of Justice Renaat van Elslande (CVP) and points out that the Action Committee Southern Africa in Louvain has an internationally documented file which indicates that Sabena guaranteed transportation of various parts of the weapons system to South Africa. It is rumored that there is indeed no judicial investigation with the assumption that there are

no grounds for it. On the other hand, the question was brought up last week whether the FRB munitions to Uruguay, which left Zeebrugge 2 weeks ago, come from the Hulsthout army depot. That is quite possible and we can do this when so-called exchange conventions are involved; for many years the army has been giving certain supplies to private arms dealers in exchange for new material of equal value. [Text] [Brussels KANCK in Dutch 9 Apr 80 p 25] 10319

COURT SENTENCES VMO MEMBERS--Attackers who raided the leftist Mechelen bookstore The Red Mole were last week sentenced by the Court of Corrections of that city after 2 months of preliminary detention. The bookstore was completely destroyed in the raid and the two salesmen were molested. The sentences ran from 6 months suspended imprisonment with deducation for time spent in preliminary detention to 1 year imprisonment of which 4 months are actually to be spent in prison. One of the sentenced persons, the majority is from Oostende, is an ex-Anada member. A total of seven persons were sentenced, all of them VMO members who had acted because of ideological reasons. However, nine persons took part in the attack; a minor was referred to a juvenile court and the ninth gang member has not yet been arrested. The brains behind the attack, a civil servant from Ellezelles, was sentenced to pay a large sum of money for damages to the victims, bookstore operators of the Flemish Library Center. [Text] [Brussels KNACK in Dutch 9 Apr 80 p 26] 10319

CVP LOSES POPULAR SUPPORT--The newspaper DE MORGEN revealed yesterday the existence of a political poll. Its result apparently confirms an investigation published recently by HET LAATSTE NIEUWS. As compared to the election results at the end of 1978 the CVP would be losing about 2 percent of its votes, whereas the SP would gain about 0.6 percent. In particular the liberals would be the biggest winners, especially in and around Brussels, where the losers would be the PSC and, to a certain extent, also the FDF. The latter would drop from more than 35 percent of the vote to 33.3 percent. The weekly POURQUOI PAS? published the results of a poll of the popularity of the most prominent Belgian politicians. CVP Chairman Leo Tindemans is for the time being still number one in Flanders, followed by CVP Prime Minister Wilfred Martens, SP chairman Karel van Miert, and PVV Chairman Willy De Clerq. Curiously enough, FDF Chairperson Antoinette Spaak is most popular in Walloon territory; she is followed by ex-PS chairman and Prime Minister Edmund Leburton, PS Chairman Andre Cools, and Prime Minister Martens. Tindemans is here lagging behind as ninth. PSC Chairman Paul vanden Boeynants is most popular in Brussels, second is Antoinette Spaak, as third is mentioned Economic Affairs Minister Willy Claes (SP), and as fourth Willy De Clercq with Tindemans as fifth. [Text] [Brussels KNACK in Dutch 9 Apr 80 p 26] 10319

CSO: 3105

BUDGET CRISIS GROWS, STATE INCOME DROPS

Ministry of Finance Report

Nicosia HAIKIN SESI in Turkish 1 May 80 p 1

[Article by Erten Kasimoglu]

[Text] According to the Ministry of Finance's revenue and tax office March 1980 report, KTFD [Turkish Federated State of Cyprus] monetary revenues have been falling rapidly.

According to the published report, while aid from the Republic of Turkey amounted to 18 million Turkish liras in March 1979, there was a 1-million-lira reduction in March of this year.

The report pointed out that average monthly local revenues for the 1980 fiscal year were estimated at 186,683,000 liras and noted that the actual figure has been 61 million liras, a 66-percent deficit.

The same report noted that, while domestic indebtedness totaled 2,305,000 liras in March 1979, it rose to 5 million liras as of March of this year.

Various observers have stressed that the rapid decline in state revenues and, to counter this, continual borrowing on the part of the government in order to meet expenses are accelerating economic and financial decay. They stated that, in addition to this, the possibility for small tradesmen and villagers to obtain credit is steadily declining.

April Figures Given

Nicosia HAIKIN SESI in Turkish 7 May 80 p 1

[Article by Erten Kasimoglu]

[Text] It has been announced that the 1980 fiscal year budget deficit has gradually reached the danger point.

According to information that has been received, a large percentage of the estimated revenues in the government budget for the month of April, as for the month of March, was not obtained.

Revenues foreseen for April were 40 million Turkish liras, but only 6 million liras were received.

Officials have drawn attention to the growing indebtedness and to the size of the deficit, which has not been seen to date, in the face of rapidly declining government revenues.

Debts, Notes

According to information that has been received in the meantime, the KTFD's debts and notes have reached 3 billion liras as a result of steadily falling revenues.

Various observers, who worry that the KTFD's economic crisis will grow even more serious in the days ahead, have pointed out that, because ordinary expenditures (consumer spending) are increasing excessively, inflation will be fanned to a very high degree.

11673
CSO: 4907

LABOR MINISTER PLEADS FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 14 May 80 p 1

[Text] The Minister of Labour and Social Insurance Mr. Emilios Theodoulou has made a new appeal for cooperation between the government, employers and employees and the preservation of industrial peace as an essential requisite for uninterrupted economic growth and social progress.

Mr Theodoulou said that the number of disputes referred to the Ministry during the past year reached "high levels" and that industrial relations went through "some crisis".

He urged both sides to show a sense of responsibility when collective agreements are coming up for renewal in vital sectors of the economy this year which is anticipated to be marked by a slow-down of economic growth.

The Minister made his remarks during a television interview concerning the development programme of his Ministry.

Mr Theodoulou said he hoped that the wage-related supplementary social insurance scheme could be launched before the end of this year, after it is processed by the Labour Advisory Board later this month and is submitted to the Council of Ministers for final approval.

Together with the wage-related scheme the Ministry is planning to introduce legislation regulating the function and operation of Provident Funds with a view to affording better protection for the interests of the working people.

The Minister referred to the setting up of the Industrial Training Authority which has the responsibility of assessing the manpower needs, determine priorities and see about training programmes to meet the anticipated manpower shortages.

Mr Theodoulou said the Ministry, after its survey in 1978 of manpower in the rural districts to pinpoint idle labour pockets, has now completed a study about under-employment in the agricultural sector.

Workshop

The study, he explained, could lead, through industrial training, to additional untapped manpower resources and to additional income for the farmer's family.

The Ministry is responsible for the Higher Technical Institute, the Hotel and Catering Institute, the Cyprus Productivity Centre and the Apprenticeship Scheme.

During the past year a new workshop has been built at the site of the Vocational Rehabilitation Centre for Disabled People where handicapped people are taught furniture making.

Another workshop for teaching handicapped people in the manufacture of travel goods is also planned, the Minister said.

Mr Theodoulou said that safety at work was one of the principal cares of his Ministry and he announced that with the aid of an ILO expert currently in Cyprus legislation is being prepared to amend the Factories and Workshops Legislation.

Moreover, the expert will assist in preparing legislation concerning work environment and notably pollution and noise and generally occupational hazards.

As a future measure, it was planned to introduce legislation to allow both employers and workers to be involved in dealing with questions of safety and health at the work site along the lines already operating in mines, quarries and voluntarily, in other big businesses.

The Minister also referred to his Ministry's care for nonunionised workers or workers of smaller unions who fail to strike a satisfactory bargain and he mentioned in this respect the amendment legislation last year for reduction of working hours for shop assistants and increase of the minimum wage and salary rates for clerical staff and salesmen.

CSO: 4920

BACKING FOR ASSOCIATION WITH EEC REPORTED

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 15 May 80 p 1

[Text] Any idea of abandoning the association of Cyprus with the Common Market and the ultimate aim of a customs union would be catastrophic, says Mr Antonis Pierides, the director general of the Cyprus Employers Federation.

Mr Pierides, a former Minister of Commerce and Industry, explains that an association agreement offers much greater advantages than a trade agreement, and unlike a trade agreement, the association offers stability.

The views of Mr Pierides, which reflect also the views of the Federation which stands for the Cyprus-EEC association, are contained in a letter in AGON newspaper in answer to a comment which had expressed favour for a trade agreement and re-orientation of the Cyprus export trade with less dependence on the EEC.

In a detailed analysis of the composition of Cyprus external trade, both export and import, Mr Pierides says that the Cyprus-EEC association should be tackled as one of the top priorities second only to the political issue, away from party or other prejudices.

"Our Customs Union with the Common Market alone would ensure the economic future of Cyprus in the long run", Mr Pierides says.

Other benefits likely to accrue for Cyprus from a closer association with the EEC would be the possibility of inflow of foreign capital and higher technology know-how that would help the upgrading of Cypriot industry, he states.

Defending the ultimate Customs Union, Mr Pierides says that this would be an immense asset for Cyprus with a basically agricultural economy.

It is only natural, he explains, that the EEC countries would seek to protect their own partners and Cyprus agricultural exports would find themselves barred or severely restricted in the Common Market without an

association agreement when Greece, Spain and Portugal, supplying the same products as Cyprus, become full members of the Community.

Mr Pierides dismisses the argument that Cyprus has been accorded less favourable terms under the association agreement than those enjoyed by other Mediterranean countries under a trade agreement. On the contrary, he says, the favourable treatment accorded to Cyprus products has solved, to a large extent, the problem created from the abolition of the Commonwealth preferential tariffs for Cypriot exports to the U.K.

At the same time, however he says that the EEC could and should show more understanding for Cypriot circumstances and problems in its approach to the current negotiations during the transitional period to the second stage of association.

In his analysis of figures, Mr Pierides shows that a re-orientation of Cyprus exports, especially of agricultural products, would be easier said than done, although he agrees that every effort should be made to increase and expand foreign outlets.

He points out that as regards trade with socialist countries Cyprus exports to the Eastern block in 1979 were almost to the same level as in 1972 which was only £8 million and represented only six per cent of total exports of the island.

Socialist countries, he says, produce similar items as Cyprus and for some of them, like potatoes, they are self sufficient, whilst manufactured food products, including wines and spirits, fetch in these countries rather low prices compared with costs and sometimes below costs.

As to exports to Arab countries, they show a marked increase from £3 million in 1972 to £57 millions in 1979.

However, most of the exports to Arab countries were manufactured goods and represent the drive after the invasion for export-orientation when Cyprus products ventured to markets which were not so strict in their demands about quality. But now they face increased competition from the Far East where labour costs are less.

On the other hand, exports to the Common Market went up by 134 per cent, the largest percentage increase of Cyprus exports to any of the other groups except for Arab destinations--the percentage rise of exports to the rest of the countries (other than EEC, Arab and socialists) being only 54 per cent.

In conclusion Mr Pierides says that only the EEC countries offer a stable, big and generally remunerative market for Cyprus products, chiefly for farming products but for the industrial output as well. At the same time Mr Pierides dispels as wrong the impression of disproportionate increase of imports from the Common Market, as against other origins.

Total imports into the island rose from £121 million in 1972 to £358 million in 1979 or an increase of 196 per cent. A breakdown, however, shows that imports from Arab countries rose by 350% (including higher volumes and prices for oil) from socialist countries by 218% and from the rest of the world by 242% whereas importations from the EEC countries rose by only 148 per cent.

CSO: 4920

FINANCE MINISTER DISCUSSES ECONOMIC SHORTFALLS

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 17 May 80 pp 1, 6

[Text] TFSC Minister of Economics and Finance Hakki Atun has made a statement on the condition of the Federated State's economy.

In a written statement he made yesterday following the recent upswing in publications on this topic, Atun stated that the TFSC budget, defense expenditures with production-oriented projects to boost employment and national revenue, as well as current and regular transfer expenditures that have been defrayed by mainland Turkish aid are to be met by local revenue resources.

Atun also stated that local revenues, which reached 48.1 million Turkish lira in 1974, rose to 1173.1 million Turkish lira in 1979. He said, "Obviously, local revenue occupies an important place in the budgets and for years it has displayed a developmental curve that cannot be underestimated. Moreover, when the economy's gross national product is taken as a base, it is clear that taxes on local revenue were around 15 to 20 percent of the gross national product."

Atun stated that it is inevitable that countries with developing economies feel in need of foreign aid in their development efforts. He went on, "In this regard, to achieve the goals envisioned in our development effort, the necessary aid (mainland Turkish aid) is provided for yearly in our budget in order to meet the needs for financing beyond local resources."

Atun noted that it is impossible to maintain that such aid increases inflationary pressures.

Atun said the following on indirect and direct taxes: "The portion of direct taxes within the local revenues envisioned in the budget had been conceived as 20.31 percent and indirect taxes as 33.31 percent. Realization, however, was 23.32 percent and 00.34 percent respectively. Moreover, in the tax systems of every country direct and indirect taxation are always side by side and in no country can one or the other of these taxes be given up. In addition, one must accept as a requisite of our economic structure that

the ratio of indirect taxation within general budgetary financing will become greater--paralleling, import volume for the year. This is so because our state displays in large measure the characteristics of an island economy and because a major portion of our needs are provided by imports.

At the end of his statement, Atun listed the major reasons for an inflation that prevailed throughout 1979:

(A) Price increases that particularly effected importation inputs as a result of the monetary unit's decreased worth and devaluation.

(B) The inability to create an [economic] balance based especially on tourism and, with respect to the foreign payments deficit, the inability to overcome the tourism and foreign exchange bottleneck because of the political and economic embargo against our state.

(C) The inability to persue an effective monetary policy for lack of a unit correlated with monetary operations.

(D) The fact that a high ratio of revenue is devoted both to expenditures generated by all sorts of social benefits being provided the state's citizenry--as required by the Social State mentality--and investments that must be made for the development effort.

(E) Price increases running parallel to the price hikes OPEC countries have placed on liquid petroleum.

(F) Wage increases stemming from labor contracts in state economic enterprises and institutions with working capital.

Our government is taking the necessary measures to ensure uniformity of wages in every field and of benefits accrued.

CSO: 4907

CAUSES OF TFSC ECONOMIC STAGNATION DISCUSSED

Nicosia OLAY in Turkish 28 Apr 80 pp 18-19

[Article by Ahmet C. Gazioglu; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics or all caps in boldface]

[Text] We ended our article last week with a promise to continue examining in detail the causes and cost of the economic instability which has persisted for years.

We have tried to reach some conclusions during the past week by continuing to talk with experts and people well versed in the subject and get their opinions. Our final impression is this: those who give direction to and manage our economy are not in harmony and lack a healthy coordination. Everybody speaks at once and there is no conductor to create form and harmony among these voices. And what is worse, almost everyone in an official or responsible position is convinced that his own view is right and that he knows best, and each one is suspicious of what the other says and does.

Within such squabbling, such mutual suspicion and disharmony, how can one expect the point which our economy has managed to reach to be anywhere but at the impasse of the present vicious circle, but the present instability and narrow straits?

The point we have reached is the best, most logical point that could be reached by the path we have taken, the erroneous policies and day-to-day decision-making that have been applied for years. When you set out with eyes closed and mind blank without looking at or taking any notice of the signposts showing that the road taken for years and still being insisted on is a dead-end road, what is left to do when you get to the end but complain and turn around? While it is possible to turn back from this point which we have reached in 5 years and come back to where we started and to find the right road with light at the end of it and set out on that road, we are seeing that we are entering another dead-end road all over again. And this distresses us, we are worried about it and we believe that the duty and responsibility to raise our voices in warning falls upon all of us individually and generally, upon labor unions and the realted professional organizations, and most of all upon our political parties.

Local Input Story

Article 21 of the "Decree on the Regulation and Oversight of Imports and Exports," published on 3 April, says:

"The ministry may permit exports from the TFSC [Turkish Federated State of Cyprus] to the Turkish Republic if the goods to be exported are in excess of the needs of the TFSC. However, in reference to industrial products to be exported, /it is mandatory that the minimum added value created in the TFSC be 40 percent and the local input (excluded from profits in the accounts) be 60 percent."/

Because Mr Denktas has kept alive the reverberations of his speech complaining about Turkey's interference in our economic affairs which was published in the Ankara newspaper, ADALET, we suspected and were afraid that this condition of /40 percent added value and 60 percent local input/, which hampers the sale of our local industrial products to the mainland, was imposed on us by Ankara and was accepted under duress. We have searched far and wide as to whether this suspicion and concern of ours is justified. We have argued the matter with sources on both sides. The conclusion we reached is this:

a. The local added value that Turkey wanted in the customs-free sale of our local industrial products to the mainland was 30 percent, as it was before, not 40 percent. Ankara did not request, in any way, either directly or through its representatives here, that the added value on industrial products to be exported to Turkey from the TFSC be raised to 40 percent; it did not even hint at such a thing.

b. Turkey did not request in any way that TFSC industrial products to be sold customs-free to the mainland be attached to a 60-percent local input proviso. This term was made up entirely by our technocrats here and is an artificial term which has no meaning outside of added value.

Therefore, to invent such a term in addition to /added value/, blocking local industry's exports to Turkey and instituting restrictions, has no other meaning than to sabotage local industrial initiative.

c. Local inputs are borne in mind in the computation of added value within the economic rules. Therefore, there is no need for a separate "local input" proviso. To set forth such a condition for TFSC industry is to inhibit exports to Turkey. It means being more royalist than the king. To assume a role more royalist than the king in this case, however, is completely unnecessary and a negative approach.

The counselor of the Trade and Industry Ministry, however, has the following theory on this:

"It is a mistake to consider the term 'local input' in the same sense as added value. Local input is different from added value. Nevertheless, there is an error in the wording of article 21. It should be:

"'...minimum added value of 40 percent /or/ local input of 60 percent.' However, this /or/ was printed by mistake as /and/ in the RESMI GAZETE. Correction of this error is in process. Thus an industrial product with 40 percent added value may be sold to Turkey."

But even if this error is corrected and 40 percent added value and 60 percent local input are not both set forth (together) as a combined condition, insisting on 40 percent added value for the customs-free sale of TFSC industrial products to Turkey will still be a hard road for business, in the view of the experts with whom we have been in touch.

TFSC's Export Surplus

It is stated in the 21st article that permission may be given for the sale to Turkey of a local industrial product if that product is in excess of local need, that is, if more is produced than the amount needed to meet local requirements.

This is what is happening here: since importation to the TFSC from any foreign country of goods produced by local industry will be permitted, it means that the Turkish sector's market will be filled with foreign import goods. It is an accepted fact that, because of the appetite of both our local people and visitors from Turkey for goods from foreign countries, everything from Europe will be much sought after and bought even if it is more expensive and thus the sale in our country of the same type of goods produced by local industry will be sharply reduced. This means that local industrial capacity, which meets local needs and is regulated so as to make some sales to Turkey, will automatically be paralyzed. That is, in order to protect present capacity, it will be necessary to realize a higher rate of sales of local industrial products to Turkey since the local market will be filled with European goods. This cannot be accomplished by adding further to the conditions for the sale to Turkey of local industrial products but will be possible by immediately removing the obstacle which was created by increasing the 30 percent added value imposed by Turkey.

Maintaining the present capacity of industrial production, not to mention raising production, depends solely on the opportunity of increased sales to Turkey. The consequences of cutting off this opportunity, reducing production, throwing a large portion of labor out of work and closing down factories will be in the fact that new initiatives and new thrusts in industry are nothing but a dream.

In a country lacking raw materials for its industry, what remedy is there besides importing these raw materials? Is it possible for a state which is just establishing its industry and, indeed, is just newly formed itself, to obtain suddenly an added value larger than 30 percent in the branches of industry it establishes, or is it that easy to attain 40 percent added value?

The industrialist whose chance to sell to Turkey an industrial product with 35 percent added value is taken away by his own government is abandoned, on the one hand, to competition with similar goods imported from Europe and, on the other, is deprived of the opportunity to find foreign exchange and bring in raw materials at reduced customs rates so as to help him produce goods more cheaply and is denied the support and encouragement of his government in this respect. And as if this were not enough, the condition of paying exchange rate differences to the treasury is introduced, thus throwing the full burden of the frequent losses in value of Turkish currency onto the shoulders of the industrialist.

Erroneous Arithmetic, Wrong Attitude

It is clearly seen that there is some erroneous arithmetic and a wrong attitude on the part of the officials charged with giving direction to the industrial and trade sector, which comprises a lifeline of our nation. We would like to point out the need for them to see this wrong attitude; to understand what the cost of what they are doing to the industrial sector will be and how they are tying up development and efforts to become a more advanced, more prosperous, self-sufficient society; and to take measures without delay to correct the mistake.

We have learned from the newspapers that the Council of State in Turkey made a decision just the other day to cancel the article envisaging taking the difference between old and new foreign exchange prices from the importer. Since we have also been using the practice lately of taking this sort of exchange rate difference from many importers and especially industrialists, it would hardly be too much to ask that this mistaken practice be stopped immediately and that the situations bordering on injustice be rectified. The authorities involved ought to have been able to see that this sort of practice was wrong and unfair to start with. Instead of this kind of unfair behavior and these disabling decisions, especially for industrial raw materials, they ought to have taken measures to increase production and lower costs. Every day, something is done wrong, some wrong decision is made. And we deplore the time we are wasting in correcting these mistakes.

We claim that we are taking the mother country as an example. But are we? We pretend not to see the good practices on the mainland and choose to emulate whatever is bad and wrong. Turkey has not left its own industrialists faced with the injustices and blows unfairly struck by the recent "Trade Program" in the TFSC. It has not avoided efforts to provide foreign exchange to the industrial sector; it has not put local industrial products in an unsupported and unprotected situation vis-a-vis similar foreign products. Actually, no nation would abandon its own local industry to such a sorrowful, such an unprotected situation, leaving it wandering in the open like this. Local industry is protected by the state in all nations, whether socialist or capitalist. Take the EEC nations for example. Despite their being among the wealthiest, most developed nations of the world,

they introduce measures from time to time to protect their own industrial products, banning, restricting or putting customs obstacles in the way of imports of similar products. But what do we do? We freely allow the import of luxury commodities, we impose customs duties on industrial inputs and raw materials as if they were luxury items, we do not provide payment and foreign exchange facilities for industrial inputs and, as if this were not enough, we create various obstacles with our own hands to deprive our own industrialists of the opportunity to sell our industrial products customs-free to Turkey.

It is time to say "stop" to these miscalculations, these wrong attitudes must be corrected without delay, facilities must be provided for those who are active in industry in our nation and opportunities must be created for new industrial thrusts.

8349
CSO: 4907

SOVIET DELEGATE DISCUSSES SOVIET LINE

Nicosia TA NEA in Greek 26 Apr 80 p 5

[Interview with Alexander (Dzassoknov), first deputy chairman of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, by Fifis Ioannou]

[Text] "We the Soviet people respect the repeated statements made by the government of the Republic of Cyprus, which are absolutely in line with the proclaimed nonaligned policy of your country, as well as the statement made by President of the Republic Kyprianou concerning a complete demilitarization of your island, because statements of this sort fully correspond to the well-intentioned interests of the Cypriot people as well as to the interests of peace and security in this area." The above was emphasized in a brief interview to TA NEA by Alexander (Dzassoknov), the first deputy chairman of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee.

When Mr (Dzassoknov) was invited to tell us how his country regards the more general problem of international detente and security, he said to us: "As you will appreciate and as is stated in the General Proclamation of the Malta Conference, which I had participated in at the end of last month, 'whereas the USSR has reduced unilaterally its armed presence in Europe, the United States announced its decision to transfer to and set up in the European sector the most advanced of intermediate-range missiles, and to undermine the efforts being made to reduce armaments.'"

Next the representative of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee give the following answers to our corresponding questions:

Question: Under the above circumstances, what duties are coming to face the progressive, peace-loving peoples of the Mediterranean, included among which are also the Cypriot people?

Answer: The same General Proclamation stresses that "it has become the most urgent duty of the peace-loving, progressive forces to consolidate a broad, powerful front for thwarting the plans of imperialism, for

abolishing the imperialist bases, and for transforming the Mediterranean into an area of peace, with its peoples the managers of their own national resources and the masters of their own destinies." And that proclamation adds: "The participants welcome the Soviet proposal for a withdrawal of the Soviet and American nuclear submarines and other naval forces from this area, thus converting the Mediterranean into a zone free of nuclear weapons, and they are resolved to put pressure on the United States and NATO and the other nuclear forces to accept and implement this proposal." And this further statement is added in the proclamation: "The immediate implementation of the Helsinki document on the Mediterranean is demanded by all the representatives. In connection with this, the AAPSO [Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization] has decided to cooperate with the Permanent Secretariat of the Mediterranean Conference of Socialist Parties to coordinate the efforts of the progressive forces in their anti-imperialist struggle and to promote economic, social, cultural, and military cooperation in the Mediterranean, so that this sea of conflicts can be turned into a zone of peace and cooperation."

Question: And for Cyprus more particularly?

Answer: I believe that imperialism will never give up its aspiration to convert Cyprus into a military stronghold in opposition to the national-liberation movements of the Middle East and for purposes of spying on the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community. This imperialist objective takes on an even greater significance in light of the notable realignments which have been seen in the Middle-East sector, which have imparted even greater dimensions to the strategic importance of your island.

Question: What have you to say about the Turkish occupation of Cyprus and its de facto partitioning?

Answer: I am glad that you have put this question to me, because I know how many efforts are being made by the international reactionary forces and their local servants to misrepresent the position of the Soviet Union. We as a people and as a government have repeatedly proclaimed and now proclaim the same thing which has been embodied in the General Proclamation of the Mediterranean Conference of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization, which states verbatim: "The conference expresses its solidarity with the struggle of the Cypriot people for an immediate termination of the military occupation, and the conference is against this artificial partitioning and in favor of an immediate implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations on a free, nonaligned, independent Cyprus having territorial integrity, and in favor of the dismantling of the military bases."

Question: What do you say about the efforts of the U. S. imperialist circles and the NATO militarists to undermine the approaching Madrid

Conference, at which an assessment will be made of the degree to which the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act have been implemented?

Answer: We are keeping an eye on these efforts, which had been seen also in the similar Belgrade Conference of 1978. But it is precisely this which makes it necessary for the progressive, peace-loving forces to intensify their own efforts to thwart the machinations of the imperialist circles--thus giving a new impetus to the supreme cause of all of mankind, which is peace, security, and cooperation among the peoples of Europe and of the whole world: We must never forget the enormous dangers which arise from the fact that today the United States has military bases in more than 100 countries in the world, while at the same time 500,000 troops, prepared to take military action at any given moment, are located thousands of miles away from the United States--so that there is no validity to any argument about an ostensible threat to the security of the United States.

And our interlocutor concluded with a certain degree of marked emphasis: "United and through coordinated action, all the peoples can thwart the imperialist plans and can put an end to the presence of the warmongering bases in their areas. I hope that the International Cooperation Center which was set up in Malta and the International Information Center which was established in Cyprus under the chairmanship of Dr Lyssaridis will make significant contributions in this direction. For you in particular, the Mediterranean ought to be released from the hegemony of the United States and turned into an area of peace and progress."

12114
CSO: 4908

BANK OF CYPRUS CHAIRMAN REPORTS ON ECONOMY

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 7 May 80 p 1

[Text] The Cyprus Government should tackle the problem of the "war debts" in a way ensuring an equitable distribution of the financial burden, the Chairman of the Bank of Cyprus group Mr G. Christofides said yesterday.

Mr Christofides was speaking at a press conference yesterday on the eve of the annual general conference of the Bank of Cyprus (Holdings) Ltd. which takes place at the Hilton today when a dividend of 10 per cent per share will be proposed.

The Chairman said that the group's total profits for the year rose from £1.5 million in 1978 to £2.3 million in 1979.

Out of this the Bank of Cyprus together with its wholly owned Mortgage Bank accounted for £1.17m. as against only £989,689 in 1978.

The General Insurance Company had a profit of £148,506, and the Finance Corporation £234,442.

The London operating group, Bank of Cyprus (London) Ltd. and its affiliates trebeled their profit of £225,940 in 1978 to £753,067 in 1979.

Sound basis

The Chairman attributed this to three main reasons: The return to a sound basis of operations after the troubles of 1974/76, the higher interest rates which prevailed in the London market, and the release of retentions that had been made for doubtful debts.

On the question of interest rates the Chairman pointed out that it was time for Cyprus to adjust its interest rates and he hoped that the bill before the House of Representatives empowering the government to fix rates from time to time--now pegged at 9%--will be soon passed.

Mr Christofides was assisted at the press conference by the Vice Chairman of the Bank Mr Solon Triantafyllides, and Board Member Mr Takis Pantzaris,

the Bank's Governor Mr A. Patsalides (former Minister of Finance) and the General Manager of the Bank of Cyprus (Holdings) Mr Evdokimos Xenophontos.

It was stated during the conference that had the interest rates been adjusted it would be an incentive for more money to be transferred to Cyprus from the U.K. after the freeing of the movement of foreign exchange by the Thatcher government.

National angle

Mr Christofides dwelt on the question of what is called the "war debts", debts due by displaced persons and said that the government should tackle the matter as speedily as possible and in a way that would make a more equitable distribution of the burden.

It was believed, he said, that the matter should be approached from a national angle and not be left to a few creditors alone to bear the burden. Moreover certain criteria should be established as to when such debts are recoverable instead of a blanket treatment.

The Bank of Cyprus believed that it would be a step in the right direction to encourage the formation of public companies and this could be done both with incentives for savings and incentives for investment.

It was mentioned in this respect that the Banks 9,991,866 shares are owned by 5,319 individual shareholders and 243 companies, foundations or groups but no single shareholding exceeds 2 (two) per cent of the total.

In a survey of the Cyprus economic scene the Chairman referred to the targeted growth of 5 per cent which compares favourably with that of several other countries, but whether it could be maintained or would be further reduced would depend on the effectiveness of the measures and the outcome of the efforts for improved productivity.

The Bank's lending policies were streamlined with government directives about priorities, and Bank's advanced had increased by 25 per cent as regards investment in the industrial sector and by 29 per cent in the tourist sector, Mr Christofides said.

CSO: 4920

BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON BANK OF CYPRUS GOVERNOR

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 4 May 80 pp 1,2

[Article by John Neves]

[Text] The archetypal technocrat has now been Governor of the Bank of Cyprus for three months. He is finding the change from the Ministry of Finance refreshing, but the difference in working habits is not all that striking.

Life is that much quieter--an unusual impression, one would think, as he has merely been lifted from one pinnacle of Cypriot economic life to another. But it is the impression of an unusually hard-working and gifted careerist, to whom heavy financial responsibilities are the stuff of life.

He had been Minister of Finance for 11 and 1/2 years, and since prudence is at the core of a successful financial administrator, especially one who had been at the helm of the economy during the years of the "economic miracle", he decided last November that his health demanded that he hand over to some one else. The "economic miracle" of course was still in full swing, when he left, with Cyprus a lonely exception of a Europe of chronic depression and unemployment.

Prudence and hard work seem to be the key both to his successful management of the state's finances and to his own career. In both cases it must be said that the materials to hand were of excellent quality. But they could not have been fashioned to such achievements without endless midnight oil and a naturally circumspect mind.

Andreas Patsalides was born at Tseri, 6 miles from Nicosia, in September 1922. It was a family of five children, his father being a police officer, whose career took him to Kyrenia, Famagusta and other places on the island. The varied postings of the head of the family meant that special arrangements had to be made for young Andreas' schooling. True, he frequented the village elementary school in Tseri for an undisturbed 7 years. But the time came for him to begin the gymnasium, and now he was sent to stay with relatives in Limassol to attend school there.

Throughout his life he exploited his ability for mathemtatics, and this was the direction he took when he obtained his School Leaving Certificate in 1941. The war made it impossible for him to go abroad to study. Andreas looked for a job in Cyprus and took and passed the Civil Service exams. After two or three years in various government departments as a clerical officer, he was given responsibility for statistical work in the Ministry of Labour.

Nothing was handed to young Andreas on a plate. It took him till 1949 to be promoted to the administrative service, a period of eight years during which he was using his spare time to study economics and statistics. However, joining the administrative service marked a watershed in his life.

He served for some years as District Administrator in Famagusta and then in 1952 joined the Colonial Secretariat in Nicosia. Meanwhile he had been continuing his studies in economics and had passed several exams in the subject. In 1956 he won a scholarship to the London School of Economics, and for th next three years he was in London working for the first time full-time at his leisure pursuit. The result was a good honours degree in economics and, when he returned to Cyprus, a leg-up in the government service.

He was posted to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and given responsibility for industrial development. Three years later he was asked to organise the Planning Bureau, of which he was soon appointed Director-General.

He had arrived by now at a position of considerable overall power in directing the Cyprus economy, but he was by nature at least as much an academic as a civil servant, and he did not allow his new responsibilities to smother his interest in economics as a subject of study.

It was not long before he took a year's leave of the Planning Bureau to do a post-graduate degree in development economics at Harvard.

In 1968 President Makarios asked this academically inclined civil servant to become Minister of Finance. It was a step into politics that he succeeded in keeping as unpolitical, as technocratic, as possible. No one pressed him to take out membership of a party, nor did he join one either then or at any time during his long tenure of high office.

The prospect was attractive: the Cypriot economy had been expanding steadily since independence, and the task awaiting the new Minister was one of keeping it on course, stimulating it to continue growing without overheating, without inducing inflation, and without running up unmanageable debts. His success in doing this was his achievement over 11 years at the Ministry.

The only hiatus in the steady growth of the Cyprus economy under Patsalides' management was the inevitable one caused by the Turkish invasion of 1974. And here the blow sustained by the economy is a good deal less remarkable, perhaps, than the extraordinary recovery it made from it. Unemployment has

been tackled so effectively that there is now something of an acute shortage of labour. In 1975 the tourists stayed away from Cyprus, curtailed of 40% of its territory, and the outlook seemed desperate. Today growing has picked up to the extent where dampers are needed to prevent inflation getting out of hand in an economy in which demand has hit the ceiling.

Patsalides' tenure of office as Minister of Finance saw an unprecedented expansion of the social service , financed by the country's steady prosperity. It was also of course a time of permanently negative trade figures, but these have been cancelled out by foreign exchange accruing from tourism, remittances from Cypriots abroad, and other sources--a situation which obtains as much now (pace the mildly negative balance of payments last year) as before 1974.

The Director-General of the Planning Bureau reported direct to the Minister, and Patsalides saw to it that priority was given to infrastructure projects, because the development of the rest of the economy waited on these and to other projects which increased the productive capacity of the Island. Industrial estates, ports, the airport, and road projects, dams and irrigation were some of the projects to which priority was given.

In spite of the enormous cost of financing the settlement of the refugees after the invasion, the debt servicing ratio in Cyprus remianed low, thanks to the country's growth rate.

In November 1974 Andreas Patsalides decided that he had carried the burden of steering the Cypriot economy for long enough. He was feeling the strain, and he wanted to pursue his speciality, development economics, in calmer waters.

He had always considered the private sector as making as important and dynamic contribution to development, and he saw the banks as playing a key role in channelling funds into the private sector's development projects. It was no great change of working habits which awaited him when he became Governor of the Bank of Cyprus last November. He continued to work as economist and administrator.

CSO: 4920

FIRST LEG OF WATER PROJECT NEAR COMPLETION

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 1 May 80 p 1

[Text] The first leg of the Agios Khariton-Akdogan Group Village Water Project, which will provide ample water to the central Messoria region, an area that has suffered, in particular, a drinking-water shortage for years, will be completed in June. Project applications section head and chief engineer Olgun Necat Pasalar gave a statement to the press and said that the initial studies dealing with the project were begun 2 years ago and that, now, work has reached the final stage. He went on:

"The exploratory well in the village of Agios Khariton produces 100 cubic meters per hour. A 100,000-gallon storage depot was constructed alongside the well, and then three pressure valves were installed to control the flow of water. The water to be transported from the depot will flow to Messoria via a 60-kilometer-long pipeline that has now been laid."

First Leg

Pasalar explained that the first leg of the project, which will be completed in June, will include the villages of Agios Khariton, Akova, Dortyol, Korkuteli, and Pirhan. The second leg will be put into operation in 1981 and will cover the villages of Agios Khariton, Akdogan, Melousia, Erdemli, and Yigitler. He noted that the total cost of the project will be 88 million Turkish liras and that, when the project is completed, the Messoria region, which has had to be content with dry farming to date, will have the opportunity to engage in irrigated farming. Pasalar reported that a 30,000-gallon storage tower is being constructed in the village of Akova in order to distribute water in the region. Working under Pasalar on this large project are three engineers, three mechanics, 10 technicians, and 40 laborers.

11673
CSO: 4907

GREEK CYPRIOTS ACCUSED OF HOARDING WATER

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 7 May 80 p 1

[Text] The drinking-water shortage of Famagusta residents has reached unbearable limits because of the various ploys of the Greek Cypriot leaders. Drinking water, which had been supplied to the Famagusta region at varying intervals for a long time, is not being delivered now by Greek Cypriot leaders, who use the pretext that repairs are being made on pipelines.

New Tactic

A statement that was released reads:

"Greek Cypriot leaders, who are increasing their pressure as the summer months begin, are readying various games so as not to deliver the 3,500 tons of drinking water that are needed in the Famagusta region. Despite the fact that, during talks held under the auspices of the peace force, it was decided to give the Famagusta region 2,500 tons of drinking water immediately and 3,000 tons later, the Greek Cypriots' new tactic today is to release less than these amounts.

Policy Being Determined

"Taking advantage of the fact that the Famagusta region has no drinking water, the Greek Cypriot leaders continue to apply pressure to the Turkish Cypriot side and to engage in efforts to deprive the people of the region of drinking water at a time when hot weather has begun. This has awakened loathing and anger within the Turkish Cypriot community. In the face of this type of threat and blackmail employed by the Greek Cypriots at every opportunity, work to establish a Turkish Cypriot policy has been accelerated."

11673
CSO: 4907

FIGHTERS PAID RETIREMENT, COMPENSATION

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 4 May 80 p 1

[Text] Minister of Finance Hakki Atun has announced that the freedom fighters' compensation law bill was approved at the last Council of Ministers' meeting and has been submitted to the federal assembly. Atun gave information related to the bill that he believes will pass out of the budgetary and planning committee and be submitted to the general council and that he feels must become law and be put into effect within a short time. He said:

"As is known, freedom fighters who were public employees and a portion of those who were on contract gained various rights through the Retirement Law when freedom fighter services were considered from the standpoint of retirement. As for the large number of freedom fighters other than these, it has been deemed necessary to ensure them similar rights. In this way, those who gave their sweat and blood for years to defend the country and to serve our national cause, those who set aside for years their professions, their work to become freedom fighters will be honored and wished well by being paid for having all their other rights wrested away. The law bill, which was drafted with the constant consultation of the Freedom Fighters' Association Administrative Council and which was approved by the Council of Ministers, has concerned our people for a long period of time. Under the major guidelines of this law bill, which we will work to pass through the federal assembly in the shortest time possible, those who have served as freedom fighters for over 10 years will be paid a retiree's salary in the form of a monthly stipend. Those who have served less than 10 years will be given a lump payment calculated by the number of years served, and their social insurance premiums will be paid by the state."

Other Topics

Atun reported that compensation to be paid to our freedom fighters takes into account the annual resources of the state and will be paid to the majority within a period that will not exceed 5 years. He said that he believes that the restrictions included within the framework of the law will satisfy our freedom fighters. Atun reported that more detailed

announcements on this topic will be forthcoming within the week and gave information on other decisions reached at the last Council of Ministers' meeting. In addition to a number of issues on the agenda, the law bill to amend Section 113 (32/75) of the Corporations Law and the limited corporations law bill were discussed and approved. Several legal gaps were eliminated, and fees for registering corporations and for other procedures were altered to meet current conditions. In this way, obstacles related to recording procedures for foreign companies which were registered in the north prior to 1974 have been eliminated and necessary legal restrictions have been set. In addition to this, changes have been made in health service fees and in rules dealing with civilian aeronautics so that fees collected by the state have been changed to reflect present-day conditions.

To Become Effective This Year

Minister of Finance Atun was asked when the rights proposed to be acknowledged former freedom fighters will become effective. He replied by saying:

"They will be put into effect in 1980. In order to do so within the year, a special appropriation of 50 million Turkish liras has been inserted in our budget."

11673
CSO: 4907

INCREASE IN NUMBER OF RETIREMENTS UPSET BUDGET

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 15 May 80 pp 1, 6

[Text] The number of those who retired rose 506 percent while pensions paid to retirees were up 2534 percent over the last six years in the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. While 4,840,000 Turkish liras were allocated from the state budget in 1973, this figure reached 127,480,000 Turkish liras last year.

Although a total 306 retired in 1973--146 police, 70 teachers, and 90 government employees--this figure rose to 1885 in 1979 with the impact of the law that granted retirement rights to young public servants. According to statistical data published by the Director's Office of the State Planning Organization's Statistics and Research Department, the increase in the number of retired has caused a significant rise in pensions included within the budget's social transfers allocation.

The highest yearly percentage increase in the number of retired public servants in the period between 1973 and 1979 occured in 1978 with a rise of 117.3 percent. The most important influence on such a high percentage increase was the initiative in 1978 to legally change some benefits granted public servants in the Retirement Law. Public servants who did not want to lose the benefits they had gained should the changes be put into effect, retired en masse in 1978. According to official data, while the average yearly number that retired between 1973 and 1977 was 119, this figure reached 920 in 1978. With the broad limitation placed on granted benefits as the result of changes in certain provisions of the Retirement Law in 1979, there was a significant slowdown and decrease in the number of retiring public servants relative to the previous year. Accordingly, 115 public servants retired in 1979.

Of those total 1855 who retired over the last six years, 63.13 percent were government employees, 25.12 percent were police, and 11.75 percent were teachers. A vast majority of those who retired particularly from government and the police were "young and 3-5 year public servants" who took advantage of benefits granted by the Retirement Law. The number of police and teachers who retired between 1973 and 1979 generally did not show an excessive fluctuation. Whereas there was a major rise in the number of government

employees who retired after 1975 and a significant fluctuation in 1978. While the number of government employees who retired in 1978 totaled 33, there were 70 police and 48 teachers who retired. The reason for a large portion of those retirements was the age of retirement falling in 1978.

Economic circles in Nicosia, where Northern Cyprus News Agency reporters sought their views, said, "The generation of young retirees has caused negative conditions with respect to communal development," these circles maintained, "The Retirement Law is a law that was passed without regard for the community's future. The rapid increase of the retirement and pension ratios in our country--which cannot attain the level of development desired, cannot increase exports, and which has tied more than 50 percent of its budget financing to loans and foreign resources--is such that it will create significant drawbacks and bottlenecks for the TFSC's future."

These economic circles added, "In our country, whose resources are rather scarce and whose means of generating revenue are few under present conditions, the most negative impact of retirement pensions and bonuses is on our development. These sorts of expenditures--which increase our routine expenditures--greatly limit the transfer of resources to investments beneficial to the country's people. Above all, if one considers that budget revenues are being secured at somewhat deteriorating levels and that budgetary excesses increase markedly every year, the drawbacks both to creating a cadre of "young retirees" and to increasing these types of routine expenditures become clear.

CSO: 4907

BRIEFS

BULGARIAN PATRIARCH VISIT--Patriarch of Bulgaria Maximos is arriving in Cyprus this afternoon for a 5-day visit, following an invitation by the Church of Cyprus. The patriarch of Bulgaria will be greeted at the airport by Archbishop Khrysostomos, the members of the Holy Synod, a representative of the government, and the Bulgarian envoy to Cyprus. Patriarch Maximos will be accompanied by the metropolitan of Stara Zagora, Pangratios; the metropolitan of Lovech, Grigorios; the archdeacon Vasileios Velianof; and the theologian-interpreter Ivan Zielef. And upon his arrival, the Order of Wayfarers of Love from the bishopric of Kition will render honors. The Bulgarian patriarch, along with the prelates who are accompanying him, will coofficiate with Archbishop Khrysostomos and the other members of the Holy Synod at the Church of Our Lady of Pallouriotissa this coming Sunday. [Text] [Nicosia TA NEA in Greek 25 Apr 80 p 3] 12114

CSO: 4908

RADICAL LIBERALS, ONCE KNOWN FOR CONSISTENCY, VACILLATE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Apr 80 p 11

[Comentary by Monitor: "A Resounding 'Maybe'"]

> [Text] Up until 1966 the Radical Liberal Party steered a straight course--port of the bourgeois and starboard of the Social Democrats. Nowadays the course steered by Horup's old party is more difficult to chart and maintain.

"It was Viggo Horup's bold idea that in politics people should be divided according to their opinions and not according to personal interests. This attitude has determined the policy for the Radical Liberal Party, but it has also limited it. In times when conflicts of interest threaten to take over in society, the Radical Liberal Party can get caught in the gears, but we do have the ability to serve as arbitrators between the two sides, when such is the case."

This was how the Radical Liberal Party's official history summarized the character of the party at the 50-year jubilee celebration in 1955.

1980 is another jubilee year. In 1980 Viggo Horup became a monument--in the Rosenborg Gardens. He is talked about as befits a monument. His imposing figure can invariably spark a debate. He lives on in statue form just as his editorials in POLITIKEN lived and sparkled in words and ideas in his own time. But the party of which he was the post mortem father, which is supposed to be the party of radical opinions, is it alive? Or has it stiffened in its posture, just like Horup? And has the posture become the one which a person assumes when he supports the policy of "a resounding 'maybe,'" as one sarcastic soul once characterized proponents of the party's most radical efforts?

After the 1977 election researchers from Copenhagen and Aarhus universities studied the reasons behind the voters' choices in the election. That 1977 election was the worst on record for the Radical Liberals, but for that

reason it is well-suited for demonstrating who left the party in its hour of greatest need as well as who were--and are--the party's core members.

In the election the party received 3.6 percent of the votes, representing a generous 113,000 persons. Of these, only 54 percent had no doubts concerning what they should vote for. The rest wavered between other possibilities. That the above-mentioned portion of voters was no larger is emphasized by the fact that the study attempted also to pinpoint which voters had cast their votes out of strong party allegiance or because they felt in agreement with Radical Liberal Party ideology. Fifty-five percent of the radical voters fitted into these two latter categories. There is, as well, hardly any doubt that there were only some 60,000 persons in Denmark in 1977 who considered themselves radical in the sense represented by Horup himself, by the party's history and the party's platform. These were the people who supported the party's statement of social liberalism as it was formulated in the 1955 platform: "We will defend moral, political and personal freedom. We will fight the misuse of power by organizations and monopolies, and we will secure ecnomic freedom within boundaries which are set with the common good in mind."

A journalist with a collector's mania for pithy political sayings would be reminded in this case of the leftist politician Jens Peter Jensen's characterization of the radicals: "Radicals are like cows' tails: they grow downwards, but they keep the flies away." The 60,000 social liberals who still remained in 1977 as in themselves the proof that the Radical Liberal Party has grown downwards through the years. Besides, the radicals of 1977 had--on an equal level with the Social Democrats and the Conservatives--an unfavorable age ratio, which all by itself would have led to a decline: more old voters than young ones.

Every now and then some Radical Liberal succeeds in blowing some life into the election statistics. Hilmar Baunsgaard blew hard in the sixties, enough to fill a balloon which probably made Horup turn over in his grave, but which added to the constituents. But the color of Baunsgaard's balloon was never radical, and the air leaked out of it quickly. Since then, others have attempted the same thing, with different balloons. "Revolution in our Midst" was a neo-radical balloon. But it turned out to be a helium balloon: it had no natural tendency to stay down to earth.

It is a trait of radical politics in the last few years that even though the party in the period from its founding in 1905 up until 1966 stood for a more consistent (even in the trivial details) platform than probably any other Danish party, nowadays the radical ship is having trouble steering a straight course. It is the wind which is determining the course now, and the crew doesn't agree among themselves where favorable winds are to be found. Barnhard Baunsgaard believes that the issue of the individual, particularly the citizen persecuted by the "system," might yield a good wind. Tage Draebye and his friends have misunderstood the significance of the "green wave." Green waves can supply suitable velocity on land,

but they are not necessarily good to ride on at sea. All in all, there are many opinions about where the course should be charted, and the captain stands on the bridge trying to keep the crew from open mutiny while he hunts for his pass.

For the compass has gotten lost. Up until 1966 the Radical Liberals had a dependable compass. Port of the bourgeois and starboard of the Social Democrats was the course which was faithfully maintained and charted with that compass. It was a good course, easy to keep to. But when the Socialist People's Party popped up as a factor in the parliament and the Social Democrats altered their course, things began to go badly. The Radical Liberal ship started to vacillate. Since then it has gone from bad to worse. New parties, new relationships, cooperation between the Social Democrats and the Liberals over the Radicals' heads, are some examples of how the seas got so rought that the compass was swept overboard.

This is the background for the Social Democrats' recent attack on the Radical Liberals by means of the loud-voiced Minister of Labor. But, as in other situations, the minister misses his aim when he shoots at the radical politicians as individuals. Individuals really don't matter, even when rumor has it that he, the Social Democrats and the Folketing must deal with a Radical Liberal Party which is no longer dominated by socially liberal voters, even though it is supposed to be the party of those of socially liberal opinions. Horup's distinction between opinions and interests has fallen apart. The Radical Liberal Party today encompasses a wide range of opinions, most of them unreconcilable.

In this jubilee year, then, there is no great hope left that the party will be able to "serve as an arbitrator between two sides when it is necessary." There is certainly no hope that the proceedings for the coming weeks concerning a total economic plan will be able to keep the flies away.

9584
CSO: 3106

PRO-PRC ORGAN DESCRIBES DANISH PEACE ORGANIZATIONS

Copenhagen ARBEJDERAVISEN in Danish 2-15 Apr 80 pp 8, 9

[Text] A short description of the Danish peace movement is printed below. Some organizations have not been included. For instance, we have left out the political parties and their youth organizations, as well as the labor unions, which are connected with the peace movement. But we have included the most significant actual peace organizations and movements which are active today. We have dealt with the Cooperative Committee for Peace and Security in the most detail, partially because it understands itself to be an umbrella organization for the entire peace movement, and partially because we consider it the most significant agent to misuse the population's widespread desire for peace, and because in connection with the latter it has been the arena for fundamental disagreements within the Danish peace movement.

We will later print a follow-up article with more information about the Soviets' international net of "peace" organizations. Read also our evaluation of the situation in the peace movement!

No More War

This organization was organized in 1926 as an offshoot of the Danish Peace and People's Federation Association, which had been organized in 1871. This original organization is now called the UN Federation.

The main thrust of No More War's policy is, to put it briefly, against all war, whether it be war of aggression, defensive war or civil war. It is a pacifist organization which has absorbed movements of conscientious objectors, etc. Internationally No More War is affiliated with War Resisters International, which is particularly strong in England and which attracts anarchistic groups, etc.

Lost Members During the Vietnam War

No More War has approximately 425 members now, but it had 1200 in 1931, and 2000-3000 until the mid-sixties. The organization has absorbed movements of conscientious objectors from parties such as the Justice Party and the Liberals, and partially from the Social Democrats and the Socialist People's Party. The decline in membership can be attributed partially to the revolutionary boom of the sixties, including the influence of the Vietnam war, etc., which affected the organization as follows: the more passive members could not go along with the involvement of the activist members in leftist activities and therefore withdrew. Also, some of the activist members veered so far towards the left that they began to distinguish between justified and unjustified war, and they left the organization for this reason.

Today the organization accommodates political opinions from the right wing of the Socialist People's Party to the left wing of the Justice Party. They are generally pacifist, but pro-Soviet attitudes can be found as well. The organization puts out the newsletter NOT BY FORCE, which appears 7 to 10 times a year. Besides this, the organization has no other activities, except for joint ones with other organizations, and demonstrations.

No More War has expressed disapproval of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

The Reconciliation League

The Reconciliation League was founded in 1913 by clergymen, and until 1974 was called the Christian Peace League. Today it has 150 members. As the name indicates, this is a Christian pacifist organization, but besides that the League is a kind of combination of pacifist philosophy and ecology. Thus the Reconciliation League was involved in founding the OOA, and Sigfred Christiansen of the OOA was formerly a member of the Reconciliation League.

The Reconciliation League's international organization is called the International Fellowship of Reconciliation and promotes a policy based on brotherhood and an opposition to oppression, exploitation and injustice. A ban against non-Christian members was lifted in 1973. The Reconciliation League has worked together with No More War on the newsletter NOT BY FORCE, etc., but the cooperation between the two groups came to an end in the last part of 1979. Since then, the League's most significant activity has been to support the new newsletter DEFENSE, which is critical of military action.

International League for Peace and Freedom

This organization was originally a pacifist organization for women only, but membership was later opened to men as well, even though in actuality most of the present members are women. Internationally, there are still many countries where only women may belong to the organization.

The organization is neutral as regards party politics, but includes a sizeable amount of Socialist People's Party members, etc. It has expressed disapproval of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The UN Federation

This is a nonpartisan organization whose goal is to strengthen international cooperation and international mutual understanding. It is, therefore, not purely a peace organization. It is affiliated internationally with two organizations, the World Federation United Nations Association and the World Association of World Federalists, of which the latter holds quite radical ideas about the formation of a one-world party, the dissolution of the individual nations, and the development of the United Nations into a world government. The UN Federation here in Denmark would also like to see the UN evolve into a world authority.

The organization incudes both indiv'dual and group memberships, and at present has approximately 2000 individual members and 90 group memberships. The latter group includes labor unions, special interest groups, etc., as well as a group from the Foketing with representatives from the various parties. The Federation puts out the newsletter UN ORIENTATION. The UN Federation has pulled out of the Cooperative Committee for Peace and Security in protest against the Committee's lack of protest against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Cooperative Committee for Peace and Security

According to its own by-laws, the Cooperative Committee brings together "Danish organizations for the purpose of wodespread cooperation towards de-escalation, security, and disarmament." Its goals are "a) facilitating cooperation between organizations and individuals who are involved with issues of peace and security, and b) working to increase the public understanding of peace and security issues."

Besides this, the by-laws mention "a) Facilitation of contact between Danish organizations and the Peaceful Powers' International Contact Forum in Helsinki. b) Establishment of contact with national and international organizations, including the World Peace Council, in Helsinki, and the International Committee for European Security and Cooperation, in Brussels."

Especially the last quotation--having to do with the international connections--is significant. The Cooperative Committee was founded in February 1974 as a Danish contact organization for a world peace movement based on the European Security Conference in Helsinki. The Helsinki meeting, in its turn, had its source in a world peace conference in Moscow in 1973; tracing these threads back reveals who is the real architect behind the Cooperative Committee, namely, the Soviets.

Umbrella Organization

The Committee is an umbrella organization which includes approximately 40 organizations. Representatives from these make up the Committee's Representative Council, which is its highest authority. The Representative Council elects a steering committee, which in its turn appoints a working committee and a secretariat. Besides this, the Committee has a presiding committee staffed by well-known names, but they are not part of the decision-making structure. There are also local committees, and activists have the opportunity on an individual basis to join special committees, but these committees are not involved in any democratic decision-making structure, and proposals suggesting more power for the local committees were voted down by a meeting of the Representative Council in February. The Committee is an umbrella organization.

Consists of Communist-controlled Organizations

Until recently the Committee involved all of the above-mentioned organizations. In addition to them a number of others should be mentioned, for example the Catholic Workers' Action Committee and the Common Council of Danish Youth, which in its turn is an umbrella organization for a long list of youth organizations, representing a total of 1.3 million members. But besides this, the Cooperative Committee includes the Danish Communist Party, the Danish Communist Union and the Democratic Women's League of Denmark, which is a front organization for the Danish Communist Party, as well as groups which are sympathetic to the Soviet Union and East Germany and numerous specialist groups and student organizations of which the majority are controlled by the Danish Communist Party.

Combining the above-mentioned groups, then, the Cooperative Committee is thus partially composed of pro-Soviet groups and partially of pacifist-oriented ones. And within this combination of groups, it is the Danish Communist Party which totally controls the Committee. The Danish Communist Party thus has power over the steering committee, the working committee and the secretariat. And besides being a coordinating organization representing the many organizations, the Committee has developed into an independent organization, in which the steering committee has taken the initiative to join campaigns against the neutron bomb, against the development of the new NATO missiles, etc.

The Committee's real political function has been as a tool for the Soviets to unite our Danish pro-Soviet and pacifist-oriented groups into an offensive against the USA, NATO and a Danish arms program. It has not been consistent in working for peace and against all aggression. This was revealed by the fact that it has become impossible in the Committee to raise criticism against the Soviets, most recently in connection with Afghanistan.

Uffe Torm Resigns

It happened recently that Uffe Torm, who as a representative of International Cooperation sat on the Cooperative Committee's presiding committee, withdrew from his post. In a press release to the CHRISTIAN DAILY on 22 January, he explained clearly that this action was due to the lack of disapproval of the invasion of Afghanistan, which he himself disapproved of at that time. He wrote, among other things: "In connection with this situation, it is amazing that the Cooperative Council for Peace and Security has found no occasion to express clear and unequivocal disapproval of the Soviet invasion. In their published statement, the Committee's working committee was content with 'expressing concern' about the heightened antagonism between the superpowers, and content merely to 'ascertain' that numerous circumstances, including the Soviet Union's military 'interference' in Afghanistan has contributed towards heightening that antagonism.

"This weak and evasive stance incredibly grew no less so even after the Cooperative Committee, in connection with Denmark's security and defense policy, has expressed opposition to the establishment of foreign bases in other countries."

Representative Council Meeting in February

This dissatisfaction with the Cooperative Committee's one-sided criticism of the armament of the Western powers continued at the Committee's Representative Council meeting 16 and 17 February. Niels Tofte, of the Common Council of Danish Youth, expressed some criticism, but did not get far with it, and his organization later withdrew from the Cooperative Committee. He himself had a seat on the presiding committee of the Committee, but he has now resigned. The group Radical Youth expressed some criticism, but an official statement of criticism was not adopted, but merely sent around to the other member organizations. Also, No More War and the International League for Peace expressed criticism. Also, the UN Federation had previously withdrawn from the Cooperative Committee in protest.

The present secretary of Radical Youth, and presiding committee member, Holger Villumsen, presented a proposal for a resolution: "We are particularly concerned about the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, which has given the USA cause to mobilize the western hemisphere in a policy of cold war, which absolutely does not encourage disarmament efforts.

"The Cooperative Committee denounces the aggression of the Soviet Union and urges the Soviet Union to promptly take its troops home..."

Even though the last sentence, after protest, was withdrawn by Villumsen himself, the entire resolution was abruptly rejected. Villumsen has resigned as a member of the presiding committee.

Anti-NATO, Pro-Soviet

Simultaneously to the Cooperative Committee's Representative Council's being forbidden a critical voice relative to the Soviets, there were few problems involved in passing a resolution which was directed against the NATO powers, which even expressed the following: "Navigable channels to the Baltic Sea must be held open to the ships of all nations in agreement with international law."

The actual political effect of this resolution is that Denmark will not be allowed to keep its own channels free from the Soviet Union's huge Baltic fleet. It will be free to sail to southern Norway and into the Atlantic.

There was also no problem involved in getting a suggestion by Villum Hansen accepted which includes the following statement:

"The Cooperative Committee rejects the cold-war attitude which sees social and national conflicts in the Third World as a result of Soviet intervention."

One could hardly give the Soviet Union a better blank check!

Thus the Cooperative Committee's pro-Soviet line is becoming more and more obvious, but not without difficulties among its member organizations, however.

No to Nuclear Weapons

In November 1979 the novelist Erik Knudsen circulated a petition against the new NATO missiles. It is worth noting that the final draft of the petition, which involved approximately 5000 signatures, included the following quotation: "We urge the Foketing to express disapproval of the nuclear arms programs of both the Warsaw Pact and of NATO." A position of opposition, therefore, against the Soviet arms program as well, even though the immediate cause of the petition was the NATO missiles.

It should be mentioned here that the Cooperative Committee took part in this campaign as well. It published an appeal with several hundred signatures on 7 December, but in this case there was no disapproval of the Soviet arms program. And on 11 December, on behalf of the entire campaign force, 63,280 signatures protesting the NATO missiles were delivered to Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen.

Criticism of Eastern Arms Programs as Well

As the campaign continued, and particularly as signatures for the petition, which also criticized the nuclear arms programs of the Warsaw Pact, continued to be collected, a movement was formed in a January meeting

with the goals of "No to Nuclear Weapons--Disarmament Now--Towards an Alternative Security." The movement aims at de-escalation and disarmament and opposes arms programs in the East as well as in the West.

In the first issue of the new newsletter DEFENSE, the otherwise pro-Soviet activist Allan E. Petersen, a member of No More War and the Cooperative Committee, sees the foundation of No to Nuclear Weapons as a result of the disunity in the Cooperative Committee concerning the Soviet Union. He also writes that the Cooperative Committee was supposed to have offered membership to the new group, but that No to Nuclear Weapons refused to join because they thought that their opposition to arms programs in the Eastern Bloc would meet opposition in the Cooperative Committee. Preparations are being made, however, for cooperation between the two organizations.

Women for Peace

Finally, there is the highly touted Scandinavian group "Women for Peace," which has attracted a great deal of attention.

The group's goal is to collect two million signatures in Scandinavia and to deliver them to UN General Secretary Kurt Waldheim. Among other things, the petition says: "Scandinavian women are calling a halt and crying out: We have had enough! We will no longer quietly accept the power struggle between the superpowers. All aggressive activity must immediately cease, and preparations for disarmament must be begun right away and be followed by action. We demand disarmament for a lasting world peace. The billions spent on weapons should go for food. We say No to war!"

In connection with this group, some individuals have expressed even more radical views in the press and on radio and television. These have included both clearly feminist ideas and clearly pro-Soviet ideas. But, as it appears, the petition itself--even though it is highly abstract, aimed against war in general, and names neither the US nor the Soviet Union--is worded such that it can be pointed against any war of aggression. We have recently explained here in our newspaper why the Communist Workers' Party supports the group.

9584
CSO: 3106

BRIEFS

PROGRESSIVES CONTINUE FEUD--Even though the national chairman of the Progressive Party, A. Roland Petersen, has stepped down from his post in the party's national convention ahead of his long-awaited retirement in September, he wants to maintain in the national convention that MP Jorgen Junior cannot be nominated again in a possible new Folketing election. In the faction in the party which supports Jorgen Junior's "line of relaxation," efforts are being made such that a vote will not be held prior to the party's national convention in which a new national committee chairman will be voted in in A. Roland Petersen's place who is considered "uptight." Another "uptight" candidate, Nina Palsbol, is up for election. The present national convention maintained last fall with three votes against three that Jorgen Junior cannot be nominated, even though he received an exemption from exclusion at the last Folketing election. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Apr 80 p 8] 9584

CSO: 3106

WEST BERLIN OFFICIAL VIEWS CITY'S ECONOMY

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 25 Apr 80 p 25

[Article by Wolfgang Lueder, mayor and senator for economics: "The Growth Scissors Berlin-FRG Are Closing Again: Thanks to the Increased Investment Activity of Berlin Industry the Position of the City Has Become More Self-Assured"]

[Text] A critical observer of the Berlin scene in the context of an appraisal of the economic condition of the city determined recently: Berlin's image has improved; the economic development of the city has reached a stage of consolidation, and above all in the last 2 years new bases have been created which have again promoted increased economic involvement for the city.

His observation crystallized in the statement: "Berlin as a steadily growing industrial center, as the location of modern service industries, as a city of conventions and fairs, and as the home of science and research, that is not only imaginable, but upon production of the necessary prerequisites for this, it is now also realizable. Truly its chances for the 1980's are not bad."

This might be a bewildering statement for those who for years have become accustomed to hearing only bad news from Berlin on the economic front. This is, however, not so surprising to insiders. There are in fact good reasons once again to paint the economic picture of the future of Berlin in brighter colors after long years of dismal results.

Various factors are indicators of this. For example, regarding economic-political goal No 1, effective stabilization of the number of jobs in the city, Berlin can look to the 1980's with optimism. The number of employed, which had diminished for several years, picked up again for the first time in 1979 by about 4,500 or 0.5 percent. In terms of a lasting economic recovery the Berlin economy almost attained parity with the economic development of the FRG for 1978 as well as for last year. This too was quite different in the last decade, so that it can now be stated: The growth scissors between Berlin and the FRG which had been widening considerably since the beginning of the 1970's are closing again.

An especially pleasing aspect of 1979 is the considerably increased investment activity of Berlin industry, which, too, conforms largely with developments in the FRG. Development in this area was so positive that the Berlin Industrial Bank declared 1979 to be, in fact, the "Year of Investments."

Even if all these positive developments were not to be explained to a considerable extent by the generally favorable business climate in the FRG, these results would not have been thinkable without massive political and economic involvement. In particular, the in part spectacular recent results of industrial settlement have proven that not only is the investment climate again good in Berlin, but that promotional instruments are taking hold.

The Berlin assistance law, with its manifold assistance provisions, the additional employment of particularly tax-favorable ERP [European Recovery Program] credits, the availability of Berlin real estate, a targeted 14-point program to develop jobs, the establishment of a successful chamber of commerce after a relatively short incubation period, the reduction of wage and business taxes, and the establishment or the locating of various technology transfer institutions in Berlin--all these things are in Berlin usable instruments of a successful policy to promote the economy.

There are assistance instruments and institutions, in part tried and true and continuously developed, in part however newly conceived, which should further advance Berlin's economy. In all of this I consider the area of research and development to be of great significance. What our city in the meantime has to offer in terms of institutions and know-how appears to me to be a guarantee that Berlin is well equipped to fulfill the essentially greater technological and scientific demands which the future will make in almost all areas of our economy--in industry, crafts, and in service areas.

For many skeptics this may sound amazingly like self-fulfilling prophecy. Indeed, the fact cannot be ignored that there are some roadblocks on the path to the further industrial development of Berlin--and our attention is directed now as before to the industrial center Berlin. We know in this regard that an adequate number of available parcels of industrial and commercial real estate remain the absolute prerequisite to an active economic policy. It is our declared policy at any time to have available at least 30 hectares of completely available industrial and commercial lots which can be built on immediately to locate and expand businesses. We are developing a 10-year program in order to be able to make continuously available lots of sufficient number and of sufficient size which are completely accessible and can be used immediately.

Providing living quarters should be mentioned as an additional point which deserves our special attention. Large, family-size, and inexpensive apartments are not yet sufficiently available. The quality of the available

apartments must also be improved in order to stabilize the position of the city vis-a-vis competing centers in West Germany. A major effort will therefore be required in the coming years, so that the possibility of an insufficient number of apartments does not lead to a lack of skilled workers and managers and function to a certain extent as a brake on the growth of the Berlin economy.

This concern applies not only to the industrial city but also to Berlin as a services center, the further development of which likewise deserves the attention of the Berlin Senat. Undoubtedly, in this regard the city took a large leap forward a year ago with the opening of the International Congress Center. This ICC is not only a plus for the convention city of Berlin, in which conventions can be held today which previously could not be brought to Berlin because of their size. Thanks to the direct connection with our fairgrounds under the radio tower, Berlin also has something to offer that is future-oriented and that will help to come to terms with the particularly future-oriented area of the combination of trade fair and professional convention.

One can also not fail to recognize the influence of increased convention activity on the very favorable development of the Berlin tourist industry. Thus, for example, in the past year about 1.3 million visitors came to Berlin, which represents an increase of 9.2 percent. Among other things we must attribute this development to the special assistance program for hotel construction initiated about 2.5 years ago which throughout the next 2 years will make available 3,000 new rooms of the upper middle class to luxury class variety.

This is all a part of what the critic mentioned earlier called the "successful Berlin year 1979."

In fact, in many respects 1979 signaled a turn in a positive direction. Whether this positive trend will also continue into the 1980's, to be sure, does not depend alone on the continued will of Berliners to achieve, which is in full swing. Even though we also hope to be able to improve the position of Berlin further through steadiness and dynamics, nonetheless economic results will certainly be influenced essentially by worldwide economic, finance, and currency developments.

9485
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SDP PARTY SECRETARY SUNDQVIST TO STEP DOWN

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 14 Apr 80 p 3

[Article: "Sundqvist to Resign Position as Party Secretary Next Year"]

[Text] Social Democratic Party Secretary and Trade and Industry Minister Ulf Sundqvist, 35, intends to resign his position as SDP [Finnish Social Democratic Party] party secretary next year at the SDP party congress to be held in Pori.

"I will no longer be a candidate in Pori. I can definitively announce that as far as I am concerned the situation is clear," states Sundqvist in an interview published on Sunday in UUSI SUOMI.

The changing of the party secretary position has been considered somewhat certain since last spring when Sundqvist went into Mauno Koivisto's (Social Democratic) government as a minister. At that time Diet Member Erkki Liikanen came into the party office of the SDP as "an apprentice party secretary".

In January the person writing under the pen name Siltasaarelainen, who reflects the views of the SDP leadership, wrote in SUOMEN SOSIALIDEMOKRAATTI that Sundqvist will "apparently" join the Finnish Workers Savings Bank as a successor to Ilmari Lavonsalo and Liikanen will become the party secretary "if Sorsa wants this, and this seems to be the case".

In the UUSI SUOMI interview Sundqvist does not mention anything about joining the bank.

"I would like to say here that I am very interested in politics and I will not be making any decisions which would cut off my ties with politics," states Sundqvist. He assures us that he does not want the chairmanship or the vice-chairmanship of the SDP or the chairmanship of the party council. Instead Sundqvist seems to be planning a place for himself in the party committee.

10576
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SOCIALISTS' CHAIRMAN SORSA ATTACKS CENTER ON FARMERS' TALKS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 20 Mar 80 p 7

[Article: "Sorsa Accused Center Party's Leadership Struggle"]

[Text] The leadership of the Center Party has stated that Social Democratic Party Chairman Kalevi Sorsa is guilty of allowing the agricultural income solution "to become deadlocked." Sorsa, who spoke on Wednesday in Helsinki at a party council of the SDP [Social Democratic Party], asked how much the consumer and the taxpayer must pay before the Center Party elects a new chairman?

Sorsa was also amazed at the fact that the government's largest ministerial faction, the Center Party, is so closely attached to the demands of the MTK [Agricultural Producers Association] that the MTK cannot even move.

The chairman of the SDP pointed out that his party continues to consider government cooperation of the left and center as the best alternative.

"But we must also feel a responsibility for the position of the wage earner, who has just concluded his own moderate income agreement. It is not right that another faction of society should override them. It is not right that a perceptible portion of the real content of a wage solution be immediately taken away on the basis of specious arguments."

According to Sorsa the government has made three offers, each larger than the one before, to the MTK. The SDP chairman stated that the most recent desire for conciliation is the best alternative and not calculating circumstances and added that now we are faced with the moment of truth.

Sorsa also recalled the origins of the present government and stated that already at that time the Social Democrats were prepared "to travel the path together since the Center Party had lost its desire for reform under the threat of the rightwing and we considered the continuation of cooperation to be important."

And this we have done even though it has been oppressive to our spirit, stated Sorsa.

KOIVISTO SAYS POSITION STRONG DESPITE CENTER CHARGE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 20 Mar 80 p 7

[Article: "Koivisto Will Not Submit Resignation to Government"]

[Text] Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto, who spoke before the party council of the Social Democratic Party, reiterated his position that in its offer to agricultural producers the state has gone as far as it can go.

The Prime Minister considered that an agricultural income solution will come about only in a form similar to the most recent offer of the government negotiators. If such an agreement is not reached on Wednesday, it is better to continue the negotiations, stated Koivisto.

The Prime Minister also discussed the possible dissolution of the government by stating that no ruling party intends to leave the government and that he has no intent to ask for his own resignation from the government.

Koivisto stated that the government intends to invite labor market organizations to the economic policy negotiations. At that time those organizations would be able to present their own view on the direction of the income solutions. In addition to this, the economic policy line could also be discussed in these negotiations according to the Prime Minister.

Koivisto gave a brief appraisal of who has restrained whom in the current round of negotiations. According to the Prime Minister the leftwing has been capable of this.

To what degree restraint has been practiced among the farm population, it has remained somewhat unclear on the part of elected representatives and the unions, quipped Koivisto sarcastically to the Center Party.

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BOOKS EXAMINE VIROLAINEN, CENTER PARTY STANDS

Helsinki KANAVA in Finnish No 3, 1980

[Article by Jouko Tyyri: "A Generalist"]

[Text] A politician will follow his greed for power whenever there is a chance. If he does not immediately take advantage of the opportunity, someone else will. From a ruler comes an autocrat.

In my opinion Johannes Virolainen is more of a people's tribune and a political performer than a ruling lord. He would still like to go around as Finland's presidential candidate.

Paavo Vayrynen, on the other hand, grabs the whole party for himself and then allows his malice to come out. Now he is talking about idealism. Still he is feared, perhaps because of Kekkonen, even more than Jussi [Virolainen] is feared. An unmerciful professional.

If Virolainen steps aside at the party congress next spring, he will certainly publish detailed memoirs. He remembers more than others and enjoys this as if he were a model student. It is doubtful that he will leave his revenge to the fate of history.

This spring he will be due his share of slander, known since 1964. In some respects it began in Kouvola.

The Agrarian League succeeded brilliantly when V. J. Sukselainen was in office. The director of the national pension system sailed skillfully in a situation in which the president was hated and the whole agrarian idea was the subject of malicious attacks by the rightwing as well as the socialists.

Professor Sukselainen was pushed aside since there were many doctors in the leadership of the peasants' party. The president also considered the leader of this strongest group of supporters to be a secret competitor. For the K-line the party was a political tool which must remain under the control of Kekkonen.

Dr. Virolainen was also a tool. The strongest force in the background did not vote for him, but he was the only alternative. The machinery built by Korsimo continued its own style and did not at any time want to make the chairman a presidential candidate, for example. The struggle against the winner began immediately, foreign policy was the weapon.

Virolainen's trump card is his specialty, agriculture, and in addition to this, he is the most capable politician in the Diet. No one else knows as much about the issues of the postwar decades as the inveterate fighter, the generalist, Virolainen. Ideas as well as facts are put on paper and also impressed in his mind. He speaks several languages fluently.

In addition to all this, he visits the party rank and file untiringly, and the Center Party is well dispersed. He seeks the direct support of the rank and file since he does not trust Immonen's mechanics. He is also responsible for the majority in the Diet faction.

Success has rewarded his prodigious efforts. The chairman directs party and district meetings in the manner of a skillful orchestra conductor. He also knows all the tricks of management. He restrains his group when a compromise is made.

All in all, Johannes Virolainen "will take responsibility" as long as there is no one else to do it. Therefore, his solution is the only correct one since no game is played twice. The alternatives die as the decisionmaker makes decisions. Alongside of this "responsibility" criticism means nothing.

Virolainen bore responsibility for the overthrow of Sukselainen, but he did not assume the power in the party office. In almost everything he acts as a visiting chapel director. He did not get his own orchestra.

A long period of authority made the Agrarian League into a general party. This development required a name change, and thus was born the Center Party. This responsibility cost two heavy defeats, for which Virolainen received the credit. He assumed the chairmanship two years too early.

The change of role was not within the Agrarian League's own power even though the desire "to go to town" was sincere. The new name was not trusted, and Vennamo received much support in rural areas. The decision was taken too lightly, and no political capital was invested in it.

A decent foothold was not obtained in any population center even though the party's media marched victoriously into the cities. At the same time its share of the market became weaker in the countryside, the main market. The most prominent trait of the party was its unconditional support of Kekkonen's foreign policy, which resulted in participation in programs directed by the old ruler. Even this became difficult, the Conservative Party escaped.

Virolainen's own momentum did not spread to the group. He made appearances, but did not lead. Even his friends complained that Jussi listens to no one.

Kekkonen must be obeyed. An agreement must be reached with the Social Democrats. Decisions must be made from situation to situation. The people must be heard. Finland is a republic even though the decisionmakers decide. From there one can see the Center Party's "line".

And after the decision, what has been decided? In what way do Virolainen and Sorsa "answer for" the grossest waste of revenue in the history of our republic? Each expensive decision to achieve harmony has resulted in an unresolved crisis. After this insanity a wise government does as little as possible and makes as few decisions as possible. An overzealous policy produces massive unemployment.

Virolainen's "malice" is too much for the good of a confidential policy. The village holds a meeting, the aldermen decides and advises, everything is restored to order.

The chairman has also taken responsibility for the party's general secretary since others do not do it as well. He dictates in detail and does not write the word in the original meaning. His text is speech and not a woven fabric.

Still I doubt that the chairman will be changed again 2 years too early because of the presidency. Paavo Vayrynen will suffer a couple election defeats and will have to admit that an agreement must be reached with the Conservative Party for dividing up the pie.

In addition to the ability of a soloist, I see two rather admirable traits in the model. He does not argue when the President remonstrates publicly. He is satisfied with being strong among his home constituency. The landlord of Tamminiemi [President Kekkonen] must for his part sometimes recognize the independence of this vassel. The peasant can go home if the people's front no longer interests him, and this will bring an end to a certain policy.

On the other hand, Dr. Virolainen is a cultural politician, more important than his reputation. He believes in knowledge and education. In this respect he is a true beginner. Vayrynen's intellectual credibility scarcely rises to the same level.

As Minister of Education, Virolainen made political errors, but his work was lasting. His interest in it did not cease when he stepped down from the position. The hegemony of the leftwing during the Era of Peace would have been total without the close ties of the Center Party leadership to education. Many issues have been put in order as a result of these ties.

And ingratitude is almost always the world's payment. A more ungrateful people than those in the area of culture cannot be found.

The cultural sphere also includes Virolainen's most famous mistake. Under his leadership, although at the bidding of Kekkonen, the administrative

council of the state-owned radio appointed Ravo as its director. A decision was made and it was imagined that public radio would develop in the spirit of the decision. The purpose was to increase the cultural contributions of the rural population. Instead we got agitprop [agitation and propaganda].

Virolainen's speed and diverse interests are legendary. In the opinion of many the world would be better if Jussi drank and repented of his sins.

The incident concerning public radio demonstrated that the Center Party leadership did not have its own man and a trustworthy vassal for ensuring an important fiefdom. He is a more skillful tactician than a strategist who must always ensure his own position.

Another instructive incident was the fate of national planning. A separate bureau, Virolainen's pet project, withered away and died on the vine. There were statements, but no program when a Large Plan was needed.

There would be enough of these examples. A follow-up is disappointing, a blessing is lacking. The landlord of Vironpera is a restless person.

Signs of stress? Verbal sallies, perhaps loneliness. Everyone has some kind of request or complaint when the contact is political.

Wisdom? An evasion of farmwork and office. Otherwise one's energy would not be sufficient for such prodigious activity.

How can the farm income question be resolved when this man is not negotiating? What will happen to the memoirs if he does not retire on time?

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SUOMINEN DISCUSSES CHANGES, POLICIES OF CONSERVATIVES

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 4 Apr 80 p 17

[Article by Matti Saari: "Will Suominen Break SDP-Center Axle?"]

[Text] In opposition leader Ilkka Suominen's opinion many issues reflect the change in Finnish politics.

Government policy has become more bourgeois even though Communists are included in the government.

In government decisions the Center Party has lost its spontaneous decision-making power to the Social Democrats.

The media and the people have lost their interest in politics.

The beginning of the end for the people's front government has become evident for the first time in the current session of the Diet.

Yet the Conservative Party sits in opposition and has not succeeded in increasing its influence in the state-owned radio even after its election victory since "the Center Party broke the agreement".

All these issues are in their own way an answer to one and the same question: has the Conservative Party become an opposition party, which in fact sits in the government and which has not received anything corresponding to its election victory in the difficult poker game of politics.

In Ilkka Suominen's opinion the posing of such a question is "old-fashioned". In his opinion the Conservative Party has been increasing its influence the whole time.

In local politics "the Conservative Party is having a completely different type of influence than before in the industrialized and heavily populated areas of southern Finland".

More and more large cities have become more amenable to the Conservative Party. This can be measured, for example, in municipal governments.

In national politics "the beginning of the end for the people's front government has become evident for the first time in this session of the Diet since this government in which there are three large parties and one small party has not even been able to push through normal legislation".

According to Suominen examples of such laws are the proposal to postpone the tax rebate and the proposal to prohibit the clearing of fields. In addition to this, the Conservative Party alone and together with other opposition parties has also been able to influence the content of many laws.

All this according to Suominen demonstrates that the opposition is influencing the government even though the government coalition has retained its status quo.

All this has resulted in the fact that the last two governments have been much less "socialist oriented than the Sorsa-Virolainen governments of the mid-1970's and before that".

In what way did this socialist orientation manifest itself?

"These governments made a forceful attempt to increase the holi of the state and to expand the public sector. The increased total tax burden speaks to this fact."

In Suominen's opinion the decisive turn toward a bourgeois direction took place in 1977 during Martti Miettunen's minority government.

Center Party Dissolves Agreements

However, bourgeois cooperation has experienced some bad days.

The last setback occurred in the state-owned radio. The Conservative Party attempted to increase its share in the directorship and to affect organizational changes which would have increased the power of the present directors, Rauno Koski and Jouni Mykkanen.

"It did not succeed," states Suominen.

"A failure to honor agreements on the part of the Center Party played a role in this."

This occurred when the organizational reform was rejected.

Suominen urges that more exact information about the party's state-owned radio negotiations be obtained.

"We have anticipated that the Center Party would see where continuing cooperation with the left will lead. It is not necessarily beneficial to the Center Party either."

But even though "a conservative gallery of people" did not essentially increase in the directorship of the state-owned radio, Suominen does, however, consider that a change has also taken place there.

"The programming of radio and TV is completely different from what it was during the years of struggle in the early 1970's."

Center Party on the Sidelines

In Ilkka Suominen's opinion the Center Party has for the most part put itself into a situation in which it has lost its opportunity to make its own spontaneous choices.

"The Center Party can only participate in the present type of government cooperation or follow the Social Democrats into another type of cooperation.

"The Center Party no longer decides such matters, but the SDP [Social Democratic Party] is always in a key position if we consider who is capable of action and who has longevity in a broad-based majority government."

And since political development has deprived the Center Party of its influence, Suominen is awaiting signs from the Social Democrats and only the Social Democrats.

This cooperation, on the other hand, is affected by the fact that "the Social Democrats are in close cooperation with the SKDL [Finnish Peoples Democratic League]. And the SKDL for its part takes a negative attitude toward the Conservative Party.

The entry of the Conservative Party into the government is thus completely dependent upon internal policy facts and in the final count on the kind of government base the Social Democrats consider beneficial to themselves.

Suominen also justifies this view by the fact that in Finland in the long run it is only possible to talk about a broad-based majority government and at this time there is no evidence of a strong base for a bourgeois majority government.

Obtuseness Lacking

In this situation the Center Party's opposition policy is based on an extreme moderation.

"As long as I have kept track of policy we have tried to carry out a relevant policy line, to be moderate in seeking our own alternatives, and an obtuseness has been lacking from this line," admits Suominen.

"We always strive to make proposals that would represent alternatives worthy of discussion also in the government.

"This eliminates a certain obtuseness when one does not propose the impossible."

In practice this means an attempt to assure the country that there are two different kinds of opposition parties, which are to be given serious consideration.

The other opposition parties do not fall into the same category as the Conservative Party. For example, Suominen says the following about the Liberals: "Indeed, a party must be of some size in order to be worthy of consideration as a partner in cooperation."

Effect of Strike Decreasing

In Suominen's opinion a trait distinctive to social development is the fact that even at the state level it is becoming ever more prevalent to adopt a consensus policy or reach decisions which all parties can approve.

In Suominen's opinion this increase in a desire to negotiate has also affected the labor market.

"In the labor market it excludes the strike as a practical measure. The strike will become more difficult since social action presupposes consensus and the strike is totally in conflict with this.

"This does not mean that I would deny the right to strike or its possibility.

"The finding of unity has been brought about by the fact that there is an awareness of how a small country such as Finland can be damaged in the world economy."

Political contradictions have also decreased.

The conflicts have not just been conflicts invented by Suominen and Saarinen and pulled out of a hat, but they are backed up by material and cultural reasons.

"Today, however, we live, eat, and dress in the same manner as well as use the same kind of automobiles, so it is difficult to see how political conflicts could become aggravated. Indeed, today the talk is only about nuances."

Apathy

In today's politics it is also fundamental that even the government has noticed that the people have become more rightwing and that the people are not as interested in politics as they were before. And even the press is not as interested in politics as it was before.

"Even those who inform have adopted a 'low profile'.

"Even if a political discussion may have seemed even apathetic, in the beginning of the 1970's it would have received newspaper space in a completely different manner."

Ilkka Suominen has the following to say about today's most important political questions:

Farm Income

"A normal Social Democratic-Center Party pattern, which will be accomplished at regular intervals.

"When one demands 1.4 billion and the other offers 830 million, it is clear that neither one is serious.

"We bet 1.15 million as a compromise... We were a little friendlier to agriculture.

"The price of grain was not raised sufficiently."

A New Revaluation

"A discussion is unnecessary and detrimental.

"A typical example of the one-sidedness of Finland's politics. Once an issue is found that seems to be good, then the politicians go to excess."

A Change of Venue

"It will give rise to revaluation expectations. There is reason to wait a while before this can be accomplished."

Nuclear Energy

"I would not shut down the nuclear power plants already in operation.

"It is an alternative worth considering, but an increase of nuclear energy is not yet timely. After 20 years it will be doubtful that we can avoid it."

A Correct Line Is Not Provocative

The correct line of Finland's politics prepared by Harri Holkeri does not provoke and does not attack.

It accommodates, negotiates, is moderate, and if necessary, even loves the enemy.

It does attack, it attacks from the center.

The man in charge has changed, but the policy line is the same.

Ilkka Suominen has led the Conservative Party for a little less than a year and is now in the middle of a political game, which has the name "low profile".

A low profile government needs a low profile opposition. This is part of Ilkka Suominen's line.

It also seems to be acceptable to the people.

In the background lies the sober truth that the people are seeking idols and Mauno Koivisto is just such an idol.

"He has been idealized among the people," states Ilkka Suominen. He has occupied a box seat from which his words have been the truth among the people. If the same words had come from commerce and industry, it would have been called denigration.

In the background there is also concern that the Social Democrats have now come to fish in the same waters in which the Conservative Party is fishing. Some already see signs that the atmosphere could become opportune for a new rise for the Social Democrats.

The former chairman of his party's youth organization has also taken note of the fact that youth groups are again finding an appeal, scouting is expanding with new members, and no one at the summer festival sponsored by conservative youth wants to listen to mere speeches.

This does not, however, mean that the politicians would be ready to give up their hold on power.

"Politics cannot be taken away from the politicians," states Suominen.

How does Suominen get along in this game?

Has the Conservative Party sold itself to the government? Has the Conservative Party played out its hand with respect to its election victory? Did Reino Korpola strike a blow against the Conservative Party in the leadership struggle of the YLE [expansion unknown]?

There are many questions surrounding Ilkka Suominen. There are also many judicious answers. Ilkka Suominen is a judicious man.

He also has behind him a more united party than his predecessor had. There are no repairmen left, the Finnish Cooperation League has become unnecessary, and there are no cracks in foreign policy.

"The Conservative Party is easy to control unless it is faced with forceful questions of principle," states Suominen.

President Kekkonen's exception law was such. Suominen's center-right turn was such.

These issues are to be found on the extreme fringes of the traditional conservative rank and file.

The rank and file was appeased by stating that a distinction from the extreme right is meant by the term center-right. The political color chart drawn up by Jussi Isotalo, the new party secretary, serves the same purpose.

This map shows the new position of the expanded Conservative Party in the bourgeois rank and file. The SKL [Finnish Christian League], the SMP [Finnish Rural Party], and the PKP [Constitutionalist Peoples Party] represent the extreme right. The Conservative Party is swelling into a general party.

A consequence of this is that more than half of the party's constituency has voted for the party for 10 years or less.

They will not necessarily follow this now unified party machinery even though its hold has become continuously tighter.

In all this stands Ilkka Suominen, who upon becoming chairman announced that he will lead the Conservative Party for 10 years. With this Suominen answered those who wondered where Suominen was going. At that time Harri Holkeri had transferred to the Bank of Finland at the age of 40.

In the inner circles of the party there is talk about "degenerate Holkerism". Suominen has not yet "sunk" to this level.

He walks a straight path and intends to begin his swimming in Alko's swimming pool.

He intends to spend his Easter vacation in Nakkila.

Even though Suominen is a Holkerite, he is also different.

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CONSERVATIVES UNDERLINE SUPPORT OF UKK FOREIGN POLICY

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 23 Mar 80 p 7

[Article: "Conservatives Emphasized Kekkonen's Initiative"]

[Text] The alarming prospects of international politics emphasize the importance of securing the achievements of detente. This was the emphasis of a statement given on Sunday by the Conservative Party's international policy committee at a seminar in Hyvinkaa.

In it emphasis is placed on the importance of thorough preparation for the follow-up conference of the CSCE in Madrid. The Conservative Party points out that the organization of a disarmament conference among CSCE-countries on a European basis would of itself promote a reduction of tension.

The Conservative Party continues to express its concern about nuclear weapons. Continuous negotiations should be conducted on, among other things, limiting nuclear weapons deployed in Europe or directed at Europe. The Finnish initiative presented in the UN for the purpose of studying a European disarmament program has been recommended as the premise for negotiations concerning disarmament and arms supervision.

The Conservative Party considers Urho Kekkonen's proposal to create a Nordic arms supervision system as timely. In the statement it is noted that Nordic countries as well as the leading superstates must avoid actions that increase tension in the Nordic area.

Suominen Demands Development Funds

In Hyvinkaa Chairman Ilkka Suominen emphasized that the Conservative Party has demanded from a position of opposition that the proportion of Finland's development funds in the gross national product be increased to an internationally fixed level. In his estimation the government has not exactly deliberated this problem.

Suominen emphasized that obstacles limiting the development of world trade should be more effectively eliminated particularly with respect to trade conducted between industrialized countries and developing countries. He also

considers it imperative that uncompensated international transfers be increased.

Sucminen estimated that 0.7 percent or 1 percent of the gross national product is only an intermediate phase.

In addition to Sucminen and Party Secretary Uussi Isotalo, Bank Director Harri Holkeri, Assistant Secretary of State Keijo Korhonen, Lt. Gen. Aimo Pajunen, Lt. Gen. Ensio Siilasvuo, Correspondent Vasili Zaitsikov of the Soviet News Agency APN, Director P. Ola Johanson, and Managing Director Axel Waldemarsson delivered speeches at the Conservative Party's international seminar.

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CP NEWSPAPER PRESENTS FRONT'S LOCAL ELECTIONS PLATFORM

Helsinki KANSAN UUTISET in Finnish 11 Mar 80 p 6

[Article: "Employment, Services, and Environmental Problems Are Most Important"]

[Text] The new local election platform of the SKDL [Finnish Peoples Democratic League] does not even attempt to take a stand on all the practical questions of a local nature. The People's Democrats have taken up general political goals of a local nature for examination and have attempted to take into consideration the changes which have taken place in local legislation, stated Municipal Secretary Paula Tolmunen in presenting the SKDL's program at a press conference on Monday.

The central points in the program are the local economy, the environment and housing, municipal services as well as the local communities and employment.

Paula Tolmunen stated that the goal of the SKDL is to increase municipal services and thus create permanent jobs in local communities. As an employer the local communities should in our opinion set an example by creating objective working conditions and by practicing a wage policy that expresses solidarity.

According to the SKDL concept the role of the local community is not, however, complete just by being an employer. The local communities must also include in their sphere of influence and planning a more serious and annually revisable employment program, by which the measures of the local communities can be timed to provide for more even year round employment.

Opportunities for Citizen Participation

The SKDL program emphasizes increased opportunities for local citizens to participate in planning and management. This presupposes the development of a local administration based on civic action by increasing cooperation between citizens and their organizations as well as the local community. In addition, the program emphasizes greater communication with local citizens with respect to projects, plans, and adopted decisions.

In addition to this, the program emphasizes that the expansion of democracy also presupposes the simultaneous development of a shop steward system and local administration with the increasing tasks of the local communities. Local citizens must have the right to objective and flexible service. The program also emphasizes the dissolution of bureaucracy, inefficiency, and official arrogance.

The Local Communist As a Living Environment

The SKDL program emphasizes the manner in which this fact is taken into consideration in planning. In the program special attention is given to the protection of the soil, air, and water, which are considered to play an important role in questions concerning the quality of life. Even the importance of noise prevention is stressed in the program.

The SKDL also wants to place certain qualitative requirements on industry. Industry must strive to develop operations that emit the least possible amount of pollutants and must voluntarily dispose of its wastes in cooperation with the local community.

The needs of children and youth in particular are emphasized in the portion of the program dealing with environmental planning. Thus such population segments which have the least opportunity to influence their living conditions and environmental changes are to be taken into consideration.

As far as new areas are concerned the SKDL program emphasizes that in addition to housing and worksite construction, public services are also to be provided so that we would avoid present developmental problems. In addition to other municipal services, local citizens are to have sufficient area and space for sports, camping, and recreation.

An attempt is being made in the SKDL's local elections platform to outline those opportunities which organized activity will open up for local citizens, emphasized Paula Tolmunen. She also emphasized that membership in the SKDL organization opens up channels for influencing the development of the local community.

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GROUP'S NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT PLAN WOULD INCLUDE SIBERIA

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 20 Mar 80 p 7

[Article: "Initiative From Finland: Remove Weapons From the Kuola Peninsula and Alaska"]

[Text] The elimination of weapons from areas north of the Arctic Circle is proposed in an initiative which President Urho Kekkonen made in the name of the Finnish Peace League and sent to UN General Secretary Kurt Waldheim. The initiative came about at a meeting of the Vaasa Section of the Peace League. The idea was developed by Peace League Chairman, Professor Goran von Bonsdorf, who is also the first person to sign the proposal.

According to the initiative the whole area north of the Arctic Circle would be declared an international zone of peace, it would be demilitarized or weaponry would be removed from the area and the area would be made into a nuclear-free zone. Also cooperation between Arctic Circle countries would be increased.

The realization of this initiative would mean that the Soviet Union would have to disassemble its large military bases in the Kuola Peninsula and remove its weapons from northern Siberia. NATO-member countries would have to remove their weapons from northern Alaska and northern Canada. Also the greater portion of Greenland as well as the northern portions of Norway, Sweden, and Finland are located north of the Arctic Circle. Finland has, among other things, a new light infantry brigade north of the Arctic Circle.

This peace initiative is justified by the fact that an unstable situation exists in the world and the area north of the Arctic Circle has become the subject of political tension.

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INTERIOR MINISTRY ANNOUNCES EMERGENCY CENTERS' PLAN

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 3 Apr 80 p 6

[Article: "Area Alarm Centers Ready Next Year"]

[Text] The Interior Ministry has approved a general nationwide plan concerning the development and organization of fire and emergency measures for the years 1981-85.

The most important reforms to be accomplished during the implementation of the plan are the completion of an area alarm system to cover the whole country by the end of next year and the establishment of fire chief position for nearly every township.

Also the full-scale implementation of new legislation in this area will occur during this period when the state's portion of the system expands to cover all municipalities. According to the plan 120 new positions stipulated by the area alarm system will be established next year. Those municipalities receiving state assistance will be provided with 55 new fire and emergency positions next year. Approximately 200 positions will open up annually during the implementation of the plan.

It is calculated that 442 million markkas will be expended next year for the fire and emergency measures of local communities. It is estimated that 167 million markkas will be needed next year for the state's share of fire and emergency measures.

By the end of the plan all the local communities will receive 20-75 percent of fire and emergency expenditures from the state according to their basic assessment class. Thus it is calculated that the state's share will increase to 217 million markkas.

During this 15-year period a special attempt will be made to develop an alarm system for threatened areas so that in communities determined by the Interior Ministry the local population can be warned immediately about possible accidents occurring in connection with plants manufacturing dangerous substances, storage areas, loading areas, and means of transportation dealing with substances harmful to humans. The local communities have already begun planning such a system.

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CIVIL DEFENSE AUTHORITIES CITE SHELTER LACK IN HELSINKI

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 13 Mar 80 p 7

[Article: "Public Shelters Avoided, Half of Helsinki Buildings Lacks Shelter Custodian"]

[Text] Apathy on the part of housing corporations is reducing the readiness of Helsinki's public shelters. Every eighth house subject to the regulations of the VSS [expansion unknown] is lacking plans for a shelter and every second unit is lacking a shelter guard who has completed a civil defense course.

The civil defense center of the City of Helsinki must go through its annual spring rite of sending out reminders: its personnel attend housing meetings, houses which have neglected their shelters are sent a reminder, some for more times than can be counted.

"There is a loophole in the law," admits Helsinki Civil Defense Chief Olavi Kettunen.

"According to the law a shelter must be constructed without delay. However, we cannot force anyone to attend the courses, and a course should be attended so that plans for a shelter can be drawn up," states Kettunen while spreading his hands in dismay.

The 1958 VSS-law and the VSS-system which has been in effect in Helsinki since 1972 require a shelter for every five-room house. In Helsinki the regulations concern 8,000 structures.

More than 1,000 houses are left completely to their own fate since no one has bothered to attend the courses. In some houses a trained individual has moved away or died without leaving a successor.

Previously a manager would double as a custodian of a shelter, but now managers will have nothing to do with this: a custodian must be a resident of a building.

"The preparation for work in a public shelter must take place voluntarily on one's own free time," states the sixth point of the VSS-law.

The looseness of the law has resulted in a curious situation in many cities. Public shelter notices are thrown into the garbage cans along with advertisements in many of the housing administrations since officials cannot force a building to equip itself with a shelter.

"We understand our work to be a service and we, therefore, are patient," states Civil Defense Chief Kettunen.

Helsinki will not set a time limit for housing units that are unable to cooperate, but Espoo and Tampere have become fed up with those not willing to cooperate and have established strict time limits for completion of a shelter.

Since a public shelter is for the most part based on voluntary work, Finland's civil defense system has acquired the role of an educator.

The Helsinki Civil Defense Association on Runeberg Street trains hundreds of housing corporation representatives annually.

The course for a shelter custodian lasts 3 days, 3 hours each day. The course itself is free, only a fee of 15 markkas is required for literature.

The Helsinki Civil Defense Association receives half of its operating funds from the city and half as gifts. The association employs eight people.

"There is room for 400,000 residents of Helsinki in the public shelters. The shelters located in housing units can accommodate 320,000 people and the city's shelters located in granite rock can accommodate 80,000," states Managing Director Pentti Parvio of the Civil Defense Association.

The goal of the VSS-course is to ensure that each housing unit will have one person who knows how to guide people and is able to teach them in the use of VSS equipment.

If the housing unit has its own public shelter, it still needs a shelter custodian. The training for a shelter custodian takes 11 hours.

Since 1958 brick houses with more than 3,000 cubic meters have their own shelter. A shelter will also have to be constructed in such older houses which are to undergo renovation from the bottom up. Thus, for example, the old university house will obtain its own shelter.

In addition to apathy, Managing Director Parvio is concerned about single family residents. A unit larger than a house in VSS-terminology is a city block. Normally the shelter custodian of a building is responsible for the block, but what about a single family residential area in which there are no custodians? A problem area, for example, is Malmi.

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BRIEFS

CRISIS WORRIES COMMUNISTS--The threat of a government crisis worries the Communist Party. A statement of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] is as follows: "The SKP Central Committee considers the purposeful aggravation of the political situation with the agricultural question to be detrimental from the point of view of the wage earner and the farm population." SKP First Secretary and Minister Arvo Aalto, who discussed economic and domestic policy, stated the MTK [Agricultural Producers Association] and the Center Party, which obediently carries out its will, seem to be interested in controlling inflation only when the cost is to be paid by the wage earner. In the Central Committee Aalto repeated the SKP's demand for a revaluation, a tighter price policy, increased unemployment benefits, and the restoration of the child subsidy payments and social security payments made by employers to the previous level. In Aalto's opinion the worst thing we could do would be to give in to the previous methods of fighting inflation since the country would then be driven into a deep recession. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 20 Mar 80 p 7] 10576

CSO: 3107

GISCARD'S FOREIGN POLICY EXPERTISE SEEN LACKING

Paris LE POINT in French 31 Mar 80 pp 50-51

[Article by Michele Cotta: "France-Israel--Political Parties Positions: Some Nuances"]

[Text] French political circles are not overly perturbed by VGE's positions. But the strongest opposition is, paradoxically, found in the UDF [French Democratic Union].

Valery Giscard d'Estaing wrapping himself in the general's greatcoat... who could have predicted it? At the time of his election to the presidency, if one remembers the predictions of some and the opinions of others, French international relations, if you believed most of the Gaullists, were going to be conducted by VGE in tune with the flow of the Atlantic currents. Opinions were unanimous on one point: Giscard--a formidable expert in domestic politics, as he had shown in the elections--did not have, in carrying out his foreign policy, the broad view of General de Gaulle, nor a matching determination.

Six years later, VGE is facing a serious international crisis, certainly the most critical one faced by the Western powers since the 1962 missile crisis in Cuba. So what happens? He does not join in chorus with the United States, neither on Afghanistan, nor in reprisals against the Soviets, nor in the boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games. And then, less than 3 months after the entry of Soviet troops in Kabul, VGE travels to Kuwait and Amman, dramatically advocating self-determination for the Palestinians.

Is it the weight of international realities, or the use of power, with its responsibilities and inescapable mechanisms, which have led VGE to take positions similar to those of his great predecessor? Or is it more his incapacity to conceive a foreign policy different from the one followed by General de Gaulle? On this point, let us be fair: VGE has never advocated, nor directly supported, a policy pertaining to the Middle East different from the one followed by the General while he was in office. Taking this position, VGE has disagreed, at times, with his closest friends.

Thus, in the last days of 1973, after the Yom Kippur War, he was already confiding to his friend Roger Chinaud, who had just returned from a conciliatory mission to Jerusalem, sponsored by the France-Israel Association: "Do not be misled! If the Israeli leaders take refuge in extreme positions, no resolution of the conflict will be possible."

In the same manner, after his entry at the Elysee Palace, in 1974, he indicated that lifting the arms embargo on Israel was not under consideration.

So, really, there has not been, over the last 6 years, any change in Giscard's policy. But, as seen by the political circles, he has elected to reaffirm dramatically, today, his position by a crucial act in the middle of an international crisis, even while the United States is trying to implement the year-old Camp David agreements. On a question which stirs up passions and divides the French people, VGE's position creates inescapable fallout in domestic politics. There is no party, no political action group, that is not embarrassed by the presidential statements.

In the first place, the RPR (Rally for the Republic) is caught completely off balance by VGE. Among the Gaullists who, in 1967, where the first to commit France to a pro-Arab stance, or among those who approved this commitment, no one is able to condemn VGE's current position. As stated by Georges Gorse, a former minister under the general, specially in charge then of relations with Arab countries: "I disagree on plenty of subjects with VGE in domestic politics; there is no need for me to try and pick a fight with him in those domains where his policies show a certain continuity." Or Alain Terrenoire, former president of the Association for Franco-Arab Solidarity, who, during the RPR parliamentary session held in Saint-Raphael, acknowledged, almost as a secret: "Basically, VGE is surprising us. We did not imagine that he would have the courage to buck the current that flows in his own circles and among his political friends and constituents."

However, a Gaullist minority who--for religious, ideological or electoral reasons--never shared the General positions toward Israel, remained among the faithful. This small group, comprising deputies from Paris such as Claude-Gerard Marcus, Gabriel Kaspereit, Pierre-Charles Krieg, Joel Le Tac, or avowed supporters of the Israeli cause, such as Jean-Claude Servan-Schreiber, Lucien Neuwirth, or Robert-Andre Vivien, had hoped that the misfortune of losing their positions of power would at least be compensated by a change in French policy in the Middle East. This group has pointed out to the RPR president that French Jews are deeply embittered by the Amman speech, and that it would be possible to retrieve some of them. Thus, Gabriel Kaspereit, deputy from Paris 9th ward, has brought Jacques Chirac to a meeting with the leaders of the Israelite consistory of France. Alain de Rothschild and Rabbi Kaplan have conveyed their misgivings. The mayor of Paris heard them out. He then answered with some prudent utterances which, up to now, have not won them over. Anyway, how could

they forget that Jacques Chirac regularly sends his emissary, Jean de Lipkowski, who has just returned from Jordan and Egypt, to the Arab countries? Even when, at the RPR parliamentary session, this emissary could assert that: "During De Gaulle's presidency, the Gaullists never made any statement to our Arab friends which could endanger Israel's security."

The socialists are embarrassed, too. Certainly, today's PS [Socialist Party] is not the SFIO [French Section of the Workers International] of yesteryear. In its ranks today, the unconditional supporters of Israel are rare. The time is gone when Guy Mollet would receive all of his cigarettes--some 500 packs of "555" brand per year--from Golda Meir's government. Quite the contrary, a consensus is quite widely apparent, to recommend to the Israelis that they should accept autonomy for the West Bank, and to the Palestinians that they should renounce the destruction of Israel. An even hand between Palestinians and Israelis: this has always been Mitterrand's position. His close assistants share this opinion, with some nuances. And so does the minority group within the PS; Rocard and Mauroy have reached the same conclusion following totally different paths. Rocard was for a long time openly hostile to Israel, from the time he was a member of the PSU [Unified Socialist Party]. He has quite recently been in contact with some Israelis in Paris. Mauroy, for his part, was more closely attuned to the Israelis' feelings, in the tradition of the SFIO. Today, he is convinced that one must try to bring the Israeli leaders to a dialogue. So there is a consensus within the Socialist Party to maintain an even attitude. To this effect, a delegation led by Robert Pontillon, Alain Savary, and Jean Poperen, will be in Israel from May 11 to 18. The socialist members of the European parliament will welcome unanimously a large PLO delegation in Strasbourg in early April.

But, whatever the opinions of politicians of every shade, it remains that VGE is the one who has expressed them. It is also quite tempting for the PS, both electorally and ideologically, to "retrieve" those among the Jews who find the president's position offensive. Thus, VGE's statements are criticized in the PS; but it is more form than substance.

Which leaves the UDF. What a paradox: the president disconcerts his own party the most! Foremost, because his steadfast friends coexist within its ranks with the supporters of the Israeli cause, or the centrists with a tilt toward the Atlantic alliance, or the dedicated anti-Gaullists: Jean Lecanuet, Michel Poniatowski, Roger Chinaud and Bernard Stasi are not among those who, at first glance, could be expected to be warm supporters of Palestinian self-determination.

Rather, opposition has emerged from the ranks. Already, VGE's position in the Afghanistan crisis had thrown them in confusion. The visit to the United Arab Emirates has spread disarray. At the congress of the CDS [Center for Social Democracy] in Strasbourg on February 24, Pierre-Bernard Reymond, secretary of state for European Affairs, was booed by an assembly

with a definite Atlantic bent. Fearing an even greater rebellion at the UDF congress, Jean Lecanuet suggested to Jean Francois-Poncet that he should abstain from addressing the meeting on March 23 in Orleans. A recommendation which was repeated directly to the minister by the Elysee. Yet, already on Saturday, even in the absence of Francois-Poncet, voices were raised within the UDF. Andre Monteil, former MRP [Popular Republican Movement] minister and honorary president of the France-Israel Alliance, vigorously insisted on having the floor--which, he claims, was being refused him--and, to the frenetic applause from half the assembly, made an impassioned speech in defense of Israel. On Sunday morning, Didier Bariani, president of the Radical Party, raised a tremendous fuss on the same themes. It was necessary to wait for Jean Lecanuet's clever and measured speech to see the assembly recover its equanimity.

What now? Opposition within the UDF? That would be presumptuous. First, because 1 year before the presidential campaign, the die-hard supporters of Israel hesitate to disapprove of VGE too strongly. That could mean putting oneself out of the political game at a critical moment. The rules of the presidential elections do not permit such capricious behavior.

Furthermore, the situation in the Middle East is not what it was in 1967 or 1973; the whole Western world--including the Americans and the opposition parties in Israel--judges the position of Prime Minister Menachem Begin to be, at times, too extreme. Therefore, VGE remains calm in the face of the disarray, the divisions and attempts to recuperate lost m[illegible]ers which are rampant in the political parties. He is more attentive to messages of support from RPR members than to grumblings among those who support him. He reacts with a shrug to his own advisers at the Elysee, who fear the electoral effects of the Amman speech. This is not disdain for electoral votes. In fact, he has every intention of making a gesture toward the Israelis soon, but he remains keenly aware of the complexity of French feelings on the Palestinian question. And he is counting on the appeal of his foreign policy, with respect to some in the opposition, to add them to the ranks of his supporters in 1981.

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MARCHAIS' GENEVA ADDRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SHCHARANSKIY

PCF Human Rights Delegation

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 22 Apr 80 p 1

[Text] Georges Marchais goes to Geneva today at the head of a delegation of the Committee for Defense of Freedoms and Human Rights composed of Pierre Juquin, a member of the Politburo and a deputy; Francis Wurtz, member of the Central Committee and deputy to the European Parliament; Jacqueline Fraysse-Casalis, deputy; and Patrick Le Mahec, deputy director of the foreign policy section of the Central Committee.

There he will hold an important press conference during which he will make public a new document and announce an action of great importance.

L'HUMANITE will report this event in tomorrow's editions.

Marchais Demands Shcharanskiy's Freedom

Geneva JOURNAL DE GENEVE in French 23 Apr 80 p 3

> [Text] Mr Georges Marchais, secretary general of the PCF, was in Geneva yesterday in his capacity as a member of the Committee for Defense of Freedoms and Human Rights in France and abroad, and called on Mr Alexandre Hay, president of the International Committee of the Red Cross, whom he told of his concerns regarding several situations (Northern Ireland, Nicaragua, Israel, Lebanon, etc.). Yesterday afternoon he held a press conference at the Rue Varembe conference center.

There are three themes in his remarks: the capitalist and "imperialist" camp has no monopoly on the defense of human rights, and it "shamefully" exploits this theme. Second theme: we in France are trying to obtain concrete results in the defense of human rights. Three: we have published a "moving" document on human rights violations in the world, with 5 million copies; finally, we have chosen to "sponsor" 13 political detainees from

around the world, of whom 2 are in Eastern countries: Vaclav Havel (Czechoslovakia) and Shcharanskiy (USSR), the others being divided among South Africa, South Korea, Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay, Northern Ireland, Israel, the USA, Egypt and Tunisia.

During the question-and-answer session which followed, Mr Marchais emphasized that his party was appreciative of Amnesty International's positive contributions, but that the latter seemed "biased and incomplete." In other remarks he insisted on the separation between the PCF and the Soviet Communist Party, recalling that the two parties diverge on the question of "socialist democracy."

Human Rights Under Communism

Paris LE MATIN in French 23 Apr 80 p 2

[Text] Georges Marchais announced yesterday in Geneva that the Communist Party intends to obtain the release of 13 political prisoners presently detained, among other places, in the United States and South Africa. The PCF secretary general also asked that Soviet dissident Anatole Shcharanskiy and the Czech writer Vaclav Havel, a spokesman for Charter 77, be released. For Georges Marchais, [begin italics] "this is not in any way to try to put imperialism and the socialist countries on the same level," [end italics] but he opined that [begin italics]"there exists in certain socialist countries a persistent failure to appreciate the democratic requirements of socialism." [end italics] Georges Marchais met in Geneva with the top officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross, mostly to discuss Palestinian prisoners, the situation in Cambodia, and Nicaragua.

Text of Press Conference

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 23 Apr 80 pp 5, 6

[Passages between slantlines originally published in italics]

[Article by Michel Naudy: "Georges Marchais in Geneva: Struggling for Human Rights is the Whole Purpose of Communists"]

[Text] /"A new and important stage in the activity of the committee of freedoms and of human rights in France and around the world."/ It was in these terms that Georges Marchais, who presides over the committee, announced yesterday in Geneva the publication of the statement which he personally handed over in the morning to the president of the International Red Cross and the publication of a document detailing 13 cases of arbitrary imprisonment in the world.

At the head of a delegation composed of Pierre Juquin, Jacqueline Fraysse-Cazalis, Francis Wurtz, and Patrick Lemshec, Georges Marchais in fact spent the whole day yesterday in the defense of human rights, a task which in his own words constitutes the /"whole purpose"/ of the communists.

The first item on the agenda after the delegation was welcomed at Geneva Airport by Armand Magnin, secretary general of the Swiss Workers Party, was the meeting at the headquarters of the Red Cross with Mr Alexandre Ray, president of the organization. The object of the meeting was to draw to his attention the fact that action is urgently needed on five particularly grave situations.

Georges Marchais, relying for the most part on experiences drawn from his recent travels, underlined the necessity for concrete measures to find solutions to the dramatic refugee problem in Lebanon, to that of Palestinian prisoners in the territories occupied by Israel, and to repression in Northern Ireland.

Supported by specific facts published below together with all the documents, he exposed the intolerable character of the cruelties and torture inflicted as much by the British army within the European Economic Community as by the Israeli army within the jails of Askelon or Toulkharem.

Particularly salient cases of generalized and systematic attacks against the dignity of thousands of individuals, the facts brought to bear being further reemphasized by the conspiracy of silence regarding them brought about by the great news organizations which apparently prefer to devote themselves to reporting on politics.

The same consideration applies as well to two other subjects broached by Georges Marchais: Cambodia and Nicaragua, which must be immediately helped to rebuild, to recover, to achieve literacy, and quite simply just to live. The disasters of the imperialist war of 4 years of genocide in the one case, and nearly a half century of pro-American dictatorship in the other, have left the people bled white, the economies shattered, and famine rampant. The courageous efforts undertaken in both cases by the new governments cannot hope to resolve the totality of the problems, and Georges Marchais asked more international support for these two countries.

These propositions were made before 11 top officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross, present at the meeting. The talks, which lasted close to 2 hours, unfolded in an atmosphere of great cordiality. They were marked by a serious air and concern to get concrete results with respect to each of the areas discussed.

After this important meeting, described as "extremely positive" by Georges Marchais and during the course of which was handed over to the officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross a list of 13 persons whose release will be energetically sought by the committee for defense of freedoms, the delegation was received by the communist mayor of Geneva. The latter, Roger Dafion, was to welcome Georges Marchais during a fraternal reception attended by Jean Vincent, president of the Swiss Workers Party.

In early afternoon, before an audience of journalists with the international press, Georges Marchais explained the political basis of the committee's initiative while denouncing imperialism's exploitation of the theme of human rights. He showed its place within the general work of communists for human freedom. Then, Georges Marchais presented a list of 13 men and women unjustly imprisoned in various countries around the world and whose plight has symbolic value in relation to other arbitrary incarcerations.

Far from being exhaustive, this list is intended to permit an immediate mobilization and to bring the rapid release of these men and women. After spending considerable time answering journalists' questions, Georges Marchais went on to a new reception.

In the course of his press conference, Georges Marchais was brought to answer numerous questions. In response to a question from a journalist on the attitude of the PCF toward Amnesty International, he said that the PCF has not changed its opinion of this organization. /"Amnesty International's activity is, to a certain degree, positive,"/ he affirmed. /"But we find it biased and incomplete. Only a modification of the behavior of Amnesty International could bring us to change our position."/

To a journalist who seemed to imply that the Communist Party had been very slow to embrace the struggle for human rights, Georges Marchais said that the PCF, in 60 years of existence, had always fought for human rights, unlike many other organizations. /"We have left many martyrs on the field. We don't need to take lessons from anyone else."/

Concerning malnutrition which, according to certain journalists, afflicts also the socialist countries, Georges Marchais remarked: /"One of the testaments to socialism's superiority is precisely that it has enabled putting an end to hunger."/ Taking Cuba as an example, he showed that in a country which only 20 years ago was an American brothel, where hunger, illiteracy, and the highest level of infant mortality in the world reigned, much progress has been made, and that, in regard to infant mortality, Cuba had now attained the level of France.

Also, Georges Marchais, without glossing over the differences which set us against the Chinese Communists, was to emphasize that China had resolved--in an extremely short historical period--problems which no capitalist country has succeeded in resolving. Georges Marchais showed, moreover, that malnutrition is rampant, today, in those countries which experienced colonialism. But he emphasized that, in developed capitalist countries, because of crisis, unemployment, and low wages, families are experiencing extremely difficult living conditions. In certain cases, one can speak of malnutrition. He explained, citing the statistics, that consumption of meat and vegetables varied considerably according to social class, as did life expectancy.

Following thus upon the publication last 20 February of a first list of attacks against freedom and human rights, a list which was recently turned

over to the director of the human rights division of the United Nations, yesterday's events dramatize the determination of communists to tell the whole truth on these questions. Let us not allow a caricature of human rights to be reduced to promoting the partisan political interests of other French political parties; let us not see them used for tactical ends by those who abuse them day in and day out. "To inform and to act": These were the concerns advanced yesterday, in sum, and with an indeniable echo.

At Red Cross Headquarters

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 23 Apr 80 p 5

[Text] Yesterday morning in Geneva the delegation led by Georges Marchais met the president of the International Red Cross, Mr Alexandre Hay, at the organization's international headquarters. At his side were Mr Pestalozzi, vice president of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Mr Aubert, a member of the Committee, Mr Hocke, director of operations, Mr Grand d'Hauteville, regional delegate for Europe, Mr Madoux, director of press and information, Mr Moseillou, responsible for doctrine and law, and Mr Convers, deputy director of operations.

Text of Press Conference

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 23 Apr 80 pp 5, 6

[Passages between slantlines published in italics]

[Text] This exceptional meeting, taking place under the presidency of my friend, Armand Magnin, president of the Swiss Workers Party, in this international conference center in Geneva, constitutes a new and important stage in the activities of the committee of freedoms and human rights in France and throughout the world.

I want first of all to recall briefly the reasons which led the PCF, 2 years ago, to create this committee, the mission we assigned it, and the initiatives which it has here and now permitted launching.

Two months of activity of our committee

/In the first place,/ therefore, I want to answer the question: why this committee? Defense of human rights is not for us--far from it!--a novel preoccupation. I underlined this, with facts to support it, when introducing our committee to the press: our struggle, for we communists, is a struggle for human freedom. The defense of human rights is the very meaning of our daily struggle. Because we are communists, we are with all those who, as well in France as throughout the world, struggle for progress and freedom. It is our whole purpose, and this is our pride.

If we have decided to give to this struggle a new dimension, it is because two major conclusions must be drawn today by any attentive and impartial observer.

First, the theme of human rights is exploited hypocritically--I will say shamefully--by the very ones who violate the most elementary rights of the human being. Imperialism thus drags into the mud this grand and noble idea, both to try to distract attention from its fundamentally oppressive and aggressive nature, and to try to caricature the reality of socialism, to put pressure on the struggling peoples, to blind the eyes of the workers to all perspectives of change. It is nothing but a clumsy hoax, one which we communists are resolved to combat.

A broad definition of human rights

Next, most organizations which claim to be working for the defense of human rights develop--especially in France--a singularly restrictive conception of these rights, which they limit arbitrarily to individual and collective freedoms, at least certain among them do. Now, if these freedoms are, to our way of thinking, essential, that does not mean they are exclusive [of all others]. We, communists, give to human rights a much more broad definition, which at bottom ties up with that of the United Nations Charter.

This definition encompasses, beyond the group of freedoms which I have just mentioned, the right to work, the right to equitable and satisfying living conditions, the right to health, the right to education and to culture--beginning with the right to know how to read and write. Not to forget the first of all rights: the right to eat until you are full, the right to life.

For this double reason, the PCF believed it necessary and urgent to increase significantly its efforts in devense of human rights in France and the world. This is why it created this committ e.

We want to obtain concrete results

/In the second place,/ I want to go over briefly the dual mission which our party assigned to this committee.

On the one hand, we want to see the truth burst out about the continuing and often monstrous violations--of rights and of all rights--of individuals and peoples. And to do this everywhere where it appears that these problems exist. We categorically reject the extremist partiality which characterizes the position of all the other French political parties on this question. We want to foil their unacceptable pretension to turn a great cause into a petty propaganda gimmick, a simple politician's alibi. We are exerting ourselves, through a great effort to inform public opinion, to re-establish as much as possible the truth of the matter.

On the other hand, we want to obtain, through as many actions as possible, concrete and positive results for men and their human rights.

This is the case even in France: there we fight for respect for the rights and the dignity of workers in the factories. There we struggle for the

democratization of institutions. There we struggle to preserve and deepen every freedom. There we struggle for the creation of new freedoms and rights. And we struggle to persuade the government of our country to take [lit. "perdre"; almost certainly intended to be "prendre"] initiatives for peace and disarmament, to do its share in the war against hunger and underdevelopment, and finally to deal justly with the legitimate demands of the peoples fighting for their liberty, their sovereignty, and their legitimate interests.

At the same time, throughout the whole world, we witness our solidarity and call for action supporting individuals and peoples whose fundamental rights are scorned.

To inform and to act, these are thus the two objectives we gave ourselves in creating this committee. It is the second aspect that I wanted to underline.

/In the third place,/ it would not be unprofitable to recall briefly the principal initiatives taken by our committee since its creation 2 months ago.

I will cite first of all the publication of a document which is particularly enlightening for all those who are sincerely interested in the status of human rights in the world. You will doubtless recall it--it is a first tally of the deaths, the victims of repression, political or racial assassinations, massacres, genocides, covering the last 20 years.

This document, 5 million copies of which were distributed through our efforts, has incontestably contributed--all our information confirms it--to clarifying among large sectors of the French population the necessary debate on the question of human rights. It seems to us all the more opportune to have the conclusions of this study--which, to our knowledge, is the only one of its kind to date--much more widely known.

It was with this aim that a delegation of our committee turned over this document several days ago to the director of the human rights division of the UN, who agreed to accept it, right here, in Geneva.

I add, in connection with this document, this fact which cannot fail to touch every man and woman to the core: barely 2 months after its publication, this balance-sheet which we had prepared was already tragically incomplete. Since then, in fact, have notably come to be added to this vast slaughter of human lives produced by imperialism, on the one hand the victims of the killing in El Salvador, a thousand since the beginning of the year--including Msgr Romero--and on the other hand the 13 men Bourguiba had hanged in Tunisia.

From such facts, I am convinced, partisans in the fight for human rights can only be encouraged to join up with our actions, whatever differences we may have on other matters.

To obtain a commission of inquiry on freedoms within the EEC

Next, we must recall that on last 11 March we set forth, before the European Parliament at Strasbourg, a proposed resolution calling for the creation of a commission of inquiry on all violations of human rights in the countries of the European Economic Community, as also in the community's institutions. All political groups--with the exception of the communist group--having refused to debate this proposal, it should be discussed in committee. We shall be watching this very attentively. Moreover, I just wrote a letter to the president of that assembly to remind him that we want to know rapidly what follow-up the office of the Parliament intends to make on our request.

Another strong point in the activity of our committee has been the succession of moving speeches on violations of human rights in Europe, in Africa, and in Latin America, delivered in person to 60,000 people assembled in Paris last month with the sponsorship of the PCF, by personalities of diverse backgrounds, among whom were a survivor of the South African prisons, a leader of the popular forces in El Salvador, and the singer Mikis Theodorakis.

Finally, in a continuing fashion, our committee is dedicated to informing the public of the daily violations of human rights in France and the world, to expressing its solidarity with the victims, and to organizing protests to support them. To this must also be added more private initiatives, but we hope they will also be effective.

It is in the framework of this set of initiatives that the new document which we want to present to you now must be viewed.

Now just what is it?

We are making public today a list of 13 women and men all of whom are victims, in varying degrees, of violations of human rights.

All are imprisoned unjustly. Their plight calls for resolute and continuing action.

We want to lead this action. We want to obtain their release.

This list calls for several words of explanation.

First of all, its publication constitutes an act of denunciation of an intolerable situation. But we are not going to content ourselves with this denunciation alone. We are going to take more and more initiatives with the aim of arriving at concrete results.

Next, our initiative today--like the first document we made public--has a clearly limited objective. Thus, one might be astonished not to find a single reference to some countries where as everyone knows violations of human rights have been or are presently being erected into a system of government.

We are putting together the necessary facts to denounce them. And we will soon have the opportunity to make known the truth about them, by calling, there, too, for action.

13 imprisonments which have symbolic value

There is a final question on the subject of the 13 names we are making public today. What reasons guided us in our choice? Our response is twofold.

First of all, each one of these 13 cases gives proof in itself that our committee concerns itself simultaneously with informing the public on a massive scale, and with resolutely organizing the necessary solidarity. The struggle for human rights is nothing but idle talk unless it is given substance by specific action and follow-up. For our part, we communists, we have firmly decided not to withdraw into Platonic discourses. We are determined to achieve the release of these 13 men and women unjustly stricken. This is the first reason for the action which we are launching today.

Next, each of these 13 cases is representative of other arbitrary imprisonments, of other condemnations for holding the wrong opinions. Each one has, in some way, a symbolic value. Our action is thus not limited to the 13 victims which we present to you today. It will encompass, through these individual plights, all men and women who, in similar conditions, suffer today from as flagrant attacks on liberties and human rights.

We defend freedom everywhere in the world

From Uruguay to the U.S.A., from South Africa to Northern Ireland, from Egypt to South Korea, one will find in this document a reflection of imperialism's continuing aggression against human rights.

One will find, also, two citizens of socialist countries. This does not in any way mean that we are trying to put imperialism and the socialist countries on the same level. One cannot challenge, really, the essential and priceless contribution of socialism in the area of human rights. Socialism has put an end to want, to unemployment, to malnutrition. It assures job security, the right to health and to culture for all, the participation of the people in the administration and the direction of society. So, if it is in the nature of imperialism to deny the freedoms and rights of man, then socialism has a fundamental objective human freedom.

However, and we said it at our 22 and 23 Congress, there exists in certain socialist countries a persistent failure to appreciate the democratic requirements of socialism. This is translated into certain limitations on democracy and certain unjustifiable administrative measures. The cause of freedom and human rights being for us indivisible, we defend it everywhere in the world.

The 13 persons whose release we are asking are the following:

James Mange (South Africa), 24, born in the black township of Pimville near Johannesburg.

Considered as a "strike organizer" because he fights for higher wages, he is dismissed from his job. He next joins the ranks of the African National Congress, the South African liberation movement, which fights against the racist, colonialist policy of apartheid. He takes an active part in this fight.

Arrested, he is on 15 November 1979 sentenced to death after a parody of justice.

Since that day, he awaits his execution in Pretoria prison.

Three weeks ago the South African government refused an entry visa to a representative of our committee who wanted to visit James Mange. This refusal arouses the most intense concern.

James Mange must be saved!

Gary Tyler (United States), a black American age 21.

Condemned to death at the age of 17. Accused without proof of killing a militant racist who was a member of a commando group which conducted an attack on a bus transporting black students to schools in the white neighborhoods. Condemned solely on the testimony of one girl who subsequently admits having been constrained by the police to lie.

A jury composed only of whites found Gary Tyler guilty. The state of Louisiana having later abolished the death penalty, he was condemned /on 8 March 1977 to life imprisonment./

The release of Gary Tyler must be obtained!

Jose Luis Massera (Uruguay), engineer, mathematician, legislator.

Arrested 22 October 1975. His arrest, long kept secret, was announced months later in an official government communique.

For almost a year Massera is kept in absolute secrecy, in an individual cell, in a location unknown to his family and without being brought to court. He suffered a serious injury, very painful, which necessitated his hospitalization. The result of his injury: shriveling of a leg. Massera can no longer walk without the aid of orthopedic equipment and a cane.

It is not until October 1976 that he is brought before the military court and the lid of secrecy is removed. He is prosecuted on a pretext that he

participated in a "subversive group," basically in his capacity as leader of the Communist Party of Uruguay, which he had represented in Parliament for long years.

He can be sentenced to as much as /24 years in the penitentiary./

Massera's release must be obtained!

Salah Abdel Rahman Abdelal ("Israel"), 40. Member of the Palestinian National Front. Arrested 2 May 1974. Tried 2 February 1975. Accused of possession of weapons, /he is condemned to 18 years imprisonment./

He is presently detained in an Israeli prison near Naplouse.

The release of Rahman Abdelal must be obtained!

General Liber Seregni (Uruguay). General Liber Seregni, president of the Broad Front, which brought together all the democratic forces of Uruguay, was, by virtue of his position, a candidate for the presidency of the republic in November 1971.

A military coup took place on 27 June 1973. Liber Seregni then took part in the popular movement which, notably by a 15-day general strike, tried to resist the establishment of a dictatorship. He was arrested in August 1973.

Imprisoned ever since, he was condemned to /14 years in prison./

The release of General Seregni must be obtained!

Annie Maguire

In the heart of the Europe of the Common Market, Northern Ireland is a country where despotic action, discrimination, police power, and repression are daily occurrences.

This is the result of the police followed for years by successive British governments.

The case of Annie Maguire is testimony to this.

Fourty-five years old, a housewife. Arrested in 1976 and accused without proof of having participated in the manufacture of explosives, she was /condemned in March 1976 to 14 years in prison./ Since then, she has not ceased proclaiming her innocence. She has been incarcerated for the last 4 years in a prison in Great Britain.

The release of Annie Maguire must be obtained? [sic]

Virgilio Bareiro (Paraguay), 51, electronics expert, professor in the College of Engineering at the national university in Asuncion. He left office 12 August 1964 when police arrested him in the street.

No reason has been given to explain his arrest. He has not been indicted. No proceeding has been brought against him. Consequently, he has never been sentenced. /But nonetheless he has been detained for 16 years?/

His state of health today is alarming.

The release of Virgilio Bareiro must be obtained? [sic]

Kim Chi Ha (South Korea), 39, a Korean poet enjoying great popularity in his country. A patriot, a Catholic, he has been subjected since 1970 to numerous arrests for his struggle against the ferocious dictatorship in power in his country. On two occasions he was arrested for having published poems against repression and injustice. He was tortured several times.

Apprehended once again in March 1975, put in solitary confinement, /he is condemned on 31 January 1976 to 7 years in prison and 7 years suspension of his civil rights./

The release of Kim Chi Ha must be obtained!

Teresa Alicia Israel (Argentina), 38, an attorney, member of the Argentine Human Rights League, she was entrusted with defending imprisoned labor activists.

She was arrested at her home in Buenos Aires on 8 March 1977 by an armed patrol.

Since then, Argentine authorities refuse to divulge any information on her whereabouts. They say they do not know.

The Videla government must be made to inform the public of her fate.

The release of Teresa Israel must be obtained!

Abd Magib Ahmed (Egypt), 30, a worker and labor official in a shop at Kafr El Dawar. Member of the secretariat of the Populist Party [Parti du rassemblement].

He was apprehended on 15 January 1980 during a wave of arrests which hit the progressive and syndicalist political forces.

Arbitrarily detained for over 3 months, he awaits his trial.

The release of syndicalist Magib Ahmed must be obtained!

Anatole Shcharanskiy (USSR), 32, a mathematician. After having asked for an exit visa from the USSR, which was refused, Anatole Shcharanskiy participated in several demonstrations demanding the right to emigrate.

Arrested on 15 March 1977, he was /condemned on 14 July 1978 to 13 years of detention./

Anatole Shcharanskiy must be freed!

Vaclav Havel (Czechoslovakia), writer, playwright. One of the principal spokesmen of "Charter 77."

Arrested on 30 May 1979, he is condemned with other defendants /to 4 1/2 years in prison,/ on 22 October 1979.

Vaclav Havel must be freed!

Our meeting with the International Red Cross

In other matters, our delegation was received this very morning in Geneva by the president of the International Red Cross. In the course of this meeting we discussed--besides the contents of the document which I just gave you--several burning issues in international affairs having to do with massive and grave violations of human rights in certain areas of the world.

We thus came to the question of Southern Lebanon. I have just come back, by the way, from a trip to this country and I could see with my own eyes the gravity of the situation. We also discussed two other questions, that of the condition of Palestinian prisoners in the territories occupied by Israel, and repression in Northern Ireland. This meeting also allowed us to emphasize the necessity of bringing effective assistance to bear in the rebuilding of two particularly hard-hit countries: Cambodia and Nicaragua.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF GEORGES MARCHAIS PUBLIC ADDRESSES

Paris ESPRIT in French Mar 80 pp 151-157

[Article by Francois Brune: "Georges Marchais or the Complex of Force"]

[Text] The entire problem of the "Marchais" speech is to compensate for the stereotyped content with the orator's "appearance." You are quite disappointed when you compare the televised performance of the communist leader with the report (condensed) which HUMANITE gives of his remarks[1]. The essence of the message seems to have been volatized with the author. So that you wonder whether the PCF's political truth does not reside essentially in the personality of its secretary, as it leaked out during his one man show: in his rhetoric of force, in his psychodramatic urge to power, in his breathless attempt to rejoin the people whose expression he wants to be.

A Rhetoric of Force

Marchais' speech relies first on his material infrastructure. What counts is to have many kinds of words, to say as much as possible--quantitatively speaking, as if the intensity of the occupation of the antenna was going to automatically win the public[2]. Afterwards gestures and diction regularly support Marchais' speech, to the point that you have the impression that what he says means less in his eyes than the fact of being seen while saying it. It is the classic act, the performance of the actor-orator, which allows him alternatively to pretend loftiness of views, socialist seriousness, revolutionary terror, fraternal detente, unlimited indignation, upset disgust, supplicating exhortation and popular banter. It is necessary to make a hit, it is necessary to "burst" the screen. The voice is there, convinced to convince, especially sonorous, a continuous saliva pump, which intensifies words

and carries the words beyond the listeners, whom it cancels out. In the auditorium, the invited public is a resonance box. From that moment, the nation is startled.

In the speech itself, a certain number of stylistic procedures contribute to the effect of affected force. The liking for expressions, which are quite broad and often excessive makes it possible to free all the power of his voice ("a substantial state of crisis," "this unusual show of strength," "this astounding movement which is arising on all continents," "unequivocal position," "for the inalienable right of every people.") The word "untruth" is selected in preference to "lie": for Marchais, it is a question of counteracting the untruth, rather than telling the truth. He uses the word "demonstration" often, although it characterizes less the logical precision of the speech, than its stage value. The fact is that the force of the statement takes the place of proof in the speaker's eyes, for which reason he tends toward the absolute judgment, even the insult.: "Thus President Carter is not sincere, he thinks he is in the Middle Ages." While argument refutes, insult eliminates. Repetition of adjectives is frequent: "A feudal, tyrannical, backward regime." The word "force" reappears like a main theme (with it is true, the distinction between the "forces for war," and the "forces for peace"!). It is a question of "being for," "being against," and having "positions[3]."

The often triumphal amplitude of the phrase ("we communists") only enhances the preceding impressions. The frequent expression of the absolute is added to it: "It is by the joint action of these three forces that we will put the straight jacket on the fomenters of wars"; "the policy of the CPSU is unchanged and it will remain unchanged forever." The continual, dogmatic use, of negative restriction: "Francois Mitterrand only signed the common program as a means of weakening the PCF"; "the USSR pursues a policy of peace: socialism is peace, necessarily[4]." One can add the often binary construction of the sentence, which reflects the Manichaeism of the thought (the good communists of the PCF or the socialist countries on one side, the bad socialists of the PS [Socialist Party] or the western countries on the other, etc). The proclamation of the simplicity of things, once they are clarified by the speaker: "Everything is explained, you are going to see, it is simple"; "Why this situation? Quite simply because the PS abandoned its commitments." What is simple obviously penetrates better: Affected simplicity is part of the rhetoric of force.

The latter is expressed again, from one phrase to another, by the interminable play of questions-answers which the speaker gives all by himself. "What are the forces which are operating at this moment, forces of war? Not at all, it is the forces of peace which are operating." "I ask you a question: Do forces exist today to enforce peace, yes or no? I say yes and I say that the first of these forces is the Soviet Union." "We have preserved world peace for 35 years, have you asked yourself why? I am going to tell you why, it is because..."

There is only one didactic impression in this procedure: there is the more or less conscious intention to occupy the full extent of the speech, to not give his listeners time to breathe. This system of force culminates, without doubt, in the anaphora of the secretary general, which indicates that for him, to repeat is to convince: "In 1934 the PCF was right. In 1939 the PCF was right. The PCF was right against the war in Algeria. The PCF was right against the war in Indochina," etc. "In the affair in Cambodia, on what side was the PS? On the side of Prince Sihanouk..In the affair of Iran, on what side is the PS? On the side of the Americans...Afghanistan? It is on the side of those who want to maintain the right of the feudal lord to the first night with the bride." Of course, the need for symmetry compels some distortion of the facts.

An actor and orator, Georges Marchais is also the producer of his own speech. "You are going to see," he says. He not only narrates and reports scenes where he has been present or where he has absent persons speak (compare further on), but he also assigns the roles around himself. Before his listeners whom he judges ("You are a peculiar arbitrator, say then!") or whom he puts in the background ("It is not for you that I am speaking, it is for public opinion") or whom he hinders ("Say then, I say, oh, well quietly! well quietly, my friend!") or whom he threatens ("I am going to find some quotations of all of you") or whom he accuses ("I do not need a front man, myself!"), he knowingly has an intimidating behavior: has he not gone on other occasions as far as threatening to leave the premises? Every magnifying theatrical effect is an impression of force. In this act, it is necessary to attribute great importance to the myth of "the document": Marchais quotes a great deal; he has there in his file an overwhelming document where you see Giscard decorating the French paratroops for their African intervention; he makes a gift to Elkabbach of two booklets, which he wrote in March-April for the congress and where we will see "the justification of what is happening now"; he announces that everything which he cannot say this evening will

be published tomorrow in HUMANITE; finally, regarding the CBS denial, he declares he has in his pocket "a note with the date, the day and the precise time when the film was shown": only he keeps this note mysteriously without showing it because, he says "I want to see whether one will be honest enough in this country to show a film which exists"...In this production, the document (even kept in secret) supplies the speech with all the supposed reality to which he refers. The document, it is paper which has become history, the lay version of the sacred book, which there on the stage, confers all its "authority" on Marchais' prophetic qualities.

But there are also on the stage, all the comrades, all the sympathizers, all the workers, all the people which Georges Marchais mobilizes in his speech to have them speak through his own voice. "I believe that my party, my comrades, all my party comrades, including friends and sympathizers have fought," etc. "We take our places resolutely beside all the forces which are fighting imperialism...We will take our places beside the democratic forces which are fighting for progress. There is the position of the communist party!" The speaker in increasing the "subjects" of his own statement, reinforces it extremely. "They are numerous, who like myself have goose pimples when they see..." The crowd is with me, therefore I am making an impression. The "I" who speaks is effaced, in fact, much less than it is enhanced, as the frequent insinuation of "I myself" in "PCF" indicates: "There are some who choose the drug, I myself choose the Olympic games against the drug, there is the PCF's position." Marchais is the sum of the positions of the PCF and the herald of the forces of planetary progress. And when he proclaims "a position of principle (the right of peoples to independence" "to which we are firmly committed,") we understand that the principle only serves to give himself a "position" once more.

When all these effects of this rhetoric of force accumulate, during the great moments of the Marchais' speech, you see in the secretary general's happiness, in his verbal intoxication, how force fascinates him. It explains no doubt at the same time his obsession with being trapped (by competing forces) and his communist fideism (in converging forces). One understands that the comparison between the PCF and the USSR respectively opposing, one, other classes, the other, world reactionary forces, is not only the result of a correspondence in Marchais' mind, but also (and especially?) the consequence of an infatuation in George's eyes...It is said that the right

question is not: How could Marchais believe Brezhnev on his word? but rather: How could he not believe him? His fideism led him precisely to add faith to force.

Psychodrama and Dramatization

Fascination, intoxication, distrust, fideism: there is vulnerability in the Georges Marchais complex. He often "acts" all the stronger when he is less certain...

To begin, he has a pronounced tendency to define or defend his person (or the communists through it). He flatters himself on often being right ("Why was I right? Because...etc"). He is right because he is a communist. ("Khomeini is not a comunist, he does not think like me"). He controls himself perfectly: "You know, I never say anything casually." In the service of the revolution: "I am a revolutionary." You must not treat him as a miner: "If you please, you are a professor, but you do not have the right to give me a lesson. I am not in school, am I?" He considers himself the equal of the intellectuals in the party: "Perhaps I am only a worker in your eyes, but I am a militant worker, who with my intellectual comrades, in his party, is capable of making analyses which stand up." At the top of his party, he does not lack relationships: "in the latest period, I have traveled a lot, I have got my due, I have met 13 or 14 party secretary generals, chiefs of state, heads of movements etc." (Why has he got his due?, does he want to impress himself?). He telephones his "friend Enrico." He saw Brezhnev, there face to face, as I see you: "He was as you are there before me."

This need to assert himself, to pose convincingly on the stage perhaps explains his intimidating behavior: he intimidates out of fear of being intimidated. He is on the alert and reacts before being attacked. His initial reply to A. Duhamel is explained no doubt by cathartic projection ("you are in,I don't know how many broadcasts, and appear very nervous, very tense"). He unbends himself before relaxing the public[5]. This projection on others what he fears in himself (or of criticisms which he feels weigh down on him) is illustrated again in the assertion of his independence ("I know what independence is. I do not need a front man,") in the description of a PS which broke unity or even in the very "Bolshevik" portrayal of Carter ("He thinks he is in the Middle Ages, this fellow! The order comes from Washington! But he must still have leather boots and a whiplash, this Carter[6]!" There results a continuous need to assert himself by opposing, which leads Marchais after

having eclipsed his journalist-listeners to invent, to fantasize in his speeches these familiar figures which he heartily detests: Carter, Mitterrand, Giscard...

But he does better: he takes their place. One never hears him report their words indirectly and this behavior does not seem to be explained only by the more effective manner (theatrical) of the direct style. In his speech-play, Marchais likes to play the great roles, even if it is that of his adversaries, from whom he removes the mask a moment before tearing them down. He has Mitterrand say: "What does he say? He says; I am the union of the left (...) What does Mitterrand do? He takes a plane, he goes to Vienna before the Socialist International. The Socialist International criticizes him, he tells them: but, set your mind at rest my friends, I signed the common program to take 3 million votes from the PCF." He has Giscard say: "a president of the republic who told us--remember it was in 1974--: give me 100 days, oh, oh, 100 days, you are going to see, I will settle everything! It is 4 years since he said that..." (Marchais even imitates Giscard's verb: regarding the coming elections, the PCF candidate will be announced "at the right time"). What is characteristic of this role playing is that Georges Marchais does not change his language at all, that there is not even any change of intonation in the speech. He occupies not only the entire scope of the speech, but the full extent of the political scene which he fantasizes in this speech.

The most celebrated example is obviously his account of the Brezhnev-Marchais meeting where the speaker plays successively comrade Marchais addressing (firmly) comrade Brezhnev, then comrade Brezhnev addressing (in a fatherly manner) comrade Marchais. It is necessary to mention this scene in its entirety. We are going to see in it how, during the course of his own speech the son gradually becomes the father--the Soviet "we" being based on the "we" of the PCF which adopts its policy:

"Then I saw Brezhnev. I asked questions and I asked Leonid Brezhnev the following fundamental question. I said to him: you are the leader of a great country who bears a heavy responsibility and it is important for we French communists to know if the policy of the Soviet Union is really a policy of peace, a policy of detente, a policy of disarmament. It is important for us to know whether the goal you set for yourself, as is also ours, that is the inalienable right of every people to its independence and its sovereignty, if all that is the

policy of the CPSU. I said to him: I ask you the question and--the comrades of my delegation could testify to it--I ask you the question solemnly, but I ask it firmly.

"Leonid Brezhnev's answer was unequivocal. Moreover, I must tell you, you know, I saw a moment, when the interpreter made his translation, a certain question in his eyes, as if he was surprised by my question."

[J. P. Elkabbach]: and one speaks to him like that...

[G. Marchais]: Yes...No! surprised by my question. Because, it is true, that goes without saying, the Soviet Union pursues a policy of peace, it can only pursue a policy of peace: socialism is peace, necessarily. Then he answered me: Comrade Marchais, I can assure you that the Soviet Union's policy has not changed, that if we have intervened in Afghanistan, it is because we were forced to. We had hesitated a long time, a long time. Taraki had already asked us to provide him with military assistance against Pakistani intervention in Afghanistan's internal affairs. We did not do it at the time. When Amin came to power, he asked us to enforce the 1978 agreement. We did not do it. We had wanted to try to prevent this intervention which we knew could, for a time, help to create an atmosphere of tension. We had done everything, but finally we could not do otherwise..Pakistani intervention, foreign intervention, with the strings pulled by the Americans and others had become so obvious. If we had not intervened, that would have meant that we would not have respected the commitment which we made in signing the 1978 agreement.

"And he added immediately afterwards: Having said that, you can tell your comrades that the CPSU's policy is unchanged and that it will remain unchanged forever, because peace and disarmament are our objective."

Is it necessary to emphasize this symbolic solemn and moving relationship (Brezhnev's eyes!), comrade Marchais' fideism, convinced in advance because of his credo (USSR=socialism=peace), in the speech of father Brezhnev who places himself under the sign of the law (and of loyalty: we could not do otherwise!)? Must we show the unreal literalness of a sermon by Brezhnev all intermixed with a Marchais speech? Can we be satisfied in believing that G. Marchais merely wanted to make USSR policy understandable to the people. In fact, the dramatization of the secretary general's speech is the occasion for a psychodrama where the need for reassurance is satisfied with a bit

of megalomania. This is not incompatible, quite to the contrary, with the desire to win over the public, to reach the people through the interposed media...

Demagogy and Identification

I speak like you, think like me: such seems to be the verbal strategy which Georges Marchais practices to appeal to the "people" to identify with him, and in the same move, to join the PCF. He also shows in his speech as much as he can of his frankness, his popular "character" and his "lower class" speech. We note especially the stressed liaisons (observed by Cl.Sarraute: "C'est hextraordinaire quand meme.../It is extraordinary, nevertheless.../. Vous z'arrivez pas a vous mettre dan vot' p'tite tete"), /You cannot get it in your little head/; the suppression or shortening of some personal pronouns ("V's allez voir," /You are going to see/, "pass qu'y faut pousser le raisonnement plus loin" /not that it is necessary to push the reasoning further/, "Faut et'e serieux" /one must be sincere/) and the systematic elimination of the first negative particle: "J'arrive pas a comprendre que vous n'ayez pas encore compris," /I cannot understand why you have not understood/, "Faut et'e serieux: j'en dirai pas plus du Prince Sihanouk," etc /one must be sincere: I will not say anymore about Prince Sihanouk, etc/ These are not errors: one knows the speaker is too trained on the magnetoscope to allow this to pass unnoticed, and moreover, while he does not completely control his psychodramatic "frenzy," he has a good mastery of the language in which he expresses it (see above). It seems that Marchais indulges in his good old "dialect" of the working class districts, not without exaggerating it a little, precisely as De Gaulle became the object of popular affection, by "allowing himself to be influenced by a studied emotion" (during his contact with the crowd). We observe also that his populist language appears especially in his apostrophes to his direct listeners, while the more eloquent style characterizes the "political" developments where PCF positions appear. The second is involved with the first. In this respect, Marchais' speech attempts to connect a communist "culture" with a popular "character" on the stylistic level. This is the equivalent of the PCF attempt on the political level.

The appeal for identification, Marchais attempts it moreover just as much on the thematic level (in the more musical than intellectual sense of the word). The revengeful pity for the

misfortunes of the exploited, the legitimate anger against the traitor Mitterrand, after so many sacrifices of the PCF, the obsession and denunciation of the traps which have sprung up everywhere to defraud the good people, the need to believe in the Russian savior as well as to find western traitors, all this Manichean pathos tends toward the melodrama which makes Margot cry. Correspondingly, this hostile familiarity with the powerful (one wards off his distance from the "great" which one mentions, thanks to this familiarity of language with which one speaks about them) or this manner of bullying with a coarse joke the bourgeois intellectuals who question him (and there, he has beaten them!) gives his speech the atmosphere of the corner cafe.

The problem is to know if the corner cafe customers reciprocally understand his speech. For there is a difference (a tearing to pieces?) between the "rhetoric of force" of the communist party speech and the familiarities of popular speech. A gap which the orator desperately tries to fill because he seems involved himself: He tries to convince "as if his own life was at stake," observes LIBERATION, that is as if Marchais was constantly seeking to find for himself the unity between the communist "culture" and the popular "character," to join the people, while remaining at the top of the PCF. It is in vain for Marchais is no longer really of the people. And especially not on television. His populist language, imitating outwardly the popular way of speaking, tries too hard to "be low class"; in fact he only speaks the oral petit bourgeois language of the cabaret comics; and when he declares he said to his wife "pack the bags, we are returning to Paris," he certainly is closer to Courteline than to Zola. On the other hand, his regular psychodrama indicates too much to the average worker what he is, a worker "who has arrived," moving from equal to equal in the seats of authority, and for whom the rise in the PCF is a social elevation sufficient in itself. He gives too much credence, by his example as well as his speech, to the impression that outside the PCF, there is no popular salvation, which excludes as much as it can "bring together." And finally, the communist leader's attempt to portray himself as the shining ornament of the working class increases the distance between him and the proletarians, who have remained among the workers[7].

What purpose does this Marchais' speech serve under these conditions? To produce a good show. This spectacle in which the actor would only want to be an instrument is seen by the public as a performance in itself. The success of his speech

as a presentation indicates his failure to communicate. For the popular spectator, it provides, no doubt to the highest degree, emotional, revengeful or fideist satisfactions, but limited to the theatrical scope of the "show" (the class struggle, "personalized" is reduced there to a catch contest); for the bourgeois public, in spite of the thrill of the red speech and the delightful guilt it experiences in remaining at its post, it is a "secondary" pleasure, that of appreciating the quality of the performance and the positive creativity of the performer: in the final analysis, one ends up by pardoning him for his opinion (for the time being) because of his show, knowing well that it amuses everyone (communist or not) to really set an example[3].

But is not this also what the leader-actor, George Marchais seeks more or less unconsciously? Is there not nostalgia, unintentionally projected in this too explicit admission: "I am not there to amuse you" (wanting to intimidate is still wanting to win over)? Is not the televised show a sociological compensation, through the integration of the media systems, for the political "strategy of isolation"? And in doing this is not Marchais more representative than ever of a party which only manages to exist through dissension and to only live for unity, its identity and its "purpose" seeming by nature to be incompatible?

FOOTNOTES

1. L'HUMANITE of Tuesday 22 January, on the day after the broadcast "Cards on the Tables." The text reproduced in this newspaper is much less a series of extracts than a summary (at least of half) of the remarks of the secretary general.

2. Brezhnev also thinks it is enough to occupy terrain to convince people. Consequently the relevance of the heading in LIBERATION: "Hello, Marchais, hold your horses!"

3. The predilection for force obviously appears in the content of the speech: It is only a question of winning, of dealing blows, of going on to victory etc. Consequently this euphoria of the captain: "We have the force. If we combine these three great world forces which I mention and, in addition, take advantage of the contradictions which exist in the imperialist world, I say, we have the strength to impose and maintain peace." Is not peace the pretext here to glorify force?

4. A sentence sugarcoated as follows in L'HUMANITE: "That goes without saying: the USSR pursues a policy of peace: socialism is peace."

5. On TV Marchais observes "detente" in the Soviet manner, as the opportunity to rearm...

6. Making accusations against the adversary, on the rhetorical level, is very coarse: it is practiced especially in the elementary school playgrounds, when the youngsters stand up for themselves with remarks like "Look who is talking!" or "If you say it, you are it!"...

7. And it is precisely when he fails as a communist leader that Marchais "falls back" in his speech on the working class--as a resource or as consolation. Thus Duhamel's only question "What will you do if the PCF candidate is beaten by the PS candidate in the first round of the presidential elections?" confuses the speaker somewhat: "But that will be a first class funeral!." Duhamel declares: "It is a political hypothesis, I said 'if'." Marchais is uncomfortable and answers awkwardly, attempting to extricate himself through the demagogy of identification: "You know the 'ifs' are not what provides work for the employed and good wages for workers, it is not with 'ifs' that we will solve the problem of the railway workers, etc." This answer is not rational. It seems to originate in a kind of emotional instability.

8. It can even have the reverse effect. It can become the subject of a spectacle speech, the instrument of a rhetorical impression, that offends a certain working class dignity. You must not play the clown too much with the people's feelings.

8490
CSO: 3100

DECISIONS MADE TO INSURE ARIANE DEVELOPMENT

Paris LE MONDE in French 19 Apr 80 p 16

[Text] The two main decisions made on Thursday 17 April, during a limited cabinet meeting held in the Elysee Palace, with the chief of state presiding, cover initiation of studies preliminary to construction of a second launching pad at the Kourou Space Center, in French Guiana, and start of feasibility studies on a cryogenic engine (operating with liquid hydrogen and oxygen) with a thrust of 60 metric tons. (See our last issues, dated 18 April).

Construction of a second launching pad will make it possible to increase the rate of launching various units of the European Ariane rocket, limited, at present, to about half a dozen launches a year, at most. The cost of this operation is estimated at about 100 million francs. Its time schedule will be drawn up by the National Center for Space Studies (CNES) in the coming months, according to what was stated by Giraud, minister of Industry.

The 60-metric-ton cryogenic engine will probably equip the Ariane-5 version of the European rocket, at the end of the 1980's, in a second stage that will replace the present second and third stages (only the third stage is crygenic at present). Ariane-5 should be capable of inserting a 10-metric-ton payload in low orbit (altitude of 200 kilometers). This improvement in performance, as Giraud pointed out, will make it possible to launch large-sized space platforms, as well as the European space shuttle under study. It will also give rise to a definite decrease in the cost of a "kilogram in orbit," estimated at 60 percent in comparison with the cost of the present version of Ariane.

The limited cabinet meeting also made a survey of the various application programs in progress or scheduled. Giraud stated especially that the Franco-German agreement on the construction of direct television satellites would be signed "in a very few weeks." The French part of this program will represent a budget of around 100 million francs in 1980 that will increase to 320 million francs in 1981.

The minister also stated that the CNES budget should amount to 2.25 billion francs in 1981, (compared with 1.8 billion in 1980). He believes that this will bring it to "a level consistent with the extent of France's present space program."

Moreover, on Thursday, an ESA [European Space Agency] and CNES communique stated that the second flight test of the Ariane rocket was to take place between 20 and 30 May. The most likely date is 23 May.

10,042
CSO: 3100

DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON WAR INDUSTRY

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 27 Apr 80 p 22

[Article by D. Giannarakos: "Greece Will Soon Build 'New Generation' Tanks"]

[Text] Our country is today covered by a dense network of war industries which began to be created silently and methodically immediately after the overthrow of the coup. Up to then, not one word could be said about a war industry. All our needs in weapons systems and means, materiels, munitions and spare parts were covered by foreign production centers. We were even forced to procure the greatest part of the soldiers' personal items (uniforms, shoes, etc.) and camp equipment (tents, etc.) from abroad. A billion drachmas were spent to make Greece's defensive armoring possible and ensure the armed forces' preparedness.

Now, after only five and a-half years, we have our own war industry and the following factories are already successfully and productively functioning: an airplane factory in Tanagra; combat tank factory in Velestinon; portable armaments factory in Aigion; rolling stock factory in Sindos; ammunition and chemical products factories in Elevsis and Lavrion; warship-building factory in Skaramangas; telecommunications equipment factory in the Attiki basin area; and dry cell factory in Xanthi.

In 1979 alone, more than 200 million dollars in exchange were saved by the production of these factories; it is estimated that in the next three years savings will reach another 600 million dollars at least.

The present--but, even more, the future--is depicted as even more auspicious and it is estimated that very soon the war industry will reach the point that the first frigate and conventional training aircraft will be built. Another sector in which spectacular development is expected is tank building. Deputy Minister of National Defense A. Avramidis revealed in an exclusive interview to AKROPOLIS that an infrastructure has been created at the tank factory in Velestinon so that any type of modern tank chosen by the government can be built there.

Foreign Markets

The text of the interview given to AKROPOLIS by the deputy minister of national defense is as follows:

Question: Several days ago, Premier Karamanlis presided over a large meeting at the Pentagon in which further development of the war industry was decided upon and instructions and guidelines were given for the achievement of this goal. How will this further development be carried out?

Answer: Development, according to the premier's instructions, must be balanced so that the profitability of each industrial unit will be ensured because, otherwise, these units which will be created will have to be subsidized by the state budget. It is necessary for them to gain a profit from their operation so that they will be able, with investments from their profits, to renovate their technological equipment and expand their production. In order for this to be achieved, their production must cover not only the armed forces' needs, but must also be placed on foreign markets. On the basis of this principle, we will proceed in further developing the Greek war industry and will expand those sectors which it will cover in the future.

Question: When, essentially, did the war industry begin to be created in our country?

Answer: After the overthrow of the coup, with the instructions of Premier Karamanlis. The responsibility for developing the war industry was placed on the Ministry of National Defense and oversight and execution of the program was carried out under the personal supervision of Minister of National Defense Averof. The first industry to be established was the Greek Air Industry. I refer to this first because it is in the form of a privately-financed enterprise. Before the Greek Air Industry, the 304th Base Factory was created in its present form; it is a military factory, however, and is occupied with the reconstruction and modernization of tanks and armored personnel carriers.

Fire Power is Increased

Question: The 304th Base Factory constructs tanks from the ground up?

Answer: I would say no. Nevertheless, it is in a position to do so. It now breaks up the tank into its parts, constructs all the spare parts which must be replaced and reassembles it with new spare parts and accessories. It replaces the tank's gas motor with a diesel engine, thus increasing its radius of action, which was originally 500 kilometers, by 100 kilometers, makes it in fighting condition for night-time operations and, by attaching a cannon of 105 millimeters instead of 90 millimeters, increases its fire power. In addition, it decreases the size of the

turret which is greatly significant for the tank in case of operations.

In the 304th Base Factory there is also a section for constructing caterpillars to cover the armed forces' needs but also for the exports we are hoping to make soon. I must add that there is a possibility of this factory constructing certain accessories and making the final assembly of any "new generation" tank which could be selected to be built in Greece when this has been decided on in the remote future by the government and when economic conditions so permit. Up to now, no type has been chosen, but the potential for constructing accessories and assembling any modern tank has been expected for the 304th Base Factory.

Question: It has been announced that a program for construction of conventional basic training aircraft for the needs of the air force, but also for exports, will soon be put into effect. At what phase is this program?

Answer: It is proceeding. The matter was raised 14 months ago, possibly less. Then the agreement for starting the planning for the aircraft's construction was signed. This program is greatly inspired and it is not easy to complete in a short period of time the study and construction of the prototype so that it can be tested and we can see how to put it on a production line. At any rate, I think it will take at least two years for this to happen.

I would like the opportunity to add something more general about the Greek Air Industry. We believe that the total investment from every side, that is buildings and equipments and mechanical equipment, will have been completed by 31 December 1980. Then the Air Industry will be in a position to efficiently cover the whole spectrum of potentialities which it has been expected to have.

Profit in Exchange

Question: Aside from the factory rebuilding tanks and the Greek Air Industry, the Greek Weapons Industry [EVO], which constructs GA3 rifles of the German company Heckler and Koch, was created in Aigion. What do you have to say about this industry?

Answer: It is not up to me to report the history of the establishment of this industry which is so indispensable for our country. But I must point out that it was created in record time and it entered the fourth phase of its production eight months earlier than provided by the agreement with the German company. This means that the industry has already achieved an 80 percent Greek added value and it imports from abroad only the raw material for construction of the barrel and various other parts of the weapon. In addition to construction of the GA3 rifle, construction of a light machine gun of the Heckler and Koch company has begun and I am in the happy position to tell you that at this moment when we

are talking it is possible that the first 200 light machine guns have been delivered to the Greek Army.

As concerns the GAU, the industry has delivered to the army 30,000 weapons to replace the old arms and it has made exports in two directions--one to the mother company and one to another country. Certainly, the quantity of weapons exported is not very great. In one case, it is 5,000 rifles and, in the other, 6,000. But the fact that this occured under conditions of tough competition shows the high quality of local production and the potentialities of this industry. It must also be noted that the mother company assigned to EVO construction of rifle parts to use in assembly of its own weapons.

Finally, the 90mm recoilless rifle has already begun to be constructed by EVO and, as soon as the type of gun with which the Greek Army will be armed has been chosen, it will also begin to construct it.

Question: What else has occured in the war industry?

Answer: In the sector of shipbuilding, six "Combatant 3" type rocket boats have been built in an absolutely satisfactory way. In addition, small patrol gun motor boats and pursuit boats are being built. It must be reported that we are considering the possibility of constructing the hull and superstructures of any type of warship.

Question: In the recent meeting presided over by the premier it was announced that the construction of frigate type warships is being studied.

Answer: This will happen when the government decides on it. Certainly, the weapons systems, computers, etc. cannot be constructed entirely in our country at this moment. They will be imported from abroad as happens with other advanced countries.

But let us continue with the other industries. The Dry Cell Factory began operations a year ago in Xanthi. This factory covered the basic needs of the armed forces because dry cells have a very wide use in the three forces (in radios, etc.). So we have saved many millions of dollars in exchange.

In addition to these factories, there is also a network of other industries, such as telecommunications equipment and soldiers' personal items, like camp equipment. These latter industries have already made exports to Zaire and negotiations are being made with middle eastern countries.

In the meantime, in 1981 the Chemical Products Factory in Lavrion will begin operations for construction of rocket propellants; at the same time, studies are being made on the creation of other industrial units for advanced technology ammunition.

In conclusion, I must say that, if it is considered that during the coming five years the estimated lowest expense for procurements from abroad to cover only the armed forces' needs will reach five billion dollars, it is obvious that if, because of local production, the Greek added value covers an amount of at least 20 percent, then one billion dollars in free exchange will be saved. This means 50 modern airplanes for our air force or 1,000 tanks of the 1980-2000 generation for the army or six destroyers or seven frigates for the navy. All these could happen with a savings of only 20 percent from the local production of defense materiel while it is easy and absolutely feasible for an amount of 30 to 50 percent Greek added value to be obtained which will result in the general economic and social benefit being far greater.

I believe that, with the development of our war industry, we will save not only exchange, but we will also solve many of our development problems, among which is the problem of technical training. But, above all, we will serve the self-potential of our armed forces so that we will be able to ensure our defensive capability.

9247
CSO: 4908

ECONOMIC TREATY WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA DISCUSSED

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 5 May 80 p 15

[Text] A Greek delegation will go to Prague at the end of this month for discussions with Czechoslovak authorities on concluding an agreement for economic, industrial, and technical cooperation between the two countries.

The Greek side has already submitted a relevant plan, which is being studied by authorities in the Czechoslovak capital. Following the discussions in Prague, it is possible that the initialing of the agreement will ensue immediately.

According to reports we have received from reliable circles, the conviction is being expressed on the part of the Czechoslovaks that this agreement will have positive consequences on the extent of their cooperation with Greece. This conviction is based on the experience which they have from similar agreements which have been signed already with all the countries of the European Community.

According to data from an appropriate Czechoslovak service, the volume of commercial transactions between the two countries came to a total of about $36 million in the first 3 months of 1980.

Of this amount, about $17 million represented Greece's exports to and $17 million represented Greece's imports from Czechoslovakia.

Predominant in the Greek exports were agricultural products, which amounted to $11 million--an amount which shows an increase of 50 percent in comparison with the exports in the first 3 months of 1978. Among these products, first place was held by citrus fruits, and they were followed by the other agricultural commodities which we customarily export to Czechoslovakia, such as tobaccos, fruit juices, various other fruits, and so forth.

Moreover, exports of Greek textiles were 2 1/2 times higher compared to exports in the first 3 months of 1979, amounting this year to $1.2 million.

On the other hand, exports of cotton were 1/3 lower in the first 3 months of 1979 than exports for the corresponding period of 1978, amounting to $3.6 million in 1979.

Furthermore, in the imports from Czechoslovakia the top positions were held by iron and steel products, which accounted for $7 million, tractors and agricultural machinery, which accounted for $3 million, chemicals ($1 million), and food ($1 million).

In general, commercial exchanges between Greece and Czechoslovakia have experienced an upward trend in the last decade, with the extent of their growth being especially high in recent years. In 1970, the volume of these exchanges amounted to $26 million, in 1976 to $66 million, and in 1979 to $124 million. At the same time, the balance of trade has presented itself as being almost in equilibrium. The existing deficit which is borne by Greece amounts to about $2 million.

On the Czechoslovak side, hesitations are being expressed concerning imports of citrus fruits from Greece in the future. And this is because they are not certain whether or not from 1981 on--when commercial transactions will be settled in free foreign exchange--the Greek products will be competitive with respect to prices on an international level. In this connection, it is stated that last November and December, an opportunity was lost for supplying their market with Greek citrus fruits, because "their prices were higher than those for similar products from other countries."

12114
CSO: 4908

PENAL CODE AMENDMENT PROPOSED

Athens ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS in Greek 7 May 80 p 5

[Text] Yesterday, Minister of Justice G. Stamatis introduced for enactment in the Chamber of Deputies the draft of a law "concerning amending and supplementing the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure which pertain to judicial records." This draft law aims at orienting our laws toward the new developments in science and practice, and to this end it introduces many new innovations.

With the draft law submitted for a decision, the keeping of the judicial records by way of a file-card system is instituted, which will permit the gradual introduction of a mechanized-accounting system and of computers. Provisions are also being made for placing judicial records of aliens under the jurisdiction of the public prosecutor's office for Athens misdemeanors court judges, and placing the general judicial records under the public prosecutor's office for appeals court judges, instead of their being kept at the Ministry of Justice. This is being done to better protect the judicial nature of these police records.

The second article of the draft law refers to the entries to be made on the file cards. The chief innovations are:

a) Verdicts through which a punishment of deprivation of freedom for under 1 month is imposed are not to be entered in the judicial records. b) Fines are not to be entered. c) Verdicts imposing a correctional confinement against minors are not entered as long as this confinement is less than 5 years, in accordance with Article 54 of the Penal Code. d) Verdicts imposing reformatory and correctional measures against minors are not to be entered.

The third article designates those cases for which the file cards of the police records are retired. Aside from the already prevailing circumstances, there are also certain new features such as cases of granting amnesty for the crime and expiration of the period of a suspended execution of sentence. It is further provided that the withdrawn file cards will be saved for 1 year, but during this time use cannot be made of them.

In the fourth article, the types of copies are specified, which are limited to two kinds--namely:

a) To those which are exclusively for judicial use, and b) to those for general use. On the copy for judicial use, all the entries on the file card are recorded, while on that for general use the entries are restricted to the absolutely necessary data.

At this point, the new features of the draft law are mainly the following:

a) Punishments of imprisonment of up to 3 months are not to be recorded on the copy for general use. b) Also not recorded on this are punishments of imprisonment for 3-6 months after 1 year has passed since serving the sentence, punishments of imprisonment for 6-12 months after 2 years have passed, and punishments of imprisonment in excess of 1 year after 5 years have passed since serving the sentence. c) Not recorded are punishments of imprisonment imposed with suspended execution of sentence, or again during the period of probation. d) Not recorded is the corrective confinement of a minor, after 5 years have passed since his discharge, and e) Not recorded are unexecuted punishments of imprisonment after a period of 3 years from the expiration of the term of their statute of limitations. But such an omission of the aforesaid entries, along with the above-mentioned distinctions, will not take place whenever, before the expiration of the period of time stipulated for each case, a new entry has been made because of a conviction for some punishable act.

Finally, through this draft law the secrecy of the contents of the judicial records is safeguarded. And it is stipulated that it will go into effect 6 months after its enactment, except for the provision which concerns the formation of the general judicial records, which will be put into effect through a presidential decree.

12114
CSO: 4908

ESTABLISHMENT OF FIFTH FERTILIZER PLANT PLANNED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 26 Apr 80 p 9

[Text] The establishment of a new--the fifth--fertilizer industry in Messinia has been decided on to cover the needs of agriculture in southern Greece. In addition, the adoption of investment programs by an anonymous company for the agricultural development of the nome with the participation of ATE [Agricultural Bank of Greece], ETVA [Hellenic Industrial Development Bank] and other agents has been decided. In order to promote the new investments, a broad conference was convened at the Ministry of Agriculture in which took part the ministers of agriculture and industry and energy, G. Boutos and Milt. Evert, the vice-governor of ATE, K. Dousis, senior service officers of the ministry of agriculture and ATE, the nomarch of Messinia and representatives of the nome's productive classes.

Agriculture Minister G. Boutos announced after the conference that the establishment of the new fertilizer industry in Messinia was decided with the basic criterion being the rational distribution of the industrial potential for production of fertilizers throughout Greece. (As is known, all the fertilizer industries are concentrated in northern Greece; as a result, supplying of other areas with fertilizer is made difficult and the existing demand is not sufficiently met, especially on the islands.)

The new industry is designed to cover the agricultural needs in fertilizers of Crete, Dodekanisos, the Ionian islands and the Kykladea island group.

The agent of the new fertilizer industry will be ETVA which will finance the whole work, affording, at the same time, the possibility of local factors participating. It is expected that the new industry will employ, during the phase of its complete development, 2,500 to 3,000 persons. Particularly notable is the fact that no problem of polluting the Messinia environment will be created by its operation.

Finally, expansion of Kalambaka harbor as well as execution of other infrastructure works in the area is a basic presupposition for the achievement of a low cost of fertilizer transport.

It was also announced during the meeting that Messinia is one of the most dynamic agricultural areas and it can achieve high rates of agricultural develops t if a network of large investment works is realized in the agricultural-industrial sector during the coming years.

For this purpose, after a proposal made by ATE and EVTA, Boutos approved the establishment and charter of the new anonymous company which will promote the agricultural development of Messinia Nome according to the prototypes of analogous companies which have been established in other areas.

For the disposal by ATE and EVTA of the capital with which the company will be endowed, the minister signed a related suggestion to the Monetary Committee. After approval of this capital, the company's provisional council will be formed which will be composed of, among others, factors of Messinia economic life.

9247
CSO: 4908

BRIEFS

TRADE WITH RED CHINA--Developments in trade between China and Greece were examined in a meeting which the Chinese trade delegation had on 25 April with representatives of the Commerce Ministry's General Directorate of Foreign Trade. The Greek side stressed the need for a greater effort on the part of the PRC to buy products so that the credit balance--which presently amounts to 10 million dollars--can be stabilized. During the meeting, the head of the Chinese delegation, the director of imports for the PRC Ministry of Foreign Trade, Chao, stated that the purpose of the delegation is specifically to make an enquiry and eventually to conclude contracts for the purchase of Greek products to stabilize transactions. Chao said that the Chinese delegation is interested in purchasing ironwork products, particularly ferro-concrete, galvanized pipes, compound fertilizers, sulphur, dressed and undressed small animal skins, newsprint, packaging, etc. The Greek side made a proposal that interest be also shown in other Greek products, indicatively in: plastic pipes; asbestos cement, chromite and magnesium products; refractory products; tobacco, etc. It also proposed that the delegation study a wider list of Greek export products. The Chinese delegation promised to examine the list and make its viewpoints known. The PRC delegation, with the assistance of the Organization for Promotion of Exports (OPE), will have contacts with chambers of commerce, professional agents, businesses and factories to facilitate its mission. Interest was also shown in a visit to port facilities. [Text] [Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 26 Apr 80 p 9] 9247

CSO: 4908

ALTHING PASSES BUDGET; EXPENDITURES UP ALMOST 70 PERCENT

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 3 Apr 80 p 18

[Text] Three months into the fiscal year, the 1980 budget was finally passed yesterday in the full Althing by the unanimous vote of the 31 government party members. The budget is supposed to be passed before the year begins. The budget has not been passed this late since 1959. The total expenditures of the revised budget amount to 343.2 billion kronur, increasing by 8.768 billion kronur after adjustments in the Althing. Total revenue is estimated at 346.1 billion kronur, an increase of 6.35 billion kronur after adjustments in the Althing. The rise consists of a sales tax increase of 1½ percent or 6 billion kronur and an increase in the airport tax of 350 million kronur. If the estimated expenditures and revenue are accurate, there is a surplus of 3.8 billion kronur. The Currency Bank will be paid only 3.6 billion kronur of a close to 30 billion kronur debt from the beginning of the year or the equivalent of 1 percent of the total state figure.

The 1980 budget is not only the latest budget during the last two decades, but also the highest. The budget's tax revenue shows an increase of 65.7 percent from the 1979 budget (208.9), and expenditures are up 69.7 percent (from 202.3).

All the amendments of the opposition were defeated except one. Among them was a proposal backed by 10 Althing members of the Independence Party concerning a 5 billion kronur reallocation of a farm product subsidy for heating oil costs. It would have fulfilled a plan to "balance the cost of house heating" without increasing taxes. Also defeated was an amendment from the Independence Party to allocate a 990 million kronur adjustment fee for industrial development in keeping with promises to the industry alliance a year ago. Proposals for allocations to the Support Fund for the Handicapped, the Support Fund for the Retarded, the Art Gallery of Iceland (an increase), a hospital in Holmavik (an increase), and to "direct radio broadcasts from the Althing" (15 million kronur) were all defeated.

The only proposal from the opposition that was passed (32 votes to 19), was a proposal by Petur Sigurdsson concerning permits to reallocate the entertainment tax, which is used to support accident prevention, so that it will also include "construction of a residence and nursing homes for senior citizens."

A proposal by Olafur Ragnar Grimsson and others was also passed. It empowers the state to "purchase up to 250 copies of individual newspapers for state institutions in addition to what is allocated for papers in the fourth paragraph of the budget."

8743
CSO: 3111

BUSINESS LEADER VALSSON COMMENTS ON BUDGET EFFECT

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 2 Apr 80 p 18

[Text] Valur Valsson, director of the Federation of Icelandic Industries, expressed the federation's opinion of the amendments:

"In 1980, income tax and property tax will be levied on 1979 income and on property at the end of the year under the new tax law, i.e. Law No. 4018 of May 1978 concerning income and property taxes, along with the amendments that were passed in the Althing on 20 February. The new tax law involves major changes in the taxation of business. The main objective of the amendments is to adjust the tax law to inflation. The tax laws have not taken price developments sufficiently into account, which has been their main flaw in the past. This defect has developed in such a way that firms have been burdened with taxes that have not been in keeping with their status. It is, therefore, very urgent to amend the tax laws so that the tax burden on businesses is commensurate with their real status. It is too early to evaluate whether the measures are successful, as it is difficult to estimate their impact.

"The preparatory stage of the present tax laws took a long time and great effort. That, however, has not prevented people from branding the amendment 'a giant leap into the dark,' as the changes are unusually radical and very uncertain. During the formulation of the tax amendments, the Federation of Icelandic Industries and other business associations took a close look at the changes. This investigation resulted in the business associations submitting detailed joint amendments of the proposed tax laws. Morover, the Federation of Icelandic Industries submitted a special amendment in accordance with the tax paragraph in its platform. Several amendments were passed; however, the tax laws involve some provisions that could cause great trouble for business. One of the major things is the reallocation in income due to changes in prices, and there is also great danger that a firm's ability to pay will not square with the levying and payment of taxes. It is also clear that the planned tax bracket percentages in the amendment are very high, allowing little room for the growth and expansion of business. The proposal calls for a 65 percent tax on

companies' net income, leaving only 35 percent for business. The estimated property tax is 1.2 percent of the property tax basis, and I can assert that this is one of the highest rates in our area.

"The Federation of Icelandic Industries is in favor of tax laws that make adjustments to inflation to promote sound and strong business. However, it is clear that a major tax increase is not the way to expand business and create jobs in the country, and the planned increase could have serious consequences for business and jobs."

8743
CSO: 3111

PAPER COMMENTS ON NEW TAX LAW, INFLATION EFFECT

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 10 Apr 80 p 24

[Editorial: "Price Countdown--Increased Sales Tax"]

[Text] Three 1980 budget proposals were submitted in the Althing before one was finally passed 3 months into the fiscal year. The budget has not been this late for the last 20 years. They are supposed to be passed before the beginning of each fiscal year. Under the law governing the management of economic affairs, the government must submit an investment and loan program along with the budget, to give an overview of the state's financial affairs. This regulation has been violated now. There was no overall loan program ready at the last stage of the budget process.

The two prior budget bills involved two-part subsidies, as in the budgets of the past few years: on the one hand, a farm products subsidy, and on the other, a home heating oil subsidy. The third proposal submitted by the present government called for revocation of the present government oil price equalization to justify a plan for an immediate increase in the sales tax.

The Althing members of the Independence Party submitted an amendment reallocating 5 billion kronur in farm product subsidies to home heating oil subsidies, which would have resolved the most urgent problem of price equalization without new taxes. But the pro-government forces staunchly opposed the proposal and defeated this easy way out of our difficulties. Instead, they proposed a 4 billion kronur subsidy for oil in 1980, which merely maintains the same subsidies as last year. This generosity was tied, however, to a 2 percent sales tax boost, which would yield 11 billion in extra revenue over a 12-month period, or almost triple the amount that was supposed to be allocated for the subsidy. This "countdown method" of the finance minister on prices of goods in this country was not too successful, owing to criticism in the Althing from both government members and the opposition. The outcome will probably be a 1½ percent increase in the sales tax, which will yield more than double the amount that will be used for heating oil subsidies. The sales tax alone yields about 50 percent of the Treasury's

total revenue. Its increase is therefore the quickest way to empty people's paychecks into the Treasury and to work against the promised "price countdown" in the country.

According to the Economics Institute, direct taxes for the state and rural associations, i.e., income and property tax, health insurance fee and real estate tax, amounted to 11.6 percent of taxpayers' gross income in 1978. This ratio is estimated at 14.6 percent in 1980 and has therefore increased 3 percent through the efforts of two left-wing governments. Developments in indirect, price-increasing taxes (duties, sales tax, etc) are even more dangerous. The Treasury will take 46 billion kronur more in taxes of this kind in 1980 than during the last year of the Geir Hallgrimsson government in 1978. However, 14 billion can be subtracted from this amount because of the sales tax exemption for food and duty decreases resulting from international agreements. Nonetheless, there has been a 32 billion kronur net tax increase. The biggest tax boost, about 10 billion, comes from the increase in the Treasury's share in gasoline prices, which is making the automobile a privilege of the wealthy. Therefore, it is not surprising that the leadership of the Alliance of Rural and State Workers and the negotiating committee of the Icelandic Federation of Labor have protested the announced increases in the income tax, rural taxes and the sales tax, which, along with the devaluation, "is like oil on the fires of inflation," as the government worker's agreement says. It is difficult to see how the government will pave the way for wage agreements by taking this approach and there is not a single krona in the People's Alliance budget for the so-called "social issues package," which is a sort of window-dressing in the government platform.

On Monday and Tuesday before Easter, Althing meetings had to be postponed three times each day because of disagreement and a lack of discipline among the government's happy family. Many people are displeased with the tax-happy ministers. However, the "price countdown," which the 1½ percent increase in the sales tax involves, will in all probability be reached in the Althing by the end of the week.

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ALTHING APPROVES RAISING SALES TAX

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 11 Apr 80 p 2

[Text] Regulations to increase the sales tax by 1.5 percent and to impose a temporary oil fee on fishing vessels were passed in the upper chamber of the Althing at 2200 hours yesterday evening. The regulations were passed in a roll call vote of government party members against Althing opposition party members. The regulations will take effect on Monday morning 14 April and last indefinitely. An amendment from Eidur Gudnason calling for their termination by year end was defeated.

The Althing members of the government opposition party staunchly opposed the sales tax increase, and one of the Independence Party's Althing members, Thorvaldur Gardar Kristjansson, said that this was part of the government's general assault on the taxpayers in the country. Eidur Gudnason, Sigurlaug Bjarnadottir from Vigur, and Larus Jonsson agreed. Gudnason made the particular point that it was a clear violation of the law and the constitution. According to the so-called Olafs law, measures like this must be talked over with business and labor, but this had not been done.

The finance minister's answer was that it would be unreasonable to have all bills brought up for consultation before they are submitted to the Althing. On the other hand, they should be talked over after they are submitted, which has been done. Gudnason said, however, that it was necessary to bring up the issues first with business and labor and that he felt that the Workers Alliance should have been given the chance to give its opinion of the sales tax increase before the issue was finalized in the committee yesterday evening. He also said that the Farmers Alliance should be given the chance to express its opinion. That did not happen yesterday before the laws were passed.

One of the Independence Party's Althing members, Gudmundur Karlsson, said in discussions on temporary oil fees for fishing vessels that the opposition did not want to support this bill, which did not solve the problems of fish processing or fishing in the country and, therefore, was of little use.

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FISHING SHIP OWNERS HAVING GREATER FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 25 Mar 80 p 48

[Text] Discussions outside the daily agenda of the Althing yesterday revealed that the total unpaid debts of trawlers to the Fishing Fund amount to 3.2 billion kronur, while unpaid debts of other ships total 2 billion kronur, and the debts on real estate of fish processing firms amount to 2 billion kronur. The total unpaid debt of the fishing industry to the Fishing Fund is 7.6 billion kronur. This does not include interest. The debts of the same partners to the Community Fund total over 1 billion kronur. Magnus Bjarnason asked the minister whether the debts of the fishing industry along with increased domestic costs and price increase on foreign markets called for new taxation of the fishing industry, i.e., 7 kronur per liter of gasoline and 7,000 kronur per ton of black oil, in order to balance the energy prices in the country, as rumor would have it.

Then, Matthias Bjarnason pointed out that during the 47 days of the 84 that were left of the year, no fish prices had been in effect in this country where the fishing industry is so important. Seamen and fishing vessel owners demanded higher prices for fish in keeping with increased price bonuses for wages on 1 March, i.e., about 6.67 percent, and the fish processing firms demanded 12 percent because of their worsening operational status. He inquired whether, when and how the government plans to deal with the problem of the country's number one activity.

Commerce Minister Tomas Arnason replied that the government had not made any decisions as far as fisheries taxation was concerned, due to the situation in energy matters. Answers concerning a devaluation to support exports were unclear, as the ministers considered it dangerous to give advance information on possible devaluations. They quoted provisions in the constitution concerning restraint in matters of exchange rates.

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ECONOMICS INSTITUTE STUDY: 1979 EARNINGS UP 48 PERCENT

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 11 Apr 80 p 36

[Text] A study by the Economics Institute of rise in people's income from 1978 to 1979 reveals that it is no* 45 percent,as assumed in the budget and the proposed tax tables that are now in the Althing. National average income is considered to be up in the range of 47-48 percent. This means that the budget, in keeping with the tax tables, will yield 46.7 billion kronur or about 3 billion kronur more than the Althing and the government had aimed for.

According to information MORGUNBLADID gathered yesterday, the tax tables that it published yesterday show a 25 percent tax on income up to 3 million, 35 percent on the bracket from 3 to 7 million and 50 percent on earnings above 7 million. The tax tables were introduced at a joint meeting of the finance and economics committees of the Althing yesterday morning. The government party members wanted to streamline procedures, but the opposition demanded more detailed information about the rise in people's earnings. As a result of this demand, the Economics Institute was assigned the task. Plans have been made to inform the committees of the findings at a joint meeting early today.

There has been uncertainly about the extent of this earnings increase, since tax returns were collected a month later than usual, and employers have not yet filed their tax returns. But according to a provisional sample from some of the biggest towns on the Reykjanes Peninsula and Reykjavik, all indications are that the national average income is two to three percent higher than had been estimated. This alters the premises for the recently passed budget, as well as the tax tables that are now under discussion. The new premises will yield an additional 2.9 billion kronur in revenue to the state, with respect to the 45 percent estimate and 1.7 billion kronur more than provided for in the tax tables that Ragnar Arnalds introduced initially and that were cause for great alarm.

Amendments to the aforementioned tax tables that are being handled by the finance and economics committees of the Althing, involve a 525,000 kronur personal deduction for the first child and a 215,000 kronur deduction for any other children. Child support grants for a single parent are 280,000 kronur per child. Furthermore, a 65,000 kronur child compensation increase is called for for each child under 7 years of age.

8743
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POSSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST CONNECTION ASSESSED

Naples IL MATTINO in Italian 5 Apr 80 p 1

[Article by Sabino Acquaviva: "The Terrorist Internationale"]

[Text] To what degree is this Italian terrorism international? For how long? To what countries is it tied? It is easy to answer the first question: The degree of internationalism is still modest. The guerrilla warfare and terrorism with extensive international ties are much more sophisticated: Missiles and bazookas do not appear occasionally, and for reasons that cannot be exactly described, as happened in Italy in the Ortona episode. But other war weapons, an expression of solid international ties, are more sophisticated. The IRA [Irish Republican Army] uses high explosive bombs: Many have seen their effects on the streets of northern Ireland, the famous mines at times have opened holes more than 5 meters wide and up to 2 meters deep. When bombs are placed in barracks or public places, the buildings often are demolished down to the foundations. How the explosive auto is used demonstrates a refined knowledge.

No, fortunately we still have not arrived at that point in Italy.

But is this international character of Italian guerrilla warfare a matter of origins? Certainly not. Italian guerrilla warfare was born and developed in Italy. It brew gradually and only with time--when it reached a certain clear size--did it attempt to establish international ties. It seeks, and at the same time, it is sought: Guerrilla warfare and terrorism, at a certain point of their development, always tend to become integrated and to help each other. All the organizations need to disguise themselves, to create bases of support abroad, and therefore they search for such things. This implies that Italian terrorism--even though its origin is local--winds up by showing that it has international ties.

Guerrilla warfare and national terrorism demonstrate a political and a technical-military internationalism. For the time being, Italian guerrilla warfare politically seems to look to France. Instead the extent of ties with France seems to be rather modest. This is demonstrated by the small size, in terms of quality and quantity, of the weapons caches found up to now in that country. The limited information we possess regarding more sophisticated weapons refer to the Arab nations or even to Palestine groups.

In the same way, in my view, the training camps are Palestinian: Until now the terrorists have often shown they can shoot well, they can kill a person a few centimeters from another one they wish to avoid. This implies training and it means the availability of shooting ranges and extensive use of them. This would be extremely difficult if not impossible in clandestine ranges on Italian territory.

No, it is probable that the ranges are abroad and perhaps in Arab countries. Instead it is more difficult to think of the IRA, when the cold-bloodedness is considered, for Italian guerrilla action. Certainly it is possible also to speak of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, but for the time being this hypothesis is politically improbable if not unthinkable.

However, in the present state of affairs it does not seem that the prospects of internationalization of Italian guerrilla action are brilliant. And without internationalization, the possibilities of revolt are very modest. Alone, without massive outside aid in large amounts, revolt in an advanced industrial nation such as Italy cannot develop. At a certain point, there is a desire to emerge from the underbrush of sporadic attacks and political assassination, and therefore it needs outside aid.

But large amounts of aid will never arrive by sea from countries that are distant materially and politically such as Ulster and/or Libya or the Palestine of the diaspora. The road to international ties on a grand scale therefore seems impracticable. And therefore, from the strategic point of view, Italian guerrilla action has no future. The successful guerrilla fighters always have been those who somehow were supplied from across the borders of the country in which they developed, and in our country this kind of frontier does not exist. At least for the time being.

Yes, for the time being, because if, after Tito, Yugoslavia should fall into the USSR sphere, it could be hypothesized that the Soviet Union, or one of its allies, could be tempted to "export the revolution." Certainly, the possibility that post-Tito Yugoslavia would fall into the Soviet orbit is not plausible, and it is also not very plausible or even improbable that the USSR would change its attitude of rejection against the RB [Red Brigades], and it is also very unlikely that it would adopt a policy that would be indirectly hostile to the Italian Communist Party. But there does exist a very remote possibility that all this could happen. And the Red Brigades seem to know this: In fact they never attack the Soviet Union politically. Everything considered, in any case, it would be better if it all ended quickly, before the international picture changes; before events occur in Yugoslavia or elsewhere which however today seem, and almost certainly are, entirely improbable.

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PCI'S MANCINI ON LEFTIST ROLE IN TERRORISM

Rome AVANTI! in Italian 12 Apr 80 p 10

[Commentary (Il Punto) by Giacomo Mancini]

[Text]

Only a year ago, on 7 April 1979, when the police (and not only police) operation against Autonomia Operaia began, everything looked so sure, so solid, so irrefutable. Circumstantial evidence, proof, testimony, impeccable procedure right down the line. And it all came at such a steady pace: statements and interviews from the Padua DA's office saturated radio, TV, and the print media, with reckless regard for the value of time and space. We were already in the midst of an election campaign. This was a genuine triumph for the democratic state over its enemies, proper vengeance exacted for Moro's murder and for the awful political and police blunders that began on the very day of the massacres in Via Fane amd went relentlessly on for the next 50 days, with parliament and the government stricken dumb with terror, the political parties huddled unsure and frightened behind a facade of unbending firmness.

Those who scented a witch-hunt in the offing were branded as "fellow-travelers," until somebody wrote in the papers -- having read a little bit about American jurisprudence -- that under such circumstances there is no difference between opinion and crime. The security principle, born of bourgeois culture and assimilated by a left no longer dyed-in-the-wool Marxist, was almost as deadly and dirty a wound as terrorism itself.

Not that things are going any better today: and yet it is a fact, slight though it may be, that the articles marking the 7 April anniversary do not have quite the ring of cast-bronze certainty of a year ago, and that they call -- particularly Eugenio Scalfaro's -- for compliance with due process and respect for the rights of the accused, things hitherto taken for granted. This

is not much, of course: it is not the sudden awakening whose absence Rossanna Rossanda quite rightly laments in her article in the 8 April issue of MANIFESTO, that general outcry that should have come at the 7 April and 21 December inquiries. Rossanda is right when she says that since then there has not been a single signature of a democratic group to be read on a petition saying: "Trials for 7 April! Free the people still held without reasonable evidence of guilt"

But why not run a test, why not try the consciences of those who in all good faith accepted 7 April, and who do not accept it quite so whole-heartedly now? Why not look into some of the talk about the involvement of organizations controlled by the Christian Democrats (DC) in the terrorism? Why is no such pressure being felt now?

Her article is lucid, and on many counts it is right on the mark, as important, on other counts and by other standards of analysis, as Giorgio Bocca's book. Are theirs only voices crying in the wilderness, where no man can hear or answer? I know from experience that rhetorical exhortation is not terribly convincing. But if that path is fruitless -- and it is not -- there are issues on which the left cannot avoid taking a stand.

It is easy for the left, in normal times, to espouse a concept of the state, of society, and of democracy which is different from that of the Christian Democrats and from that of the moderate parties in general: but the left, by reason of its very nature, never operates in a "normal" dimension; it operates -- or it ought to operate -- in the immediate and in the long run, for the transformation of the social and economic foundations of society and of the state; and this triggers some very tough reactions and counterblows, against which the democratic principles of the left must stand firm: its democratic credibility is at stake, as is its very function in political and governmental leadership. If the terrorists have succeeded in stripping the left of these principles and the behavior consequent upon them, every other test of strength in which the left might venture to engage as an alternative to the governing parties would be doomed to the same outcome. And then Rossana Rossanda would be right in pointing out that the left's concepts of the state and of freedom are frail indeed, if, when called upon to take a stand in so dread a battle as this it is left in such total disarray. What will happen when other emergencies arise? If right now the left's idea of the way to counter terrorism is to subscribe to the Christian Democrats' notions, what will it find tomorrow, in the face of reactions to a process of transformation and of change, as a model for its behavior?

Now, though, let's move on from theoretical pronouncements and blue-sky projections to more readily verifiable data. In my view, the facts we can check are, briefly, these. On the issues of the state, of democracy, of freedom, the left has never accepted either the Christian Democrats' value system or its methods, nor has it ever swallowed its explanations: it did not accept them in the days of centrism or while Scelba was running things, and it did not go along with them when the DC-designed state sent the police out against the struggling peasants in the Mezzogiorno, against the great worker and union struggles, in the name of protection of individual liberties and the peculiar Christian Democratic concept of legality. That system of values was not accepted -- on the contrary: it was openly challenged -- even when the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), as a partner in the center-left coalition, entered into a cabinet relationship with the Christian Democrats. I shall not dwell at further length on this count, save to cite our battles as socialists against the "sins of omission," against "reasons of state" invoked against the reasons of truth and democracy, and against legal maneuverings used to becloud the truth behind the Piazza Fontana slaughter.

If the left has indeed forgotten that it succeeded in extricating itself from the pillory and from the trials of democratic maturity rigged for it by the DC by turning the line of questioning around against it, then Rossana Rossanda's pessimism is wholly justified, and the ultimate defeat of the left is inevitable. And the left is destined to go down to ineluctable defeat if it swallows the history of '68 as it was fabricated in the wake of the 7 April and 21 December inquest.

I refuse to believe that terrorism has so paralyzed the left's cerebral centers as to make it forget that the Mazza report itself cited thousands of people who were guilty of breaching the peace in Milan, but never mentioned any plan for insurrection, and that assumptions of that kind -- insofar as our party, then part of the government, was able to learn -- were never formulated in the reports of the local Questura political offices during the 1968 dispute. Why have the Defense Intelligence Service (SID) reports filed for the period never been made public?

That the left did not view the dispute as a criminal and insurrectional movement is further proved by several episodes, such as the PCI's opposition to liquidation of the proposed university reform plan by which, at the end of 1968, the center-left parties and the government thought they could damp tension on the campuses; or the barrage of criticism levelled by the communist opposition at the PSI -- not at the students barricaded inside the universities -- when the Christian Democrat interior ministers sent the police to clear out the occupied universities. As for our side, it never once entered our minds to accuse the PCI of being soft on subversion.

I am fully aware that increasingly atrocious, inhuman, and blood-chilling terrorism makes any discourse with the least tinge of critical analysis very difficult. Punitive investigations are spreading. It is getting hard to keep track of them. Among the many, one -- that of the so-called Vescovio hideout -- has to do with a member of my family. Whatever became of "Mancini's son-in-law" with whom the press and TV were busied for so many weeks? What is his legal status as a detainee cut off from his defenders and from his judge? And how many others, like him, are being held in preventive detention that may last as long as 12 years?

It isn't just 7 April, although 7 April cannot but be the focus of all our thoughts. By "ours," I mean all of the left. These will be hard thoughts, because terrorism is maddening: but that is exactly why they are necessary. Thoughts about terrorism, about its roots -- political and other, about the fight against terrorism, and about the horrendous political devastation it has provoked. And only the left can bend to the task of pointing to political solutions: if it does not do so, it will risk strangulation in the spiralling escalation of terrorism and anti-terrorism to ever more dizzying and ever bloodier heights of militarization. Get out of it, says Rossana Rossanda, by yoking reason with revolution.

I would counsel a reawakening of democratic sensitivity, political analysis, steps to halt repressive methods that broaden the potential swathe of terrorism, a reaffirmation in practice of those principles and those ideas of the state, of democracy, and of society that are the mark and insignia of the left as it addresses the moderate parties to which terrorism offers the chance to create the plague-stricken cities which, as somebody has said, are the ideal environment for those who would apply the pitiless rod of stern, stifling discipline. Yet the plague still rages. Do we want it to go on? If we don't,how can we explain the fact that in a "political class" which claims to be dedicated to the cult of the chairman, we cannot find the chairman of the parliamentary commission of inquiry into the Moro killing, despite the fact that my own "case" has been so ingeniously "solved?"

6182
CSO: 3104

FLM'S BENTIVOGLI INTERVIEWED ON FACTORY TERRORISM

Rome AVANTI! in Italian 13-14 Apr 80 p 2

[Interview with Metalworkers' Secretary-General Franco Bentivogli on factory terrorism, conducted by Vittoria Sivo in Rome]

[Text]

"Of course it is disconcerting to find out that the Armed Party is inside the plant, that the Red Brigades are among us, that they can disguise themselves as union delegates. And it is disconcerting to see the notion that union struggles are tantamount to terrorism making headway in public opinion." Franco Bentivogli, secretary-general of the Metalworkers' union, bitterly admitted that he has never been so beset with requests for interviews and statements as he has since the latest arrests, the latest discoveries of hideouts, brought out the names of union workers, delegates, and people who represented -- among others -- the FLM-CISL, of which Bentivogli is the leader.

[Question] Some people think that labor has made some errors, perhaps errors of omission, in the fight against terrorism.

[Answer] We are in the paradoxical position of being criticized and accused and at the same time targets for terrorism.

[Question] What do you mean by "targets?"

[Answer] We in organized labor are the number-one enemies of the Armed Party, because we are the democratic alternative. And then, too, because we are also targets in the tactical sense.

[Question] Are you talking about threats and intimidation directed at FLM cadres and delegates?

[Answer] Precisely. Death threats, continually, even against the families, the wives, and the children of union delegates and leaders. In Milan, in Turin, in Genoa. Some of our people have had

to change jobs, move to other cities. It isn't everybody who is strong enough to keep on working under conditions like these.

[Question] Do you believe these threats of reprisals will be enough to slacken union members' vigilance?

[Answer] In the vast majority of cases, no; I don't think so. The union must be, and is, ready to run risks. If one of our members knows something (and let's get this clear: we are not talking about vague suspicions), he goes straight to the police and reports it. We are not asking anybody to be a hero, especially because there are so many ways to avoid exposing individuals to direct risk. It might be the union body as such that files the report.

[Question] Could you cite me instances or plants where the FLM or its leaders behaved that way?

[Answer] No. That's as if you were to ask me to play games with somebody else's skin. The terrorists are not joking. In one of the hideouts discovered in Turin just a while ago they found the names of five union men on the terrorists' hit-list, along with detailed descriptions for identifying them -- their way of walking, the way they wear their hair, fresh particulars on the kind of glasses, for example, that one union man had just had changed a month ago.

[Question] What did you think when you read the statement of Domenico Jovine, one of the 61 men fired from Fiat, who told the court at the Biella trial that he was "a member of the BR"?

[Answer] I thought that the BR (Red Brigades), with that statement from Jovine, had done harm to organized labor that not even all the forces of reaction in this country could have done. Because that statement lent credence to the criminalization of labor struggles.

[Question] Aren't really tough, angry labor battles a matrix for violence?

[Answer] Violence is foreign to organized labor. There have been instances of people's getting carried away with anger, but that is understandable in someone who has been on the picket line for months. But we never acquiesce in forms of struggle that threaten the dignity and safety of the individual. Why don't we talk about the violence there has been in some strikes by hospital workers and doctors?

[Question] The union has not disavowed those who dragged their team and shop foremen into the parades through the plant.

[Answer] We didn't take out full-page ads in the paper to do it. But in the shop and plant meetings, in those shops, we spoke out in no uncertain terms against such practices, or against workers who marched in those processions with ski-masks over their faces. We have not been sleeping. But we have also tried to win people back to our democratic methods.

[Question] Do you still believe, in the light of the latest events, that the Armed Party is only a minority in the plants?

[Answer] Yes. A very small minority, but one that is nevertheless determined to drive a wedge between the workers.

[Question] And can the union do anything to protect itself?

[Answer] We can step up our screening, our vigilance. But when we are up against people who would never be suspected, people like Betassa or, to go back a little further, like Walter Alasia -- we are substantially powerless. We cannot have absolute certainty, absolute guarantees. We cannot forget that the PLM has 1.1 million members.

[Question] When you hear about reactions of indifference toward victims of terrorism, do they ever make you believe that the percentage of people in your rank and file who are neither for nor against the BR is larger than you might have thought?

[Answer] It is possible for popular sentiment to differ frequently from the official opinion we proffer. We are doing our best to make people clearly understand that when men like Bachelet or Alessandrini are murdered, what has happened is not something of no import to the individual worker. The union, though, is not the worker's whole life, and the worker's views and opinions on society, on its institutions, or on the inefficiency of public services are not all shaped within the union.

[Question] Are you worried that these latest developments in relation to terrorism may backfire against the unions?

[Answer] I am very much afraid that they may be made into sticks to beat us with. We must be very wary of the witch-hunt climate that may well develop. The effects of it are already to be seen: take the civil-rights advocates (mark you, I'm not talking about the bleeding-hearts, but about the people who simply called for compliance with the constitution) -- what happened to them? You know who is paying the highest price? The parties of the left, beginning with the PCI, and the labor movement. Jovine's statement at the Biella trial carries a potential for intimidation of the left whose consequences are incalculable.

[Question] Why so?

[Answer] Because if organized labor turns inward upon itself, if the area for dissent is narrowed, if little by little we lower the level of democracy -- well, then, we had better be aware that we are at risk of losing those who, so to speak, side with the criminals. And that will in turn strengthen the thrust toward clandestinity."

6182
CSO: 3104

TERRORISTS CLAIM RESPONSIBILITY FOR KILLING IN SALERNO

Naples IL MATTINO in Italian 10 Apr 80 p 17

[Article by Gino Liguori: "Red Brigades Break Silence With Leaflets on Giacumbi"]

[Text] Salerno. The Red Brigades have reappeared in the city. Two leaflets signaled their presence. They were left in the lobby of a building in the historical center and on the stairs in a building in the popular quarter of Santa Margherita on the eastern outskirts of the city.

Two tenants, whose names were kept secret, found them. One leaflet was taken to the Carabinieri station and the other to the central police station.

Immediately a vast investigation was begun by the political office of the police which maintained constant contact with the attorney general's office where late in the morning a summit meeting was held which was attended by judges, Carabinieri officials and DIGOS [Directorate for General Investigations and Special Operations].

All agreed in their assessment of the double episode. The RB leaflets were the same left in a center-city bar the day after the murder of Judge Giacumbi in order to take credit for the crime. The leaflets left by the RB were a signal to let it be understood that the execution of the attorney general is not to be considered an event that cannot be repeated but falls within a precise strategy from which other developments are to be expected (it is not possible to foretell when and how).

The leaflet that claimed credit for the death of Giacumbi had never been made public by the authorities, who released only some details. The original text was kept top secret, which was unusual in such cases but already in the days after the crime there were those--among the investigators--who emphasized the need, for the purposes of later investigations, to avoid making it public in order to establish the possible existence of a hideout or at least of some meeting place in the city. The two leaflets left at two points so distant from each other, but which were similar because of the social analogies that link the two sections of the city, were reproduced

by mimeograph from the same stencil used to print the one left in the Beatrice and Natella bar.

The question posed by the investigators--who have no doubt about this detail --refers only to the time of reprinting. They could be copies run off at the time of the crime and then held in reserve for yesterday's action, or they could be freshly printed. The latter hypothesis would support the idea that the Red Brigades have available at Salerno or in the suburbs a hideout in which, as is their style, they have a mimeograph machine for their messages, as well as weapons.

Whether the hideout exists, however, does not exclude the fact that the Red Brigades could have established a column (which carries the name of Fabrizio Pelli, the young terrorist who died of leukemia in a Milan hospital while he was being held by the police for his ties with Alunni) whose activities might not stop only at the Giacumbi episode.

Is further terrorist activity then to be expected? DIGOS officials made a gesture of helplessness even though there are those who did not hide the impression that Salerno will soon be talking again about the Red Brigades. Are these just hypotheses based on the experience in other cities, or are they conclusions derived from an investigation of the objective situation following the crime against the attorney general?

It is certain that yesterday the attorney general's office sent out an order to intensify a certain kind of investigation, while in police circles were heard the announcement of the arrival of officials and reinforcements of the existing police.

A DIGOS official said: "As far as we are concerned we will do our duty fully, utilizing the men and means available to us to the maximum: The investigation of the Giacumbi murder has not stopped for a second and we will continue in the future on this road."

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REPORTER ANALYZES TERRORISM IN SARDINIA

Cagliari L'UNIONE SARDA in Italian 19 Mar 80 p 3

[Article by Alterto Testa: "Banditry and Red Brigade Action: Up to What Point Does a Common Ground Exist?"]

[Text] Nuoro, 19 March--Among the nonparliamentary forces of the left there is a blackout atmosphere: Those most concerned are the representatives of "Su Populu Sardu," which always has been inclined toward separatism and which because of the historical association (considering Ireland and the Basque countries) always resort to violent struggle. Having identified an anticolonialist component in the ideology of the Barbagia Rossa terrorists "means having committed a gross error which risks becoming a provocation against all militants of the neo-Sardinaan area." Is this fear justified? Listening to the investigators, it would seem decisively not. An investigator says, "The groups who promote Sardinian supremacy work in the full light of day, have their headquarters where they publish their newspapers, appear on television, commit themselves to bilingualism, and even participate in elections. To suspect them of complicity with the terrorists means taking a wrong road. Instead, they give food for thought to certain youths who are outside the political movements of the extreme left: Here at Nuoro over the past 3 years all the cultural circles have disappeared, the only meeting place is the bar on Corso Garibaldi. The independents meet in small groups. We keep them under surveillance but we certainly cannot charge them on the basis of simple suspicion. Unless they give themselves away as happened for the three arrested at Cagliari."

So far the attacks carried out in Nuoro and in the Barbagia cities (against the police, Carabinieri, "red" communities and Christian Democratic offices) have gone unpunished. Our informer continues: "To identify the attackers is an almost impossible task: Anyone (considering that the action takes place in a very few minutes) can construct an alibi for himself in advance. No one, even if he has seen something, will talk and on the other hand among many youths who have revolutionary ideas in their heads there is a sort of consensus concerning terroristic acts. The myth of the balentia emerges again for the terrorists and especially on the walls of the city

where graffiti such as "Hail the new balentes" have appeared. These could be interpreted as folklore, but I believe there is an attempt to involve the world of the sheperds in violent actions. For this reason the superprison at Bad'e Carros was a school for shepherds who were imprisoned together with the members of the brigades but we must add the work of proselytism performed by certain university members who attended the hot faculties of the continent, from ome to Padua, from Florence to Bologna. They brought to Barbagia the lesson of subversion and certainly they also procured weapons. They certainly do not keep them at home (we made hundreds of searches uselessly) but in order to hide them they use the same system used by common criminals; the rifle, the pistol or explosives are hidden under rocks or in a hollow tree. It is the typical Barbagia arsenal."

The first signal of the link between banditism and political criminality came from the episode fo "Sa Janna Bassa" at Orune, when last December, during a fire fight the Carabinieri killed two bandits who were participating in a "summit" meeting together with other criminals. In the pockets of Giovanni Maria Bitti (who was shot to death) were found two leaflets of the Red Brigades. Was this just by chance? Among those arrested there was also Mauro Mereu, a young shepherd from Orgolo, who according to the investigators was "very receptive to political indoctrination." It was he who was the protagonist 2 years ago in an escape attempt from the Bad'e Carros prison which was planned in a style reminiscent of the Red Brigades. The accomplices had blown up an electrical substation causing a blackout in the prison and at the same time they had launched a rifle attick on the sentry boxes, striking a diversionary target. The aim was to commit the guards in a fire fight, thus permitting the four prisoners to escape. The escape was foiled and it was learned that among the would-be escapees there was also Annino Mele (who was involved in the Mamoiada feud), whose mother was critical of the prison system at the conference on repression.

Also at "Sa Janna Bassa" there was Pietro Coccone (presently a fugitive) who was found guilty of attempted robbery of a postal truck. Before and after his sentence, he was imprisoned at Asinara, together with political prisoners. Coccone had been the leader of the Nuoro student movement. Everyone remembers him as a member of the extraparliamentary left who was very insolent and who did not pull back when it was necessary to oust the fascists who tried to create disturbances at the movement's meetings.

Certain comparisons would be very easy, but it is unfair to attempt them: There is no desire here to brand anyone a criminal partly because officially the investigators have never made any accusation with a political background such as "armed band" or "subversive association." From this point of view, Mele, Mereu and Coccone have a clean record.

However they are episodes which must cause concern if it is considered that still another typical person of the pastoral world, Francesco Maria Serra, originally of Orune, had an attitude that was at the very least disconcerting.

Serra, too, was imprisoned in the Asinara "maximum security" prison after a trial on charges of robbery. He had received permission to marry a woman from Orgosolo and after a second leave he escaped. In February last year he was wounded in a fire fight with the police on Mount Lenardeddu, when the police liberated Pasqualba Rosas. Serra said that he was there by chance, but he was accused of keeping the girl from Nuoro a prisoner. The victim herself told the police that one of her jailers gave her "political" lectures, justifying the robbery as a reaction to social ills. Later, during a magistrate's trial on a misdemeanor, Serra fired his court-appointed defense attorney and told the magistrate he wanted to interrogate him: "I do not recognize your justice," he said. Was this a defense of convenience or political conviction?

Assistant District Attorney Franco Ionta, who followed the investigation of the more recent terrorist acts, said, "Certain signals should make us think. It is no roundabout theory that in certain kidnappings the receipt of ransom is not the final aim, but only a means for other aims that are not purely traceable to common crime. It is a mistake to think that Sardinai is culturally isolated in regard to the problem of terrorism: It is easy to find personnel who are influenced by a certain type of ideological propaganda, above all in the area of social alienation and inability to adapt. There is a series of particularly serious and alarming terroristic events which make one think: To understand them it is indispensable to update the keys of interpretation. Certainly, to single out the undercover person who on Supramonte joins the traditional fugitive means failing to take reality into account, but it is not to be excluded that there could be a very dangerous mixture between terrorism and common crime."

This was a view that had been considered by the city administrators of Nuoro. When the superprison was being planned, they had uselessly tried to oppose the creation of a building that according to them would have favored links between the imported brigade members and common prisoners, above all shepherds. The Christian Democratic ex-Mayor Franco Mulas says: "We soon realized the danger and I must say that the recent terrorist episodes showed we were right. Today the attacks upset the city and particularly strike at our party which governs here and which on the national level during the Moro case, showed it had a feeling for the national interest. It should cause no surprise therefore that the DC [Christian Democratic Party] also is a target of our own terrorists. So far there have been only small incidents (above all dynamite attacks without victims) but if these degenerative processes are not stopped in time they could also transform Sardinia into a battlefield for large-scale terrorism. Furthermore, there is more social discontent here in Barbagia than elsewhere. Certain distortions in the industrialization process have created a traumatic rupture with certain values and traditions which has led to a serious moral crisis we all feel. And certainly this big crisis of values becomes a breeding ground for terrorism. By this I certainly do not mean to accuse Ottana of a crime. This would be absurd above all considering the maturity with which the workers have dealt with the large problems of

the factory. It should be said, finally, that this new political crime is inserted into a fabric that is already torn by common crime, perhaps more serious than the years when investigation of banditry by a parliamentary committee had become indispensable."

To speak about the connection between banditism and politics as though it were something new, means not facing up to reality, and not only today's reality, according to Gianfranco Pintore, leader of "Su Populu Sardu." He said, "Banditry already in itself is a form of political reply to an oppression that involves the entire economic fabric that produced banditism. This is certainly a wrong answer, but it is nevertheless political. The shepherd-bandits of today are no longer illiterate, they at least attended obligatory school. They grasped the fundamental ideas of politics. The kidnappers who speak with the hostages of colonialism and exploitation have acquired a certain cultural baggage which permits them to express 30-year-old concepts which certainly at that time they did not know how to express clearly. From this point, it is also possible that certain Barbagia youths are led into the revolutionary experience by the same thrust as the shepherd-bandits. But their answers are tied to a superior education compared with that of the shepherd and therefore the political answer is different. It is certain, however, that they handle the themes of anticolonialist political culture very poorly. They speak of Sardinia in the same way as the continentals who were concerned exclusively with the coasts damaged by cement. Even their references to American imperialism in the island are very vague and inexact. To describe those of 'Red Barbagia' as anticolonialist seems to me to be excessive yet there is a very big risk: That of accrediting the suspicion that movements such as ours and others in the neo-Sardinian area are democratic and peaceful only opportunistically. It is almost as though the problem of revolutionary violence cannot have results that are different from those arrived at by the Basques, the Bretons and the Corsicans. It is not through opportunistic choice, but by political conviction that in Sardinia we have chosen the democratic road to advance our demands. There is democratic political space and we exploit it. Those who preach armed struggle in Sardinia are not anticolonialists but terrorists by adoption who make photo reprints of things that happen elsewhere, making very few changes. They graft on a mechanism of repression against movements, parties, militants of the anticolonialist area which have made different choices and they fight for bilingualism and the demilitarization of Sardinia."

There is "the area of suspicion and it is not by chance that Orgosolo is still considered the cradle of political banditry, perhaps exhuming the body of Feltrinelli." Mayor Salvatore Muravera says, "All the political personnel in the 1968 struggles, from Pratobello to the occupation of city hall have penetrated democratic institutions. However there is an alarming fact, noted by the more sensitive persons: There is the fear that there already exists a link between the traditional rebellion of the pastoral world and terrorist ideology. Certainly this is a very recent event.

References to Feltrinelli make no sense whatever at least as far as our experience is concerned. We met the Milanese publisher when he came to participate in debates and we asked for and obtained the publication of a book on our struggles. That is all."

Another confirmation that Feltrinelli had exclusively editorial and cultural interests in Sardinia is that he had published among other things a document by the Lombardi socialists of Nuoro, writings by Francesco Masala and other Sardinian intellectuals many of whom (like the leaders of the "city-farmland" club) wanted to convince him to work full-time on editorial research. Perhaps if he had listened to their advice he would not have wound up beneath the Segrate power pylon.

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ANALYSIS OF ROLE OF LABOR UNIONS IN SOUTH

CISL View

Rome CONQUISTE DEL LAVORO in Italian 24 Mar 80 p 9

[Article by Mario Sepi: "New Dimensions of the Struggle for the South"]

[Text] Tackling the problem of developing the country's less industrialized areas today from the labor union viewpoint, as was done by the FLM [Federation of Metalworkers] (Ariccia Seminar, 3, 4, 5 March 1980), above all constitutes a challenge to the guilty conscience and banality of certain economic and political analyses which prevail in public opinion due to a press which is irremediably "Northern-oriented."

Banal considerations and guilty conscience as a matter of fact today persuade biased commentators either to come up with excessively optimistic studies regarding the future of a South in which entrepreneurial and "self-propelled" middle strata are just beginning to emerge or with assumptions based almost exclusively on savage and palingenetic tertiary sector development. Precisely because of its incomprehensibility, the "hidden" economy provides formidable alibis for those who, disappointed by past experience, now believe that it is illusory to expect the growth of a modern and balanced economy in the South, balanced, that is, between its various sectors, or those others who, in a much more concentrated fashion, pursue a design aimed at further strengthening the industrial structure of the North and the central part of Italy. Once again, regardless of the motivations, the problem of southern growth runs the risk of becoming marginal with respect to the economic policy lines which the real power centers have chosen.

Once we have entered the narrow tunnel of this logic, all arguments and possible instrumental approaches, which are involved in them, become valid. Thus the continuous reference to the need for balancing payments, the way in which wage demands are being pushed in the factories of the North, the financial crisis of the State participation, the energy difficulties, etc.--all of these are being used to create the image of an emergency situation which does not offer any possibilities of medium-term or long-term structural transformation strategies. The only thing to do however

is to strengthen that which exists, in this manner to pay for the energy shortage, and to leave the South to the at least improbable developments of its "Brambilla." Unfortunately, the labor union faces this challenge without any grand general strategies, with institutions that are increasingly arrogant and impermeable to its demands and with parties which are very much more attentive to behind-the-scenes manipulations or ready to benefit from any extra leeway they can grab in order to win zones of influence in their structures, rather than being drawn to the confrontation on the real problems involved in the growth of the less favored areas. This is not the first time that the labor union movement finds itself facing situations which are as unfavorable as this one; but it is probably the first time that it finds itself facing tremendous difficulties in relation to the rank and file. The failure of the Eur [labor union headquarters] line now is producing huge lacerations in the factories, the loss of credibility of that "line" seems to create a crisis for the entire policy which we tried to put together starting in the seventies and that includes the attempt to act upon the investment decisions and the major points in the country's economic policy. The reaction--often hard to control--is one of severe criticism not only regarding the institutional and bureaucratic incrustations evident in the labor union policy of recent years but also the function of national coordination to be exercised by the labor union. Paradoxically, it is precisely at this moment that the government does not accept the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor]-CSIL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions]-UIL [Italian Union of Labor] Federation as a conversation partner--it is precisely at this moment that the labor union's criticism concerning its relations with the institutions comes out more powerfully.

The Ariccia conference was important precisely because of that since, starting with this analysis, it again brought out a basic objective fact involving the coincidence of interests among the workers of the North and South--a factor on which it is possible to rebuild, not so much a general strategy for the labor union, an "Eur 2" in order to understand each other properly, but rather a widespread labor union action starting from the factories of the North in order to continue that shift, to the South, of industrial production programs which, although with contradictions and delays, remains one of the undeniable merits of this season of Italian Labor Unionism. Scores of factory and enterprise leadership groups have again proposed this topic to the owners in the metalworking plants and the owners, the parties, and the administration should once again come to grips with these arguments which are so unpalatable to a political class which is becoming increasingly bogged down in the problems of power line-up.

The first results are already in; some medium-sized factories in expanding sectors have been forced to change their traditional policies of establishing branches in the north-central region. Thus, Piaggio was forced to plan its new establishment in the province of Rieti, SAME had to switch its new plants from the valleys of Bergamo and from Emilia to the South.

These are difficult changes above all because they are isolated from mass transportation, because they often arouse the hostility of the parties and the institutions in the North and frequently trigger indifference among the horizontal structures. But these differences at least show one thing: when called upon to fight for specific and controllable targets regarding the development of the South, the Italian workers have no hesitations or second thoughts but now reject ideological and general disputes which we have proposed to them in recent years.

The method now emerging is once again the method of the specific, target-oriented dispute, the method of partiality tied in with specific and realistic objectives, without however renouncing any of the labor union gains of recent years. Unfortunately, it will not be possible in all of these changes to construct Southern-oriented objectives, sometimes because the objective conditions do not exist and at other times because the lack of confidence toward the Southern policy of the labor union causes attention to be focused on wage topics. In this connection I believe that it is necessary to come up with three conclusive considerations. The first one is that a frequently excessively ideological presentation of labor union action has created the wrong kind of expectations for immediate and miraculous solutions. The term of the dispute itself has helped create confusion by conceptually linking the industrial policy objectives to the traditional demands characterized in particular by definite conversation partners, reasonably foreseeable time spans, and immediately verifiable results. The variables which become involved in a project for a new branch or plant, in a low-output sector, are much greater; the conversation partners are not monolithic; the structural changes often reveal time frames which vary from one enterprise labor union leadership group to the next. Failure to create a clear understanding on that score, quite frequently, is behind certain setbacks in some situations.

The second consideration is that above all the militants of the CISL should be aware of the fact that it would be an irremediable step back to abandon this in the face of the struggle to return once again to doing their own "job." This would furthermore produce a growing decline in enterprise collective bargaining negotiations and that would lead to neglect of the confrontation on topics of industrial conversion which are highly critical in this historical phase.

The news we are getting from Great Britain should make us reflect on the fact that our own "job," in other words, collective bargaining negotiations, which, in turn, means wages and work organization, would not be enough to maintain the relationship with the worker even in the case of labor union with traditions and significance such as the British trade unions. In the long run, if no alternate strategies are drafted with respect to capitalist development, the counterpart strategies will also make headway among the workers. The state of political subordination has a stiff price on it, just as we have to pay the price for purely ideological platforms, entirely geared toward the political situation. The problem once again is one

of reconciling the levels of political awareness and the real interests of the workers with the instruments available to the labor union, without abandoning the new dimensions of struggle while however rendering them ever more concrete and incisive.

UIL View

Rome LAVORO ITALIANO in Italian 21 Mar 80 p 12

[Article by Ugo Luciani: "Decisive Labor Union Movement Committment Over the Next Several Years To Give a Concrete Hope Back to the South"]

> [Text] The South is losing speed from all viewpoints: in terms of the gross domestic output; in terms of investments; in terms of individual and group consumption as well as employment. The employed population rate (32 percent) is still below the national level and almost one half of the officially recorded unemployment figures throughout the country can be found in the South. The per-capita income is barely two-thirds of the national average. On top of that, the features of the so-called hidden economy in the South are socially much more painful that in the north-central region and the forms of patronage welfarism in the South involve vast masses of citizens who derive one of their main sources of subsistence, if not the one and only main source from that. The "novelty" which has been universally observed in recent times, within the context of the southern issue, is that the so-called "growth process" in the South has brought out profound contradictions from one region to the next and from one district to the next and within the individual production compartments. It is therefore necessary to say quite clearly that the road covered so far appears frankly impracticable for the future.

In recent years, the European community has developed a broad policy of commercial opening and economic agreements in dealing with the third countries, a policy which is certainly in line with the general interests of its policy, with particular emphasis on the more advanced regions.

But, while it is true that the pursuit of this line by the EEC is one of the essential conditions for safeguarding its economic growth, it is just as much true that it is politically, socially, and morally not admissible that the negative consequences of this policy should be absorbed by the Community's economically weakest areas and sectors. It thus appears increasingly evident that a philosophy involving a broad commercial opening toward the third countries is bound to have, as a logical corollary, an internal philosophy calling for tight coordination of the Community's economic, financial, and monetary policies which would guarantee a less

disharmonious development and a more accentuated diversion of resources toward the system's weak areas.

We must therefore right away also on the community level launch a new farm policy and a new regional growth policy aimed at promoting not only local initiatives but also decentralization in areas involving new industrial, national and European initiatives.

It seems superfluous to stress the concept of the "southern issue being equal to the national issue." There is no important aspect of the problems which are behind the southern issue that would not be matched by a logical placement and possible move toward solution within a framework made up of the country's general interest.

We must therefore express the strongest astonishment concerning the underestimation which we discover precisely in almost all of the recent position statements on the southern issue, the problems pertaining to the demonstrated inability of the public administration on all levels to cope with the planning management mess. Everything points to the fact that the government, the regions, the local bodies and the special action units (particularly the Fund) have failed to do their job, especially in the South. This is why a policy of change and reform--which can help resolve these basic issues--is not being launched.

Let us make one thing perfectly clear: a national, regional, local government, which somehow guarantees the democratic governability of the economy and the institutions, is certainly a bad thing.

But it is not enough to change the political framework; it is also necessary to change the type of regulations and internal relationships within the government machine, its out-of-kilter logic and its antiquated systems of administration and control. It is furthermore necessary to revise the manner of legislating in order to guarantee not only the proper implementation of institutional authority but also the operational efficiency of a true planning policy. It is above all necessary to enable both the central administration and the regional and local administrations, at the proper moment, to come up with the required capital account spending money, hence the need for revising the entire system used today in this connection; this is an absurd system which certainly did not stop waste and embezzlement but which contributed to the impressive accumulation of liabilities to the detriment of the South and the weakest sectors.

Overall planning, it must be said quite clearly, cannot work without the support and interconnection of coherent programs for sectors and regions within whose scope the direct relationship with the enterprises and the local communities can unfold.

Planning From the Bottom Up

But we are not convinced by the so-called idea of "planning from the bottom up." There is no doubt that, in a phase where general planning is only a lot of wishful thinking (or does not exist at all) and where the sector and regional plans remain only on paper, we cannot just sit around and wait for the advent of a redeemer. This is why the struggle, during recent years, in the big groups has been correct and this is why today's initiative in the enterprises and in the territory is correct, in an effort to chart and push through a southern-oriented development policy.

But everybody--with the exception of some huge national or multinational industrial groupings--can see that the absence or insufficiency of a general and sector reference frame cannot lead to satisfactory results for all of the medium and small enterprises and in the individual zones or districts.

This is why the struggle in the enterprise and in the territory for a southern-oriented development policy must be accompanied by just as tough and committed a struggle for a planning policy change on the macroeconomic level.

From the viewpoint of contents, in a political and economic system of the pluralist type, a planning policy can be carried out only through the dialectical involvement and the "contract-based" commitment of the social partners. From that viewpoint likewise, therefore, the confrontation and the "triangular" clash become the indispensable premise for establishing the margin of consensus (or dissent) within the planning of the economy and to guarantee its practical implementability.

Now, along a planning policy which has been concerted between institutions and social partners, we will succeed in mobilizing the will power, resources, and commitments toward the coherence of all civilian society in the effort to promote southern rebirth or the action of the institutions by themselves and the government machine and publicly-owned businesses by themselves will fail to achieve all of the development goals.

Coordinating a More Attentive and Better Commitment

As far as the merit of the southern policy is concerned, it seems rather obvious that we must agree on the need for the south to get a hefty "additional" share of resources, beyond the regular ones, and that the special effort be handled within the framework of planning policy and with the instruments it must have. The specific nature of the biggest southern problems and the unavoidable need for a precise framework providing a permanent link between general planning and sector planning, on the one hand, and the southern regions, on the other, seem to point toward the thesis of a political body (it might be called a ministry or an undersecretariat or an ad hoc commission), within the planning "government" which precisely would guarantee the implementation of that specific nature and

the existence of this permanent link. In the operational area, our past experience--while, on the one hand, it advises us, as had been anticipated sometime ago, to eliminate the awkward superstructure today represented by the Fund--again raises the problem of having a technical, flexible and efficient instrument, provided with a rapid operational capacity, which would constitute an irreplaceable element of support both for the regular central administration and for the southern regions. In substance, this would be an agency along the lines of those experimented with by the federal government of the United States of America.

We furthermore propose that the principle be established to the effect that once a year we confirm not only the obligation of the government to inform parliament as to the status of southern policy implementation and the decisions to be made but that a conference also be scheduled in advance, consisting of the government, the southern regions, and the social forces, in order to come up with an activity review regarding the maintenance of commitments assumed reciprocally and concerning measures to be proposed to parliament and to all of the social categories for the year to come. We furthermore propose that the government, during the next several years, convene a series of conferences of the regions involved and the social partners in order to come up with a precise picture on the following topics:

(1) Whether and how one should transform the Fund for the South and what type of direct and indirect incentives one should offer to the enterprises for the development of local initiatives and for the decentralization, toward the South, of new industrial, agribusiness, and service-sector initiatives.

(2) The medium-term and long-term development lines which the planning policy must impart to the economy of the South, the role which the various production sectors should play there, and the geographic and sector priorities regarding promotional action.

(3) The space to be assigned to the South in the national energy plan and in the scientific research plan.

(4) The commitments which the social partners are inclined to assume in order to promote the shift, to the South, of new production activities and the general growth of the South's most depressed areas.

(5) The assumption as to a plan for part-time youth employment involving programs of socially useful activities, training programs and initiatives in the cooperative sector, all of this to be concentrated in the southern region, beyond any estimates which should be examined carefully here; this is an assumption which cannot be ignored and which, if it is discarded, will call for more valid and specifically more realistic alternate responses.

On all of these aspects of the southern issue, the UIL has worked out ideas, topics for debate, and concrete proposals--submitted to the 20 and 21 March conference--which, along with the general policy situation estimates, we intend to present to the United Federation so that they may become the subject of precise and careful strategy choices.

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CGIL VIEWS ON REGIONAL PROBLEMS STATED

Regional Secretary on Sicily Problems

Rome RASSEGNA SINDACALE in Italian 27 Mar 80 pp 18-19

[Interview with Pietro Ancona, regional secretary-general, by Angelo Galantini: "Sicily between new developments and old troubles"]

[Text] The priorities indicated by the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor] include a special plan for employment, the transportation issue, and methane.

The congress of the Sicilian CGIL began the day after the huge national demonstration in Palermo against the mafia and terrorism and in support of the island's return to democracy. "Continuity" was not just something temporary. The congress as a matter of fact in a very thorough approach developed the same topics as was recalled also by the huge sign behind the head table ("unity of the workers and a democratic and autonomist Sicily against the mafia and terrorism, for liberty and work, for economic and social renewal").

These by the way are topics which the entire country is wondering about during this difficult and uncertain time. New developments and old troubles again raise those topics in Sicily with particular drama, as was underscored in the conclusions presented by CGIL secretary Aldo Giunti. The slow renewal process seems to have been broken up by the murder of Piersanti Mattarella which had traumatic effects in the local DC [Christian Democratic Party] (and, by the same token, on the political setup because of the weight carried by that party there) and those effects are far from having been absorbed so far. The CGIL vigorously proposed once again the demand for an island government that would be capable of coping with its past, a representative and authoritative government of broad unity. This suggestion--shared in the greetings brought to the congress by the representatives of the PCI [Italian Communist Party] and the PSI [Italian Socialist Party]--instead was received rather more moderately in the speech by the DC deputy secretary who talked at length about the fact that political unity need not

necessarily correspond to social unity. This again is a sign of the great difficulties existing in the Sicilian political situation.

Three points of priority were brought out with regard to the commitment of the labor union in Sicily: a special plan for employment; the transportation issue; and the methane issue. We talked about this with Pietro Ancona whom the regional committee, elected by secret ballot by the congress, again made secretary-general of the organization.

"The number of people registering with the employment office keeps increasing but the number of people placed in jobs keeps declining. All of this raises some serious and complicated questions. We have for many months been trying to work out a special plan for jobs and the development of the region in order to provide jobs for unemployed Sicilian youths. In the nine communities, which are seats of local government, 4,000 jobs are vacant in the old organizational charts alone. We could get many job openings by approving projects for the reorganization of services as provided for in national legislation. The important thing therefore is to use the leftover budget allocations which have accumulated to almost 2 trillion."

Question: And what about transportation?

Answer: This sector cannot continue to be considered as a service sector but must instead be considered as a real production sector since, along with the pertinent decisions, it is necessary to determine transformation processes both in the manner of organizing the production cycles and in the distribution network. Our region today does not have a real and proper transportation system; we have a bunch of highways, shipping lines, railroads, and airlines which know nothing about each other. The regional transportation plan must therefore constitute a precise point of reference with respect to which the advisable steps and decisions must be evaluated. During the 5-year period of 1980-1985, we estimate that no less than 1.2 trillion lire can be allocated to this sector in Sicily, to which we can add the 300 billions in leftover funds. In terms of jobs, this means no less than 12 million working days if we manage to spend the money within the time frame provided for.

Question: Finally, what about methane?

Answer: Here the real problem is not to engage in any TV demagogy which will simply pass through Sicily and be gone. As a Sicilian I say that methane serves the entire country and not just the South. The initiative of the united labor union must be concentrated on three specific points. First: promote technical and scientific assistance for the region in planning a network of distribution and to point up the industrial uses of methane which the region is presently not in a position to follow up on. Second: Floating an obligation-based loan to finance the cost of building

the network in the entire southern portion of the South and that will take hundreds of billions. Third: drafting a suitable rate schedule policy because we are running the paradoxical risk of having to pay for methane at a higher price than it costs in Bologna or Milan, in other words, in a manner inversely proportional to the closeness to the source of supply. These are the three points to which we must commit ourselves concretely and right away; the rest, quite frankly, does not interest us.

Question: There is a close connection between the possibility of success in the action of the Sicilian labor union and the quality of confederation commitment toward the South. In the report, you talked about a decline in the southern-oriented commitment of the confederations, starting early in 1979.

Answer: I believe that the united federation should start all over again from 18 October 1978, modifying the platform drafted at that time in terms of quality; that platform was aimed at holding on to what we have now. We must start from new points of departure, with methane and our energy policy. The law on the South must offer a shift in incentives: from incentives for financing toward real incentives (for support facilities, highways, ports, designed as programs for the reorganization and recovery of the territory) and incentives for management. This should add up to a big program to beat the drought, the long-term trouble spot of the South, by means of a ten-year irrigation program. The noisy failure of [law] 675--something which happened not without the responsibility of the labor union--creates new problems. One of the central points involves the sector plans: the policy of coordinating sectors must switch from the management of the categories to the control of the national federation. The rescue of the South cannot be accomplished only through the logic of overall company collective bargaining negotiations.

Question: Are you satisfied with the development and outcome of the Seventh Congress?

Answer: Very much so. We saw an increase in the external significance of the CGIL. The quality of the debate improved in overall terms. The big fact behind this congress is political unity which is expressed not only in the analysis of social matters and economic facts but also in relation to the indications regarding the political context. And all of this happened without any concealment on the part of anybody with respect to the concept of the CGIL's lay and democratic role. It is extremely important for this unity to be made up of an interconnection of studies, positions, and convictions.

Conditions in Calabria

Rome RASSEGNA SINDACALE in Italian 27 Mar 80 pp 19-20

[Article by Carmine Garofalo: "The emergence of the case of Calabria"]

[Text] Public spending and welfare tend to rebuild balances, concentrations, and new orientation. Result: the subordination of the workers and the region.

Drawing the conclusions from the Third Regional Congress of the CGIL of Calabria, comrade Militello revealed how, during the congress, a kind of schizophrenia manifested itself between the desire to defend the great heritage accumulated in recent years and the ability to re-read it critically in order to move in line with a changed reality and the problems of today. As a matter of fact, there was an attempt to create a common agreement so as to make it the center of political thinking and congress debate, a common agreement profoundly rooted among the leadership cadres and even more so among the workers and the vast popular masses of Calabria: the sense of difficulty the labor union would have in holding on to the role of a political subject in transformation and change, to put together the lineup and the level of mobilization necessary in order to confront a situation of crisis as serious and widespread as the one in Calabria. All of this, while the vast masses of workers, of young people, and of women wanted a leadership oriented toward the objectives of radical transformation of the entire economic, social, and political setup. If this contradiction remains unresolved or if it grows, conditions may be created for a mixture of rebellion and qualunquism and these are the phenomena through which, historically, the subordinate position of the workers and the hegemony of the conservative and moderate forces have been expressed in Calabria and in the South. The labor union today looks to be less well equipped than it was in recent years to come to grips with this danger, registering a decline in its authority, greater isolation of its platform and a shrinkage of the forces which support it, as clearly emerged during the demonstration held in Rome at the Adriano motion picture theater on 5 February 1980. The congress denied that this kind of difficulty is the inevitable result of a subordinate policy, geared toward the emergency situation and the exclusive defense of critical points. In reality, the Calabria labor union in recent years attempted a rather ambitious operation: it tried to place the objectives of defending and developing jobs in the region within the national policy of the labor union movement as a whole, pitting the main instruments of that policy--that is to say, sector and territorial planning--as points of reference and as main levers in order to deprovincialize the platform for the development of Calabria. We did not dwell on these objectives not so much because they were subordinate objectives nor because the regional top leadership referred to them as a "public dispute."

The limitation sprang from the inadequate capacity to tie in with the concrete components of this policy and the inadequate pressure which would have been necessary in particular in dealing with the State participations. The important thing right now therefore is not to revise the policy and the initiative of the Calabria labor union but, looking at the unchanged situation today, to find out what the conditions are for resuming the mobilization and the struggle in full awareness of the need for first of all committing the Calabria labor union but not it alone.

The congress identified the first condition as being represented by the capacity and the determination of the entire national movement to place the main choices of the EUR [Universal Exposition of Rome] at the center of its own position and its own battle. If employment, planning, and the South do not turn out to be the mainstay of the union's proposal, then the struggle of the workers in Calabria and in the South will lead up a deadend street or it can only be a minor thing.

Today we can detect the risk that those choices may become weakened, may be relegated to a secondary position, making it difficult to pull the whole thing together and to restore the political unity of all areas of the movement and especially the political unit of the employed individuals with the vast masses of young people and women in the South. The recovery of priority for the southern-oriented objectives cannot be contrasted against the defense of the working class and cannot be entrusted only to a mobilization "outside" the South. Instead, it can be achieved above all if, in the South and in Calabria, we broaden the front of the struggle and we organize all subjects interested in the battle for change. From this springs the second condition indicated by the congress as the ability to rebuild the role and image of a labor union that will fight for development and for the renewal of social, political, and power relationships.

If it is legitimate in Calabria to use the term of "collapse" in order immediately to make understandable the seriousness of the crisis and the processes of backwardness in decisive sectors of the production apparatus (chemical industry, textile industry, etc.), that should not prevent the labor union from becoming familiar with and facing the mechanisms operating in society in Calabria, mechanisms which are not elements of pure stabilization but which instead play a dynamic role, a role of diverse dislocation of broad social strata and also a role of general and political orientation. In this area, the congress asserted the need for a by no means marginal correction capable of viewing the modern role which, in a region such as Calabria, is played by public spending and welfare, with results which are not simply designed to patch up social tension spots but which tend to rebuild new balances, new concentrations, and new orientations: they are marked not so much by "collapse" but by a renewed subordination of the workers and the region. The third condition consists of the construction of a political subject capable of enabling the progressive forces of the

region to catch their second wind by establishing, as of today, the objective and the necessity of a new government for Calabria, able to represent the region in dealing with the national government, a local administration which above all would carry out the decision of using public instruments and public resources within a process of development and of creating more jobs.

The congress expressed the desire to engage in explicit action, in this direction, considering the objective of unity among the progressive forces and the left to be a choice which is neither functional nor alien to the direct interests of the labor union and the workers but which instead is dictated by the emergency in Calabria itself.

Agriculture Key Factor in Puglia

Rome RASSEGNA SINDACALE in Italian 27 Mar 80 pp 20, 29

[Article by Tonino M. Chiusolo: "Puglia--agriculture is not a thing of the past"]

> [Text] The sharecroppers, peasants, and workers of Puglia have been fighting against the landowners to make sure that the land will be used efficiently. Today they do not intend to abandon this objective. The regional development plan is at the center of the debate.

To understand, tackle, and resolve the problems besetting the South of Italy, one must first of all do away with an old and stereotyped image which presents the South as being forever doomed to bare subsistence. It is becoming absolutely mandatory, especially for the labor union, to catch up in this respect or to eliminate this way of looking at the situation in the South which is often presented in this way among the protagonists in the struggle themselves, that is to say, among the workers. As others observed earlier, the Third Regional Congress of the CGIL of Puglia (Bari, 13-16 March) was not able to avoid making this observation itself, not only because this involves a large part of the southern labor union but above all because it is now a common conviction that the problems of the South are being tackled first of all by those who experience them and those who fight to bring about change in society.

In Puglia, the clash above all involves the future of a sector that is vital to this region, in other words, agriculture. In spite of the existing imbalances, as we find them in other southern regions, between coastal strips and inland areas, agriculture has constituted and still represents a point of reference, a point of economic and social significance, in Puglia. The introductory report by Giuseppe Jannone rejects the image

of agriculture as something that is a thing of the past, so that development should presumably involve only the industrial and service sectors. He also rejects action in the nature of welfare, so far requested from the Fund For The South, actions which do not bring the region back to life and which do not enable agriculture to play a dynamic role.

The sharecroppers, the peasants, and the workers of Puglia have been fighting hard against the landowners to make sure that the land would be used efficiently and today they do not intend to "go soft" on this objective. In order not to stifle the agricultural sector but also in order not to provide an incentive for a chaotic and dependent development of the sectors of industry and the services, the labor union movement in Puglia is fighting to achieve a correct balance between the former and the latter.

The congress naturally talked about planning, not without good reason. A program of works projects has been provided for furthermore also in Law No 984 (the "Fourfold National Agriculture Promotion Law"). But here again the clash is already in progress, especially as regards the quality of agribusiness development. As a matter of fact, between 1980 and 1982, 1 trillion has been set aside for agriculture among the fund allocations from the region and those programmed in Law No 984 and a part of these funds must be used for irrigation projects covering thousands of hectares of land. The region already has a tie-in between agriculture and industry. The objective is to convert the agricultural sector and at the same time to give the rural areas new support facilities which will increase the productivity of the agricultural establishments. All of this must be brought about however not by going after intensive production efforts only, to the detriment of the labor force, as the most conservative and biased landowners intend to continue to do. The labor union movement is fighting for production efforts of an extensive type not only to broaden the range of products but also to promote a consistent demand for industrial, chemical, and mechanical products, a demand geared toward agriculture which at the same time will orient the conversion of industrial establishments located in the northern regions. Profound changes have taken place in the agricultural establishments in Puglia and the family-type farm has been replaced impressively by a capitalist-type farm. We naturally do not want to attack the capitalist establishment as such--and this point was made indeed at the congress. But it is necessary to involve the big agricultural establishments in a regional development plan which would bring about a balance in the utilization of resources existing in the regional territory and in the country as a whole.

For the small enterprises, on the other hand, it is necessary to promote an adequate flow of loan funds; otherwise we are going to run the risk of watching their economic and production collapse. The irrigation plans furthermore constitute important elements in support of agricultural development throughout the entire plateau of Puglia but also regarding the

development of the inland areas of Basilicata and the other southern regions.

In this kind of context we therefore must not conceal the struggles which the agricultural cooperatives made up of unemployed young people have been conducting in recent years. There are hundreds of hectares of land in Puglia which are not being cultivated or which are being cultivated poorly and which the landowners or the government allow to be completely abandoned.

The regional development plan and especially the agribusiness development plan thus represent the point around which the congress tried to come up with some answers. But how did the delegates (408, including 20 women, representing about 252,000 registered members) outline a strategy of unifying struggle for the medium and long run, for the entire worker movement? Within the contradictions of a society and a region in continuous motion, without excluding the criminal events of the past and the most recent events which struck the citizens of Bari, the labor union likewise in some way reflects those same contradictions. Although many answers were provided for the most burning and timely problems, both in political terms (a different relationship with the region), and in economic terms (agribusiness development), as well as in social and cultural terms, the thing that was really missing was the "intertwining" of the entire topic complex which today covers the "Southern issue" above all in relation to the struggle movement. Not because this is missing as such. It seems rather that the profound link between these struggles, which exists particularly between the sharecroppers and the peasants, was assumed to be an established fact. For example, there was no lack of self-criticism for having overlooked or underestimated the relationship that must be established with the new categories in the working class and the workers employed in the sectors of the civil service and the utilities; it became a commitment of the congress to strengthen those relationships. But the debate at a certain point was "sacrificed" in order to make room for internal organizational factors for which no response had been furnished earlier. This obviously does not involve questions tied in only with the use of the secret ballot. Somehow, within the organization, it seems to be impossible to work out a correct balance for the relationship between categories and between those categories and the new horizontal structure. It was not by chance that Valentino Zuccherini, starting with the questions inherent in the organizational reform and making reference to society, in his report dwelled on the danger that may spring from an exasperation of relationships between the workers, that is to say, in a corporative sense. The speech by Rinaldo Scheda likewise, in closing the work of the congress with a demonstration near a theater in the city, again mentioned the value which the line of the EUR still has today precisely because it supplies an answer to certain forms of class egotism.

Democracy and tolerance, in substance, are basically experienced in society in order to change it but they are also implemented within the labor union movement to revitalize it and to enrich it.

Basilicata Secretary Simonetti

Rome RASSEGNA SINDACALE in Italian 20 Mar 80 pp 16-17

[Interview with Basilicata CGIL secretary-general Pietro Simonetti by Giovanni Rispoli: "Basilicata is not a Backwater"]

> [Text] The problems of a region which always teeters between modernization and underdevelopment, viewed within the southern-oriented topic complex of the labor union movement in a conversation with Pietro Simonetti, secretary-general of the Basilicata CGIL.

The theses for the Third Congress of the Basilicata CGIL--held at Potenza from 6 to 8 March--point out that the regional economy tends "to attain its equilibrium on the lowest levels." This is a dramatic fact, borne out by many indicators. But only one of them will suffice: the surplus of people who leave as compared to those who come back; this means that people still continue to emigrate from Lucania. Naturally, this does not mean that the region, in all of its parts, looks the same (and we will come back to this soon in the pages of RASSEGNA). The only trouble is that everything positive, which was achieved with so much hard work, in recent years, today has fallen by the wayside; or, if you will, it can even further accentuate the region's differences with respect to the remaining pockets of underdevelopment.

How did the labor union movement in Lucania cope with this situation? With what proposals? It is precisely on this score--the proposals--that the congress debate revealed a by no means minor effort. The remarks by the delegates--many of whom were quite young--did not dwell on denunciation; from the question of the recovery of Liquichimica of Tito and Ferrandina, irrigation and agriculture and the schools all the way to the problems of methane development and the nuclear power industry, they displayed a rich effort in terms of projects and undertakings, frequently based on criticism without hiding past errors. But above all, this brought out the desire to keep up with the national debate, without any narrow regional approach.

This is another reason why we wanted to present some problems to Pietro Simonetti--the Basilicata CGIL secretary-general--which go beyond the questions strictly inherent in the prospects of this region and which involve the southern labor union movement as a whole.

Question: At the EUR--and it now has become a litany to repeat this but it is still true--the South became a part of the labor union strategy in

the form of an absolutely priority issue. But nothing was done in practice. In substance, there was no combined action by the "strong" working class and the workers in the weak areas which alone could have forced industrial policy to move along different lines. Absence of practical wisdom, cultural delays, and the resistance of the adversary constituted a formidable obstacle to the implementation of that policy. A self-critical debate has been taking shape on that score within the movement over the past several months; and this was also discussed quite obviously at your regional congress. In your opinion, what were the most important reasons for the delay--since the EUR--of the labor union initiative for the South?

Answer: I would start with the obstacles set up by the employers. The central nature of the enterprise and neoliberalism were not just slogans but constituted specific forms of behavior and, in some way, in a few sectors of society, there was also common agreement on that. But the bitter resistance from the entrepreneurial counterpart, as well as the initially rather uncertain signals, later on followed by increasingly negative signals deriving from the action of the various administrations, cannot make us overlook our own inadequacies. The attainment of specific results presupposes control over the reorganization process now underway in the North. But there was no such thing. The enterprise and group disputes furthermore were handed down to those who continued the talks and this further reduced the involvement of the southern workers. Why? Because of an internal flaw in the southern organizations, of course, but also because of a more general limitation which prevents--and which so far has prevented--the development of their real protagonism in that direction. Along with this we must underscore the defects in coordination of the confederation center and the united federation which were against pushing our initiative prior to the EUR. Are we really convinced that our method of work is suitable to enable us to cope with this clash? Answering this question means stating the relationships between the center and the periphery of the movement in a different way and it means tackling the problem of political synthesis in new terms. Otherwise we run the risk of regional bias--for example, Calabria--which would add new restrictions on our initiative. Finally, we must recall a by no means minor delay in the analysis of the features of reorganization and changes that took place in the social landscape of the South. To be sure, we have realized by now, for example, that Basilicata is no longer what it was at the time of Carlo Levi--although some intellectuals still believe that this is so. But even when you understand the change, you have difficulty in coming up with the proper proposal. And the gap between analysis and proposal certainly has not been filled by us.

Question: One established fact which is now discounted, although for many reasons it remains yet to be spelled out, is the fact of the joint existence, in the South, of areas which vary greatly among each other in terms of

income produced, consumption, population density, etc. Now, looking at it schematically--and skipping a series of intermediate steps--there would seem to be a dichotomy between internal areas and external areas. Is not this schizophrenia in southern development also reflected in what the labor union is doing?

Answer: Sure. We have a correct inspiration, the inspiration of restoring the territorial balance but in fact we sometimes march in the opposite direction; and it is a shame that this does not make it possible to support the spontaneous mechanisms of development. This is an issue which involves not only the South but also the Center and North. And behind all that, in my opinion, is a cultural limitation which is being overcome.

Question: The regions viewed as a counterpart conversation partner with which the labor union movement, in the South, has daily contact. What does that mean today?

Answer: Just 10 years after their establishment, the time would seem to have come to discuss now what the southern regions have been and above all to talk about the relationship which the labor union established with that institution. We will find that, when we went outside a certain scheme--the scheme of confrontation on big issues--and when we came out with precise requests, some results were indeed achieved. Sometimes we also found that there had been an underestimation of their role. Take the case of Naples and Bari: in those two cities, did they not, in some cases, prefer to use the community instead of the region? But, beyond all that, I would like to underscore one point about which I believe we are not thinking enough. Our initiative is too often directed toward the state and its agencies, precisely, its regional or local agencies.

Question: But the ruling bloc, in the South, rallied precisely around the centers of federal government action.

Answer: Alright, but we entirely too often underestimate the fact that we have a Confindustria [General Confederation of Italian Industry] also in the South. Of course, the relationship which the southern employers--or those who decide to make their investments here--have with the federal government is profoundly different as compared to other parts of the country. Here, Confindustria has chosen the way of technical assistance, of working with the ministries and the Fund For The South. But I ask myself whether our initiative might not have been insufficiently organized in terms of the choice of the counterparts. Let us for example look at [law] 183. Is is true or is it not true that it was used? Did the industrial fabric become stronger or did it not in some points? But we were unable to force the entrepreneurs to a confrontation on production policy.

Question: At your congress you quite correctly called for a tenacious initiative by the labor union movement, by the progressive forces, by the processes of modernization which took shape in Basilicata in the past 10 years. Today, the crisis perhaps bring out whatever positive things have been emerging, even though in a contradictory fashion, especially in recent years. With what proposal are you going to go into the next battle?

Answer: Let me say right away that the phase of the Basilicata dispute, as a condition preparatory to any diverse development of the region, is over and done with. It was important but we must now go on. Today, the objectives of consolidation and extension of the production base, of irrigation, of correcting the imbalances call for a tie-in with the other regions and with different industrial sectors. This is precisely why we have started relations with the labor union movements in Puglia and Piedmont; a relationship not made up of general solidarity but of some specific issues toward which we can point our initiative in a coordinated manner. In substance, Basilicata cannot be some kind of backwater. And that applies also to the other southern regions.

Question: But now, the regional disputes have marked an--how would you say--autarchic limit?

Answer: In a certain sense, yes. Even though they constituted an obligatory step for the purpose of recovering various specific aspects. In other words, an important experience. But there was one flaw: it involved an exclusive relationship with the central government. This flaw concealed one fact: the wide scatter and the organizational setup and interconnection of the economic and political decision-making centers. Now, if this is true, how can we think of resolving everything by addressing our question to a single addressee only, in Rome?

Veneto Conference Discussions

Rome RASSEGNA SINDACALE in Italian 20 Mar 80 pp 17, 18

[Article by Raul Wittenberg: "The labor union of Veneto outside the trenches"]

[Text] Attention to the reality of production decentralization, of hidden labor, regional plan, economic planning, and terrorism--these are the main topics of the regional congress of Veneto.

The strategy of the CGIL in Veneto might be spelled out with a slogan reading something like this: "attention to the 'scattered factory.'" Not that anybody is dropping the initiative aimed at the major industrial concentrations, such as Marghera, or on agriculture, which is flourishing

in some parts, or on the tertiary sector, etc. But some objective data, such as the rise in income and consumption, the attainment of almost full employment in the region, indicate that the increase in the crafts, in small and medium enterprises, in production decentralization, in moonlighting and temporary jobs constitute the real element that permitted this favorable employment situation. The labor union therefore must not allow itself to adopt an attitude of preconceived rejection with regard to this situation, nor must it fail to keep up with the logic taking shape here. And the logic of the employers, of spontaneous growth, of case-by-case handling, a choice on which the regional government proved to be rather condescending, must be countered with the logic of using specific possibilities and instruments of leadership and planning for this process.

The new attention being devoted to this situation was one of the central topics of the report by Roberto Tonini to the Third Regional Congress of the Veneto CGIL. This was the third congress but, like the others that were held or are being held in various regions, it was in fact the first one, constituting the new CGIL in terms of its regional setup. This gathering had little impact on the population, on the people as such (few citizens in Mestre knew that this meeting was taking place); but that does not mean poor participation by the workers, by the almost 300,000 registered members of the CGIL. The 570 delegates and what they discussed between 27 February and 1 March constituted the final outcome of a myriad of grass-roots and intermediate congresses, such as more than 3,000 congresses in the factories and companies, 21 in the districts, 17 in the regional categories, while there were also gatherings that constituted the regional federations of the transportation workers and the public employees. The sensation--according to the comments of a journalist who, we might say, is "outside" the movement--was one of a labor union which, without emphasis, without worrying about displaying compactness in the trenches, realistically tackled the problems with the help of a new structure. A labor union which, he said, might perhaps leave unaltered its capacity to have a profound effect on social and economic relationships but which could also become an enormous force in the equilibriums of the region.

Not being able to report everything, we will try to visualize what questions the reader might have for the Veneto labor union in thinking of the problems of that region and the answers the congress came up with. One of them might deal with the fate of Venice, a city turned into a museum or a production center, destined for ruin or rebirth. Another question certainly will involve terrorism, violence, and autonomy for Padua. Still another question necessarily will involve the region's production fabric. We missed out on many remarks but one cannot say that the congress debate on the issue of Venice brought out the major points which, although they may not be central points, were present in Tonini's report when, for example, he talked about the district development plan for the communities of the Lagoon and the

Venice hinterland, which the labor union proposed in an effort to involve the factory, zone, and residential area councils and the schools in a relationship which would go beyond mere contract practices between the labor union and the local government.

Concerning the remarks on the production fabric, the policy called for restoration and improvement of the existing production machinery, both the crafts, small and medium industry (which we talked about earlier), and agriculture, as well as big industry. And on the basis of that one must rebuild a relationship with the workers which had become worn out, as Conte said, amid the concrete materialization of the tie-in between the first part of the contracts, work organization, and territory development. There is already a regional development plan for this which has been heavily criticized by the labor union; but let us be careful, assistant secretary-general Carlesso warned, in not throwing out economic planning along with the regional plan. The problem of relations between the labor union and the workers was the real core of the congress debate. While Agostini, secretary of the national FIOM [Federation of Those Employed in Metallurgical Industries], tied this in with the forms of collective bargaining negotiations ("we reduced the gap between an entirely vertical bargaining procedure involving the categories and another entirely horizontal one involving services"), Perulli, from the regional union of textile workers, analyzed the new company statistics: through the division of labor, the employers managed to break down the conventional figures for the worker, the middle classes, the tertiary sector, etc. Hence we must offer a new labor culture.

Next we have terrorism. Everybody talked about it with an evident effort to analyze the situation clearly in terms of the political judgment regarding the connection existing between autonomy and the armed party. And the biggest contribution came from a delegate from the University of Padua, a man by the name of Gabriele Di Stefano. With "scientific" precision, he demonstrated that there is no connection between poverty and violence, that autonomy does not require any mass base but rather a silent mass and that the open and clandestine structures of subversion coincide in the attack directed against the labor union since it is a force that gathers the masses around it.

Conditions in Campania

Rome RASSEGNA SINDACALE in Italian 20 Mar 80 pp 18-20

[Article by Tonino M. Chiusolo: "The paradox of Campania"]

[Text] A region which remains stationary while advancing or which advances while remaining stationary: policies

and strategies for emerging from the paradox, overcoming resistance and strong privileges.

In a situation which is continually although slowly changing, what does it mean to redefine or reassemble the various historical, political, economic, and social elements which go by the name of the "Southern issue?" The labor union tried to supply the meeting, which was held recently in Naples, with some answers to this question by analyzing the struggles that characterized the recent decade. Keeping in mind what had been "x-rayed" during this meeting, above all the southern-oriented commitment of Feliciano Rossitto, who was commemorated before the start of the activities, the Third Regional Congress of the Campania CGIL (Caserta, 5-8 March) was unable to avoid taking a close look at the problems facing it not only in Campania but in the rest of the South and the country as a whole.

First of all, the field was cleared of certain analyses or certain attitudes which still view the South as a "ragamuffin" existing at the very limits of subsistence or everywhere deprived of a valid production system or devoid of efficient forces which would contribute their own energies to the nation's wealth.

Through a rather impressive transfer of public funds, by means of the Fund For The South, the ruling bloc wanted to make sure that the economy and the production fabric of the southern regions would be transformed ffom poor and somehow self-sufficient areas into less poor but even more dependent systems. Dependent, in other words, in a functional manner on the patronage power apparatus and the new ruling bloc revolving around the so-called government bourgeoisie.

Private enterprise itself, as a matter of fact, did not want to and does not want to go the same way that was used in the industrialization of the North, without adopting some planning procedure. There is an attempt to create a new image of private enterprise which is more modern and which, relying on the sectors which are more "enlightened" than those that are more conservative and patronage-oriented, such as they are found in the Neapolitan area of the Christian Democratic Party, is settling down in the area around Caserta.

In this way, in spite of everything, this only makes the existing territorial and sector imbalances worse by, fictitiously, creating zones of wealth which are not tied in with the rest of the region, side by side with poor zones where agriculture has dropped to the lowest output level. We thus face an industrialization effort which in fact--by increasingly stifling the operating conditions of the small and medium enterprises, particularly the crafts enterprises--did not create new jobs to the proper extent. This promoted the growth of a secondary market involving parallel work, unofficial work, made up of a group of unemployed, of young people with part-time jobs,

of women, and so forth and so on, with extensive forms of decentralized and "hidden" labor.

Although it does produce a certain income, also thanks to this second market, Campania in particular does not manage to tackle and solve its own basic problems and looks like a region which paradoxically enough--as was written in the congress topics--remains stationary while going forward or goes forward while remaining stationary.

One special feature of the current situation therefore involves the imbalance between the coastal strip and the inland zones, although new industrial nuclei are developing around the cities of Avellino and Benevento. This is an imbalance based on the increasing density of the urban population in the major cities, particularly in the Neapolitan area, which is paralleled by a continuous population loss in the small parts of the inland zones and the subsequent flight from the land.

Although this can be considered a rough picture of the situations that today characterize the "Southern issue," one must not forget that, in a region such as Campania, the labor union movement must come to grips with old and new problems at the same time, involving the modifications on the labor market and in the makeup of the working class, the social breakup and the power of the ruling bloc, which is often also identified in the local government.

It was not easy at this congress--and it could not be otherwise--to outline a labor union strategy which would do justice also in handling the mistakes of the past, when the labor union found itself forced to handle the corporative and patronage impetus coming from the various social strata of the population. The debate, which involved the participation of 441 delegates representing 260,000 registered members and the presence of 29 women, was characterized by the vivacity and passions pervading it; these were the many problems that had to be analyzed, checked out, and assembled again within a single fighting strategy that would be sustained by the commitment of the entire movement. It was for example inevitable to point up the various political interpretations regarding the "EUR policy" and all that it meant at the moment when the labor union's southern-oriented commitment was put at the very center of everything. Is the strategy of the EUR--many people asked themselves--still valid in dealing with the South? According to the admission of many, the labor union in recent times had almost set this commitment aside. Does this involve only white-washing the front or adding some patch-up job here or there so that everything may proceed regularly? Before arriving at conclusions that would put an end to the "EUR policy" or that would make it an absolute policy, the analyses and the contributions made by the delegates, during the general meeting and in the study groups, were designed clearly to bring out also the most profound

contradictions between a social-economic reality that is in a continuous state of "boiling." The severest criticisms were expressed for example with respect to the region and the government. Just 10 years after the creation of the region as a unit, the political actions of the board were characterized by the failure to manage public affairs. On the other hand, through the intervention of the Fund For The South, the federal government promoted pork-barrel projects which were not based on any planning criterion. The relative majority party, both in the federal government and in the region, thus promoted the growth of the patronage system and the right to work, the right to social services, and so forth, was replaced by "the gift," the "concession," and the protection ("favor") offered by the powerful.

Caught between these corporative thrusts, the labor union did not manage to control the labor market through specific management of job placement procedures. Here it suffices to refer to the leagues of unemployed youths and the special rosters provided under Law No 285. It was said, with some elements of self-criticism, that the experiment of the rosters is now over and that it is necessary to get away from the losing logic of the daily mad dash in trying to resolve the various problems. There is furthermore the problem of the very extensive presence (about 180,000) of young people, of persons with part-time jobs, of seasonal laborers, and so on, which is completely beyond the labor union's control. There is also the temptation among the delegates to organize this mass of workers into a separate federation; but both Trentin--in his conclusions--and the congress resolutely rejected this proposal, instead trusting in the ability of the individual categories to take over the job of organizing the various workers according to the sector involved; thus the seasonal laborers, employed in picking tomatoes, would be organized under the food industry workers or the seasonal farm laborers would be organized under the Federation of Farm Laborers and so forth and so on. Workers "who cannot be better identified" would go into the horizontal structures, starting with the structures of the zone. The problem is not to make the same mistakes as in the past, when we simply dumped discontent, anger, and despair among unemployed youths upon the horizontal structures, among other things creating an opposition to the union itself.

In order better to outline a development and fighting plan, the labor union, in the face of all this--as Silvano Ridi said in his introductory report--cannot stop at the doors of the institutions. It must directly become involved in the contradictions, also in those of the welfare types, in order to overcome them and to modify public action in the South, starting with the special action of the Fund For The South itself. In this context we advance the demand for breaking up the Fund and the Ministry for the South and we ask for the establishment of a technical agency directly controlled by the region, to which would be referred all of the funds, including the additional allocations. In supporting--as a

union--a regional development plan, within which specific points become a new production base (agribusiness, energy, transportation, and so on) and a different growth of urban areas, and in overcoming the welfare system, the confrontation-clash with the institutions (from the federal government to the regions), will be stated in a different manner but in a continuous fashion with respect to the "EUR policy." This means that the congress once again, and by no means in a ritual manner, is placing this transformation blueprint at the center of labor union strategy. This is obviously a matter of not yielding to blackmail by the federal government and giving it alone the results of the sacrifices of the workers. In order to impose--and in order not to wait for--the counterparts which the federal government must furnish, the labor union movement must build a social bloc (young people, women, unemployed, persons with part-time jobs, political and intellectual forces) and it must expand new alliances and a vaster social consensus within the working class. But this fighting strategy must also involve private industry. This is why the blueprints for a new quality of work and development go hand in hand with the struggles in the factories for a different allocation of wealth produced. Here again, the debate on productivity does not end, as if due to an incident along the way, but becomes an integral part of the struggles for the transformation of the production system and society.

Tying the struggle in the factories together with the struggle that must be conducted in the territory and in the public administration, in support of a reform of the institutions themselves, means above all healing unity within the CGIL, between the regions and the categories and between the latter and the other confederations, that is, the CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions] and the UIL [Italian Union of Labor]. Here, in Campania, there is certainly no lack of different interpretations of the manner in which one must plan and carry out a new regional development plan. The labor union of Campania, which has set some ambitious targets for itself, faces a difficult trial during the coming months and years. One of those ambitious objectives is the establishment of leagues of part-time workers, young people, and so forth and so on, on the level of the zone and the district.

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NATION'S AGRICULTURAL POLICY COMPARED TO EEC'S

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[Article by Francesco Conto: "New Outlines of Italian Agricultural Policy"]

[Text] This article is intended to bring out the difficulties which must be faced in order definitely to work out an efficient and clear farm policy to the advantage of Italy's agriculture. It is indispensable first of all to avoid any possible delays in the implementation of the standards now in force otherwise Italian agriculture will run the risk of continuing in a phase of stagnation for a long time to come.

General Context

Far from permitting a clearly determined definition, Italy's "farm policy" reveals a considerable degree of difficulties to anyone who wants to explain its contents and identify the pertinent decision-making and operational sources. The fact is that we are dealing here with a complex of actions (expressed in normative provisions) which have an effect on the process of price and production cost formation, as well as upon the entire service system. In our study here we will try to provide an organic presentation of the complicated concatenation between national and community legislation (with the pertinent regional consequences) on the topic of agricultural "structures," as well as an update on the state of implementation and on the difficulties encountered by the various provisions.

Without exhaustively trying to cover the entire broad range of actions which, as of now, are being taken in the primary sector, it is a good idea now to recall the most important of them which, when viewed in the proper context, represent a valid,"specific materialization" of the term Italian "farm policy" as it relates to the structures involved; in other words, we are looking at the part which properly speaking involves the effort based on public planning. We will separately take up the aspects of price policies and markets which comes within the exclusive purview of the European Community.

The legislative context develops along four specific action directions: (a) increase in the production efficiency of the establishments; (b) arrangement of valid supporting structure which would help improve and raise establishment productivity; (c) creation of facilities for the processing and sale of agricultural products, placed on suitable levels and no longer proliferating "at random;" (d) vertical arrangement of agricultural-food system, understood here in terms of the better integration of strictly production activities (under a) with the product sales and processing phase (under c).

In substance, the legislator has realized that, in the current commercial situation, there cannot be any production advantage to the agricultural operator by concentrating exclusively on holding down the production costs and the rise in sales prices on products obtained. Reality teaches us that there is no longer any sense in increasing the supply, through a series of structural actions, if we do not make provision for the creation of suitable outlet markets and for "letting" the farmers "into" the commercial circuits.

Therefore, the examination of normative provisions will be made in terms of their combination on the basis of the four action directions pursued by them.

The description pertains to the part that could be defined as "how" one should carry out the specific actions in the area of agriculture. Unfortunately there is a real break between the proposal element (the law) and the implementation element (government administration) which manifests itself in various aspects: some of a general character (pertaining more to normative provisions) and others which are of a special concern (pertaining only to one of them).

Law No 984/1977 (the so-called "Fourfold National Agricultural Law")

Let us start our examination of the steps which in fact constitute Italy's farm policy by taking a look at the so-called "Fourfold National Agricultural Law" (Law No 984, dated 27 December 1977).

The decision to start the series of studies with this provision is not a casual one. As a matter of fact, both for reasons of proper sequence and because of the significance of the program innovations introduced by that law, it is indispensable to take a close look at the way it works out in practice, 2 years after its passage. As for the rest, the four guiding criteria, for the group of farm laws involved here, list direct action, aimed at improving and stabilizing the production efficiency of the agricultural establishments, in first place. Law No. 984/77 moves in that direction by providing for a complex of initiatives in support of the development of the most important production compartments in Italian agriculture (livestock, horticulture and fruit cultivation, forestation, the

big Mediterranean plantations, and wine-growing), as well as the practical implementation of indispensable supporting facilities in the area of irrigation and hill and mountain land improvement (likewise tied in with an increase in establishment efficiency).

In order to make the law immediately operational, as we recall, the CIPAA [Interministerial Committee for Agricultural and Food Policy] provides for launching a brief practical implementation plan with an operational span limited to 1978, asking the regions as quickly as possible to adjust their sector programs to it.

The regions, with a few rare exceptions, in reality, confined themselves to refinancing "old" regional laws, without concerning themselves too much with the "innovations" contained in Law No 984, widely praised--with words--in all propaganda media (newspapers, television, meetings).

This state of affairs was bound to have consequences from the financial aspect. As a matter of fact, the "financing law" for last year provides for "slipping" 670 billions over to 1979 which, with the addition of only 400 billions (taken from the 1.1 billions provided for 1979 in Law No. 984), constitute the "normal" coverage for 1979 (400 billions), taken from its effective budget allocation and 670 [billions] "recovered" from the 1978 budget.

This emergency situation involves the risk of getting worse whenever one once again examines the government budget for FY 1979, when the above-mentioned 400 billions did not show up in the estimates presented by the MAF [Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry], although they did show up under chapter 9004 in the table provided by the Ministry of the Treasury; this means that this money was not budgeted for the coverage of Law No. 984 and, hence, even assuming that the regions cannot spend this money, these funds cannot be carried over as leftover liabilities in the MAF budget for 1980 and, in the long run, that money will disappear from the allocations under Law No 984/1977.

It will therefore be up to the region to repudiate in fact the amounts otherwise allocated due to the inability to spend this money in agriculture so that these funds could then in effect be invested in other sectors of Italian industry which likewise have a sad reputation.

Through the CIPAA, the Ministry of Agriculture as a matter of fact has already set up the final multiannual plan (4-year and 9-year) on the basis of the provisions contained in Article 3, Law 984/1977.

This plan, recently revised, obtained the backing of the regions on 21 November and was approved by the CIPAA and, in a definitive manner, by the cabinet, respectively, on 13 and 14 December 1979.

We must however not stop at this point, except to underscore the need for quickly working out an overall estimate for food planning. This estimate as a matter of fact simply cannot involve just the passage of the Fourfold National Agricultural Loan. This is something which does not allow us to set the National Agricultural Plan up so that it will be capable of overcoming the limitations of sector planning; this does not make it possible, with adequate technical-administrative instruments, to tackle the problems of the connection between the decisive sectors, such as those of industry, of the distribution circuits, of transportation services and promotional services for exports (which operate up the line and down the line from agriculture).

However, it has been said that the recently approved multiannual plan itself yielded much to the regional levels of government deriving from mere demands for "quantities of money which can be spent freely"; this is to the detriment of the duty (rather than power) of "guidance and coordination" entrusted to the federal government under Decree No 616/77.

In substance, we intend to stress here quite forcefully that the conflicts of interest or interpretation, which arise between the individual aspects of the agricultural-food circuit (laws on health or environmental protection, transportation or employment problems, relationships with related industry or commercial circuits, education in the use of food and the effect of food products on the shopping basket in order to calculate the sliding scale, etc.) contribute not a little to slowing down a balanced development of the agricultural sector as such by preventing the latter from having specific points of coordination within which it can move and make its plans.

It is true that Law No 984/77 is the first attempt in Italy to "construct" farm planning which would constitute the pivot for the restrictions imposed by Community farm policy and those inherent in the new regional authorities, also in compliance with the combined provisions of articles 4, 6, and 11 in DPR [Presidential Decree] No 616/1977 (which regulate the "managing and coordination" power of farm policy, entrusted to the federal government, as well as the participation of the regions in drafting the planning outlines).

In spite of these premises, Law No 984 however remained exclusively a provision for procedures and financing. It has not as a matter of fact been successful in transforming the Ministry of Agriculture and by the same token, the CIPAA, into an effective sector planning agency (for agriculture) and it therefore entails the risk of frustrating any effort designed to provide a single thrust for all of the actions being taken by anybody within the primary sector.

Community Farm Policy

In moving on to the topics of Community farm policy, it is a good idea to discard the customary or now out-dated manner of contemplating them. We

consider it more correct right away to take up the argument by observing that the spending for market supports, in the budget estimates for next year (rejected by the European Parliament at its session of 13 December 1979 and now operative in terms of twelfths of the 1979 budget, month by month) amount to 9,465.475 million EUA, thus constituting an increase of 17.43 percent as compared to FY 1979. This however is a statistic which remains to be checked out to a great extent.

Within the context of expenditures included in the EAGGF-guaranteed budget we as a matter of fact find again included the spending items deriving from the Community's foreign commitments. This is the case with expenditures for restitutions pertaining to sugar imported from the ACP [African, Caribbean, and Pacific states] and India (395.5 million EUA) and for the storage of butter coming from New Zealand (240 million EUA)--expenditures which should more correctly have been listed under the budget chapter pertaining to "cooperation with developing countries and with third countries."

Another spending category, which one cannot continue to list under costs for Common Agricultural Policy [CAP], consists of agricultural-monetary expenditures.

Indeed, as regards the compensatory membership amounts (ICA), for which an expenditure of 0.1 million EUA was set aside for 1980, it is obvious that these expenditures have no connection whatsoever with the management of the agricultural markets.

These instruments, as a matter of fact, represented a temporary necessity designed to promote the lineup of EEC farm prices with those of the newly-joining countries.

A similar point can be made regarding the compensatory monetary amounts (MCA) since they reflect the rather low level of conversions among the economies of the member states which, in turn, is expressed by divergent monetary processes which, through the device of [price] supports do not have any repercussions on farm incomes.

Looking at Community earnings, one must not forget that the handling of the CAP helped support the Community balance. The agricultural allocations, as a matter of fact, provide the Community exchequers with 1,776.1 million EUA, whereas the "sugar" contributions and the "isoglucose" [sugar equivalent] contributions amount to 467.3 million EUA.

Taking into account what we said in the earlier points, the expenditures of the EAGGF, Guarantee Section, always with reference to the estimates for 1980, account for 48.44 percent of the total Community budget which, it is well for us to recall, represents only 0.8 percent of the gross output of EEC and 2.5 percent of the sum of the budgets of the member states. These

shares as a matter of fact are not exorbitant if we keep in mind that agricultural expenditures facilitate a considerable degree of self-sufficiency for the Community in the sector of food consumption.

On the other hand, a greater demand for food products on the world markets coming from the member states would certainly contribute to the deterioration of the commodity quotations which is why the saving for the same would mean very little in substance.

Still looking at the topic of allocations for the EAGGF, Guarantee Section, we must not forget the rather considerable disparity in protection given for continental products as compared to those which are typcially Mediterranean. The latter, which account for 18 percent of European agricultural production, are getting supports under various headings to amount to 12 percent of the total funds allocated for market supports. Milk and cheese production--which accounts for 19 percent out of the Community PLV--gets the benefit of 40 percent of the entire budget.

The restoration of balance in this situation--through a serious policy of reducing incentives for surplus production--would make it possible to achieve a specific financial saving, as indicated in the forecasts of the Commission.

A general fund cutback on the other hand would strike harder at the production efforts and agricultural areas which are already at a disadvantage today.

Going on now to an examination of community policies in the structural sector, comparing the amounts earmarked, in the 1980 budget draft, for the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF (9,465.4 million EUA) with those earmarked for the Orientation Section (322.3 million EUA), we are certainly struck by the gap existing between expenditures for market supports and those set aside for the improvement of the structure.

In this case likewise, however, it is a good idea to make some specific remarks. The market support expenditures are entirely financed from the community budget and therefore replace any national assistance for all agricultural products, currently with the exception of potatoes, mutton, ethyl alcohol, timber, and honey.

The expenditures of the Orientation Section, on the other hand, constitute a complement of the national expenditures designed for the same purpose. One can therefore say that they have a stimulating function since the community budget is involved in a proportion varying between 25 and 65 percent, depending upon the nature of the expenditure, in support of actions decided upon at the community level but implemented by the individual member states.

Furthermore, through the adoption of Regulation 929/79 (EEC), concerning the expenditures of the Orientation Section, the fixation of an annual maximum was eliminated which is why, if there were a political determination along these lines, we should witness a certain restoration of balance between the expenditures financed by the Agricultural Fund.

Community policies so far have not contributed to the process of integration between the economies of the member countries. If we take a figure of 100 as the community average for the per-capita JNP, then the FRG, between 1970 and 1978, climbed from 124 to 140; Italy dropped from 70 down to 55; Great Britain dropped from 89 down to 75; Ireland dropped from 53 down to 50. As far as Italy is concerned, Lombardy likewise--among the most prosperous regions of Italy--is below each of the regions of West Germany.

But it is certainly not through the transfer of funds from the agricultural sector to other policies that it will be possible to have a positive effect upon the restoration of economic balance between the richest areas and the less well-off areas of the Community.

This desirable objective as a matter of fact can be attained only through an EEC budget growth rate which would move up faster than the average of the national budgets, so as to transfer some financial burdens from the member states to the Community.

If we exclude expenditures for market support policy, then one cannot maintain that the current budget will be capable of taking the place--even if only partially--of those of the "Nine," instead having a direct effect on incomes.

In this situation, any reduction of agricultural spending, which does not spring from an attempt to restore the equilibrium on some surplus markets, would penalize the less well-off areas which are usually characterized by a high level of agricultural activities.

The structural and investment efforts will be equalized from the financial viewpoint, although within the scope of greater availability of funds belonging to the Community itself.

Social-Structural Directives of EEC

The previous reference to the Orientation Section of the EAGGF deserves further development through a more updated reference to the social-structural directives of the EEC (directives numbers 159, 160, 161 of 1972 and number 268 of 1975), included in the Italian standards by Law No. 153/1975 and No. 352/1976.

Through the approval of this system made up of various specific actions (and at the modernization of the agricultural establishments, encouraging

an end to agricultural activities and the designation of agricultural utilization areas for the purpose of improving the structures, and at social-economic information and the professional improvement of persons who work in agriculture, as well as the development of mountain areas and particularly disadvantaged zones), the Community at last made available to the member countries a kind of initiative supplementary to the traditional price policy.

Beyond the assured financial support coming from the community contribution, the big novelty here was represented by the "instrumentation" designed by Mansholt in order to implement the "structural policy" of the EEC.

In substance, through the approval of the directives, the agencies in charge of national agricultural policy were given the possibility of overcoming the sector approach (firm plans) by switching to a type of overall action.

As a matter of fact, on the basis of the approach introduced through the directives, we find here the principle of selectivity of actions to be taken. Far from constituting a kind of discrimination which would penalize the interests of the major portion of the Italian establishments (as a certain political segment constantly repeated during the span of time since 1972), this selectivity is the only criterion that can guarantee the allocation of scarce funds toward effective utilization capable of generating the following:

(a) An increase in agricultural productivity and the remuneration level of the factors employed in it in order to move this sector closer to the others (industry, commerce, etc.); (b) the reduction of the differences between the agriculture of the various countries which are partners in the Community; (c) the rebalancing (through proper operational methods involved in the actions taken subsequent to such a policy) between Italy's "easy" zones and "difficult" zones.

The application of this principle means in fact switching to a system of action in agriculture based no longer on assistance from the government, intended to solve "particular" establishment problems (artesian wells, etc.) but rather on organic "enterprise development plans."

It is precisely the combination between the establishment development plan and the income comparability thresholds based on the ULU (man-work unit), to be attained at the end of the plan (objective conditions) and the commitment in agriculture, as a principal activity, on the part of the entrepreneur (two-thirds of the income derived and two-thirds of the time used), with the pertinent occupational qualification (subjective conditions), which makes it possible to obtain optimum results from the resources employed in structural actions.

However, as we can read in the report of the CNEL [National Council for Economy and Labor] on the policy of agricultural structures in Italy, "the

phase of pressing impatience, with which Italy (although with opinions differentiated domestically) called for action along those lines, was followed--the moment the reception phase began (first on the national level and then on the regional level)--by a rather sleepy rhythm which soon had lost all appearances of urgency. Together with this change in speed, the debate on the degree of correspondence between the community directives and the features and requirements of Italian industry, gradually slowed down and, with the exception of some sporadic spurts, attention was gradually shifted to problems and instruments of the type connected with the economic situation as such" (price policy, production "quotas," etc.).

Although we have been conditioned by a similar experience, it is a good idea to start giving serious consideration to the need for applying, in Italy likewise, these procedures which, with a few rare exceptions, never became a part of Italy's positive law. It is therefore necessary, also in connection with structural actions, to arrive at a single standard for all EEC countries, as happened in the case of the previously mentioned price policy.

Infrastructure Actions ('Mediterranean Package')

The constant reference to the difficult economic-territorial conditions of most of the agricultural areas in Italy is precisely accompanied by the hope or the necessity that infrastructural projects be prepared in them which would be capable of helping toward the development of production, the increase in productivity of establishments located in those areas, as well as the improvement of the living conditions of the population involved.

The important thing is--within the limits of usable technological knowledge and available funding--to modify the structure and natural conditions of more or less vast territories in order to eliminate or at least reduce the disparities as regards their production conditions with respect to the less localized areas.

These operations therefore constitute the indispensable prerequisites for the structural recasting and for the efficiency of the agriculture reform measures which we intend to implement in those regions (in other words, the actions provided for under the Fourfold National Agricultural Law, the community directives, and the specific regional laws).

The priority need which we detect in this sector is to standardize the bureaucratic-administrative procedures and to insert all of the actions possible in the infratructure field into coordinated overall programs.

The community regulations, which were included in the so-called "Mediterranean package" (a rather imprecise term which we will define in greater detail later on), moved in this direction.

In particular, this involves the following: EEC Regulation No 1362/78 (pertaining to the program for the acceleration and orientation of the collective irrigation operations in the South); EEC Regulation No 1760/78 (part of a joint effort to improve the infrastructures in certain rural areas); EEC Regulation No 269/79 (pertaining to a joint effort in forestry in some arid Mediterranean parts of the Community).

The novelty characterizing these steps resides in the explicit revision to be harmonized with other similar and/or complementary measures aimed at providing incentives for agriculture.

To attain this purpose, the above-mentioned regulations introduce a special procedure. The Community as a matter of fact participates exclusively in financing the projects which are inserted in appropriate general programs responding to the conditions which were definitely spelled out in the regulations themselves.

The logic behind the drafting of these general programs revolves around the need for defining some parameters and fundamental conditions which must assure internal coherence between specific projects which will be used in order actually to implement the efforts provided for under the regulations (and/or national and regional laws). Hence the need for the general overall programs to contain fundamental indications, such as:

The measures and funds provided for the implementation of the program itself (in other words, the entire series of actions which the federal government intends to take regarding irrigation, rural electrification, forest cultivation, roads, etc.);

The properly motivated delimitation of areas involved in the operation;

The period of time provided for their implementation;

The arrangements--and this is of extreme importance in connection with our approach here--which, on the one hand, will guarantee the harmonization of the program with other possible actions or measures designed to encourage the integrated development of agriculture and the improvement of the infrastructure facilities in the areas involved and, on the other hand, priority for complementary projects of such programs or measures;

The possible description--wherever necessary--of preliminary actions considered necessary, such as collection of data and conduct of research work;

The links with the general regional development program (wherever there are implications regarding the provisions contained in this latter document).

This position statement, which seeks to "institutionalize" (to the extent that this can be done with the help of a community regulation) the procedure of coordinating various infrastructure actions, presents a possible "break" in the phase of general-program drafting.

This authority is given to the federal government and therefore also to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. An irrigation plan scheme (basin by basin) has already been prepared at this time in conjunction with the Fund for the South.

However, it is necessary to underscore some difficulties of a practical character which come up in the Ministry of Agriculture in order to comply with the community requirement and in order thus to activate the new procedure provided here.

In particular, the authorities of the regions, of the Fund for the South, of the Mountain communities, and the other entities or consortiums involved in infrastructure projects, constitute a barrier which is difficult for the current Agriculture Ministry to clear.

On the other hand, a general plan, such as the one outlined in the above-mentioned regulations, requires broader and more effective cooperation on the part of all entities involved (and the organizations of agricultural producers) if it is supposed to attain the goals assigned to it.

It is in the drafting of that plan that we can overcome the narrow approaches of the individual institutions which can and must instead be taken up during the implementation and management phase of the individual specific projects included in the context of such plans. It would be harmful to continue to create obstacles to the inevitable requirement for coordinating the infrastructure actions (a job assigned to the MAF by DPR number 616/77).

In strictly financial terms, we must devote some attention to the request recently made by the EIB for a loan of 2,500 million EUA which would enable Italy immediately to start the implementation of the above-mentioned normative provisions (awarding project contracts, etc.) and which would prevent inflation from progressively eroding the purchasing power, thus reducing the operational capabilities. In this respect, there are two fundamental elements at play: Italy's joining the EMS and the activities of the Italian regions.

Agriculture and the European Monetary System

The creation of the EMS was designed as a first attempt to put some order into the international money market and to speed up the process of economic

integration within the Community. This is why it is up to the individual governments to institute coherent measures on the level of national economic strategy which will be compatible with the attainment of such objectives.

Having made this point, and taking into account the particular Italian situation, it is probable that, over a rather long span of time, we might register a spread of several points between the Italian rate of inflation and the Community average; this spread--due to the effect the stabilization of the foreign value of the lira--cannot be expressed in terms of the levels of exchange.

Looking at the situation from the agricultural viewpoint, the problem becomes relevant because of the inevitable repercussions upon the sector of farm rates and compensatory monetary amounts. In recent months, the unit of mcm [compensatory monetary amounts] underwent a rapid and noteworthy shrinkage. The development was as follows:

As of 8 April 1979:	-17.2
As of 9 April 1979	-11.2
Start of 1979-1980 harvests	- 7.8
Start of 1980-1981 harvests	- 2.5

In a situation where the lira is stable within the EMS, we may get additional mcm, without any revision of the parity between the lira and the ECU by an entity equal to the maximum fluctuation permitted (up 6 percent), minus the anticipated [duty] exemption (1.5 percent). In substance, new Italian mcm may be created within a ceiling of 4.5 percent. In this case, their absorption would take place between two harvests with the possibility of a speed-up upon the initiative of the interested government.

Assuming, on the other hand, that there is a revision in the central parities, the cabinet, with a qualified majority, will from time to time decide also because in this case, the reflections upon the complete shopping basket will be generalized with a modification that in turn is a reflection of all of the parities and all of the supports.

As regards the agricultural sector, we can anticipate three different scenarios: (a) the lira remains stable and does not change its parity with respect to the ECU: the mcm situation remains what it is now (down 2.5 percent) and within the period of one harvest, they are completely absorbed. In this case, the price rises will not be sufficient to compensate Italy's agriculture for the current rate of inflation; (b) the lira grows weaker, gradually approaching the maximum fluctuation provided for, with the development of new supports equal to -4.5 percent. In that case we would get a maximum of -7 percent which can be absorbed within two harvests. After this absorption, we would once again face the problem of the inflation

differential; (c) the lira is devalued beyond the amount allowed: the unit of new mcm and the method of absorption are decided by the cabinet [Council] at the moment the new schedule is established: in that case likewise, the agricultural sector, with every probability, would be barely indemnified as compared to the production costs which would be around 19 percent.

For the primary compartment we therefore expect a future without the possibility of using the amortization factor which is represented by the devaluation of the firm lira which permitted a partial recovery--on the basis of the final prices--of the growing production costs.

It is evident that a situation of this kind--whose materialization may only be a very short time away from the existence of the current supports--would help wipe out those certain income expectations for the agricultural operators which constitute the basis of their actions and the condition for crop planning and investments. The damage deriving from that would hit the entire Italian economy.

Agriculture and Regions

The aspect which most distinguishes the agricultural activities of the Italian regions consists of the delays with which they operate and spend.

The causes behind the fact that the regions do not ask for the funds allocated to them by the federal government in turn are many but not all of them can be blamed on the regional administrations themselves.

Among the specific reasons which, in local terms, bring about the accumulation of leftover funds regarding investment spending are as follows:

(1) The long time taken up by the passage of budget laws and laws in general: the length of time depends not only on the uncertainties of the regional government agencies regarding the decisions to be made but also sometimes on the frailty of certain regional majorities which in practice lead to a paralysis of regional action: emblematic in this respect are the cases of Marche (6 months of political crisis) and Campania (9 months of crisis) which brought about a delay in the passage of the budget for 1979 (May in the case of Marche and June in the case of Campania) and which made it practically impossible to implement the regional ad hoc laws; (2) the extremely general nature of many regional spending laws: the regions often confine themselves to indicating the field of action and the general principles, leaving the specification of the operational methods for successive provisions depending upon studies and research; (3) delays in the passage of administrative implementation acts, with particular emphasis on the approval of distribution plans for the territorial set up of action to be taken and the identification of initiatives authorized for financing: most of the regional laws so far worked on the basis of requests reaching the

region after the laws themselves took effect; (4) implementation of a rigid scale of priorities established by the spending laws: in the agriculture sector,the files on the direct growers are processed first and then the others are examined; (5) lengthy administrative procedures between fund allocation and the actual requesting of the amounts of money needed to carry out the projects: delays in the submission of projects, in the approval of acts of authorization to use credit, in the approval of the projects as such; (6) further filtering phases represented by the sometimes unnecessary delegation of certain functions to the lower-level local government agencies: this is true in Puglia which, on the basis of a recent law on action to be taken to correct the damage inflicted upon the grower by bad weather, delegated to the communities the entire authority to issue directives on processing the files, giving the province the function of acting as "official payer" for the region; (7) paralysis of administrative action sometimes due to conflicts between the board and the regional council: wherever, according to the charter or certain spending laws, specific administrative steps should be taken by the council upon proposal of the board, the political crisis in a particular region (Marche, Campania, Calabria) causes administrative action likewise to be blocked.

This situation obviously involves an incorrect and rather hasty handling of funds allocated to the regions for various actions in the operational sectors under their authority. Thus, the sums set aside for agriculture remain immobilized for long periods of time while inflation and devaluation considerably reduce their purchasing power.

Because of the uncertainties and long-drawn-out procedures, the subsequent technical and bureaucratic processing during the final phase of reception, instruction drafting, financing, and authorization of requests sent in by interested parties cannot be handled in the proper short span of time; this is so bad that, from the moment the request is filed until the aid is actually given out, an average of 3 years may pass (the community agencies, for example, make their own contribution through a delay ranging from 12 to 18 months after the work is supposed to have been finished). This is why, at the rate in which devaluation progresses today, the interested parties receive financing aid which in fact has shrunk by 45-50 percent; and these are funds which are already insufficient to meet the actual requirements from the very beginning.

It is precisely this long-drawn-out processing which must be blamed frequently for the negative response of the growers to the aid offered by the instruments available.

In order thus to speed up actions of this kind and to make them more effective (such as those provided for in the directives for the reorganization of agriculture and others) it would be necessary to abandon the system used

so far and instead to provide for the adoption of new and more complete instruments which would coordinate all actions involving the primary sector through "integral and/or integrated, sector and territorial projects" which would in a united and complete manner cover the entire compartment or, better still, the entire economy in certain territories.

In practice this should involve working out and implementing "projects" drafted in close collaboration between the community, the federal government, and the regions.

In order thus to guarantee the speed of problem statement, the overall charcter of the actions to be taken, and the autonomy of management, on the operational level, the above-mentioned three authorities should delegate the pertinent functions to an attached executive appointed by common agreement.

Enlargement of EEC

The need for doing what we have said so far becomes even more urgent in view of the fact that new Mediterranean countries are joining the community.

Indeed, with the conclusion of negotiations for the admission of Greece to the Community, signed on 21 September 1978, the enlargement of the EEC to include the three countries of Southern Europe, which recently became democracies, was launched concretely.

The treaty covering membership for Greece does not turn out to be particularly penalizing for Italy. Greater difficulties, on the other hand, may be expected in connection with the negotiations with Spain and particularly with Portugal.

As far as Spain is concerned, it experienced a great increase in its exports due to the Community; the main difficulties reside in the Spanish level of industrialization, with low man-power costs, export supports, etc., and, generally, the introduction of community mechanisms into Spain, such as the VAT, administrative controls, etc., along with the abandonment of the current system of protectionism. Furthermore, structural backwardness, industrial concentration, a deficit in the balance of payments, and unemployment are the main problems for the integration of the Spanish economy into the EEC.

Regarding agriculture, the real problems of competition, especially for Italy, seem to reside in output increases (particularly oil and wine) which may materialize as a consequence of the introduction of new prices. More generally, Italy may also be at a disadvantage because of its administrative situation which is comparatively worse than the situation in Spain although it is rather defective likewise.

In this connection it would be desirable that, during this initial negotiating phase already, the Mediterranean countries would draft and agree upon

a real and proper strategy for restoring the balance of the Community, a strategy based on Italian initiative: as a matter of fact, the constitution, within an integrated Europe, of a Mediterranean area with similar social and economic problems will necessarily bring out and even underscore a request for the shift of the community equilibriums in its favor, with particular emphasis on more voluminous transfers of resources toward the less favored areas; besides, it would boost collaboration of the EEC in view of the "new international economic order" which, drafted and supported by the developing countries, involves any area, country, or part of the world whose take off--which so far has not happened--may be possible only thanks to a different international division of labor. Spain and Portugal finally will certainly represent yet another bridgehead for a policy of commercial, financial, and technical cooperation by the EEC with Latin America, a continent which is of interest to Italy also because it is bigger than Africa south of the Sahara.

To be sure, the specific problems to be tackled are neither few in number nor simple in the agricultural sector although, in terms of surface area, we are not going to have any significant percentage shifts in the Mediterranean component (from 17 to 18 percent); it is also true that, following the application of the highest community price levels, there may be major shifts in the rate of self-supply of the EEC with the typical products of Italian agriculture.

The opposite situation will shape up for so-called continental products for which the enlargement [of the EEC] will permit the opening of new market outlets.

In terms of the contract clauses as such, it will be necessary to provide for a long transition period (5-10 years) during which it will be necessary, on the part of the community, to activate a flow of funds earmarked for development efforts, particularly those designed for regional policy, in order not to reproduce the phenomenon of manpower migration toward the richest parts of the Community and the simultaneous "turning into deserts" of entire regions.

Within the specific context of the PAC, it will not be useless to emphasize that its functioning will not only have to be reviewed for the purpose of preventing, as we said earlier, certain production explosions, but it will also be necessary to work toward its greater economy, preventing the distortions deriving from the costs for structural surpluses.

As far as Italy is concerned, the enlargement can constitute an opportunity for removing what has been a constant contradiction between the desire to join in as much as possible within the European context, on the one hand, and the unjustified need for defending the agriculture of the most prosperous countries of the Community, on the other hand.

The elimination of this contradiction may be one of the advantages which may accrue to Italy from the enlargement of the European Community.

Agriculture From the Angle of National 'Economic Policy'

At this point we must again reflect upon some conditions which more directly touch the agricultural features of national economic policy.

Spending on food plays a very important role in the general price level rise, given the importance of food consumption out of national consumption (more than 30 percent) and the significance of food items in the "shopping baskets" of the various indexes used to measure the increase in the cost of living (an index for the application of the sliding scale, an index of consumer prices for the families of blue-collar workers and white-collar employees, etc.).

The billing volume of sectors connected with agriculture is furthermore quite significant and, for 1979, it has been estimated at around 50 trillion lire, a figure which includes various activities connected with the primary activity: the production of technical equipment, machinery, and tools, the processing and sale of agricultural products, the production of consumer goods for the agricultural population.

If, on the one hand, however, the direct and indirect effects exerted by agriculture upon the entire economy are rather marked, then on the other hand, one must record that the incomes of farmers, self-employed and employed workers are still, in 1979, about half of those of workers employed in other sectors.

In particular, it must be stressed once again that the incomes of self-employed agricultural workers--in addition to turning out to be on the average lower than those of the agricultural workers--are most heavily hit by inflation which distorts the distribution of incomes to their detriment.

During the 2-year period of 1979-1980 we expect that, in the face of an increase in the costs of the agricultural enterprises for expenditures and taxes--fertilizer, fodder, fuel, machinery, interest on capital, wages, etc.--amounting to a good 30-33 percent, the increase in prices on agricultural products at the point of origin will only be 20-23 percent.

According to estimates, based on official data from the national accounting office, the greatest increase in costs as compared to the increase in prices collected would reduce the income of the self-employed agricultural worker by a good 1 trillion, again during the 2-year term of 1979-1980.

Although a part of the causes influencing this situation should be found in our agricultural structures, which are less efficient than those of the other

European agriculture establishments, and in the rather poor contract negotiating power of the agricultural entrepreneur, as a purchaser of technical equipment and services or as a seller of products, then we must not forget and we must not underestimate the conditions of low efficiency and the sometimes even parasitary situations under which the distribution conditions are implemented.

To give an example, we can see how there is a difference of 120 percent between the value of food spending by the typical family, based on the anticipated shopping basket requirements for the calculation of the sliding scale, and the value, at the point of origin, of agricultural products, calculated on the basis of producer prices in terms of quality and quantity of goods corresponding to those of the labor union basket!

It furthermore also turned out frequently in the course of this year that, for some particularly important products in the diet of families, the prices at the point of origin remain steady or even decline, whereas at the consumption end there are major increases (for example, the price of eggs at the point of origin dropped 26 percent in March 1979 as compared to March 1978 but the consumer price went up 4 percent).

The relationship between prices at the point of origin and at the consumer end for food products therefore is rather more complex than is generally believed, both because of the broad spread between the price level, at the point of origin and at the consumer end, and because of the sometimes rather different development of prices on individual agricultural products and food items.

If we want to fight inflation, we must not only regulate the increase in prices of agricultural products at the point of origin, but we must also control the increase in prices during the various intermediate phases, from processing all the way to sales.

It is furthermore necessary to establish a better ratio between costs and returns which would enable the agricultural enterprises to hold down the deterioration of their incomes deriving from autonomous labor. For that purpose, the following are considered among the measures that could be implemented with rather modest expenditures: the adoption of faster procedures for granting financing--especially through the regions (as has been amply demonstrated earlier)--and the selective funding of social expenditures to be borne by the agricultural establishments.

Indeed, the agricultural accounting statistics outline a primary sector which suffers due to the presence of an added value that grows little in quantitative terms whereas most of the growth in monetary terms is absorbed by wages which, during the 5-year period of 1973-1977, increased percentage wise from 25.4 percent to 35 percent.

The cost of agricultural labor assumed a very special significance and carries rather great weight. The curve of the labor factor is the one which presents the steepest rise when compared to the curve of amortizations and intermediate consumptions.

The collective bargaining negotiations concluded last May (first of all among the sectors where the contract had to be renewed) added new expenditures for the agricultural enterprises. This is why it is necessary to take effective action both with regard to investments facilitated and with regard to tax reliefs.

In some new irrigation areas it is possible to employ new manpower under qualitatively good conditions; at the same time, the primary sector can make a big contribution in terms of jobs indirectly through sectors connected with it (industries supplying technical equipment and food and commercial enterprises) which would be particularly happy over such a development.

That of course does not include figuring on the fact that the public actions, examined in this article, wherever implemented, would help provide new stability for the entire agricultural-food cycle and would consolidate the currently existing labor force (something which cannot be dismissed out of hand considering the country's current social and economic situation).

Conclusions

The approach presented in our essay leaves little room for a chapter on conclusions as such. By illustrating the individual steps as a matter of fact we have already brought out the difficulties we encounter in definitely working out and implementing an efficient and clear agricultural policy that will benefit Italian agriculture.

However it is a good idea to focus our attention--in connection with these conclusions--on the situation that existed prior to the norms examined here: absence of any policy of incentives throughout the seventies; slow and laborious construction of the region; start of regional legislation; almost complete absence of financial allocations.

The effects naturally were not long in making themselves felt regarding the operational capacity and overall efficiency of the primary sector and, in particular, concerning the investments and the conditions determining them.

In 1977, on the other hand, Law No 403, concerning the general refinancing of the regions, disregarding 1977 to 1978, made 990 billions available for the next 3 years. Law No 984 on planning procedures between the federal government and the regions in the field of agriculture allocates about

6 trillion for the next 4-9 years. Furthermore, Law No. 183/76--in addition to the revision and refinancing of special promotional projects under the Fund for the South (which we did not talk about in order not to crowd this essay too much)--allocated another 2 trillion to the southern regions to be allotted preferably to regional agricultural development projects.

Finally, we have what, with a rather happy term, has been called "Mediterranean compensations." These are community regulations which were drafted primarily (as was demonstrated) in order to work out a new planning procedure between federal government actions and EAGGF actions, orientation section: a different relationship which, on the one hand, will tend to prevent the approval of inapplicable community standards and, on the other hand, directly give the member state the task of actively inserting them into the proper domestic regulations. From the financial viewpoint there is furthermore an additional 1 trillion available.

In substance we have been outlining an organic framework of legislative reference and financial availabilities which leads us to a different organization of agricultural policy. There has been a complete turnaround in the situation which so gravely characterized the period until 1975-1976; and the moment has come to make these favorable premises produce results.

First of all we must avoid any possible delays in the phase of application of the above-mentioned standards. If this should happen, then Italian agriculture would run the risk of remaining for a long time to come (here we might think of the almost 10 years that separate us from the end of the "farm plans") in a stalemate phase. And this would happen at an extremely delicate moment when it is necessary absolutely to modernize Italy's structure if we really want to remain within the European market and counter the competition from old and new partners.

The diversity, with respect to the past, resides in the greater importance, assumed in this operation, by the administrator in dealing with the legislator. The key to success here as a matter of fact resides in knowing how to organize a different bureaucratic apparatus which would implement and manage a real (domestic and foreign) planning policy.

The meeting between the decision-making levels (federal government, region, and community) finally assumes a decisive role. Here we must know how to switch from the phase of clash to the phase of meeting in keeping with the latest community regulations. If the technical capacity of future administrators manages to dovetail with the sense of balance of the politicians, then our primary sector will readily derive the proper benefit from this and so will the entire Italian national economy along with it.

5058
CSO: 3104

DUTCH BLOCK DEVELOPMENT AID TO SURINAM

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 19 Apr 80 pp 12-15

[Article by Sig. W. Wolf: "Minister De Koning: 'Painful Intervention Needed'"]

[Text] Minister De Koning is very cautious in his assessment of the corruption now coming to the surface in Surinam . Hard proof has still to be delivered. Up till now the Netherlands has refused to transfer 20 million guilders of development funds. The minister has confidence in the intentions of Surinam 's new government. "However, painful steps are unavoidable. Surinam can count on our support. We are willing to discuss a revision of the development program." It will be extremely difficult for Surinam 's National Military Council to prove the corruption in official circles during the prior government. The flood of reports about corruption on a grand scale regularly coming out of Paramaribo over the last few weeks, is creating a lot of anxiety in political circles in The Hague.

An avalanche of fraudulent acts has been set in motion but lack of indisputable proof could damage the image of the National Military Council, which intends to clean up thoroughly. Nobody is foolish enough to think that persons with key positions who are the target of the military zeal to clean things up, will keep proof of their misbehavior in desk drawers. During the first 2 days after the 25 February coup civil servants were feverishly busy in many government buildings purging desk drawers and file cabinets of compromising papers. It is not only government workers and politicians who are scared by a thorough search of the civil service establishment. Many private citizens are directly or indirectly connected with the widespread financial patronage and corruption.

With a per capita income of 1,300.00 guilders Surinam belongs to the rich developing nations. This nation's weak points are lack of employment and stagnating industrialization. The number of government workers has increased during the last 5 years from 20,000 to 40,000, all of whom must be paid out of a national income of 500 million guilders. Employment opportunities moved from the private sector to the government. It created an atmosphere of just loafing and sharing in illegitimate income. To

nobody's surprise civil servants close to the sources of funds cooperated with private enterprises to see to it that everybody received his due share in a mood of mutual assistance. Whether it was issuing contracts to build roads, purchasing medicines, expanding hospitals, allocating parcels of real estate, or buying patrol boats, something could always be "arranged." Shortly after the military intervention a high official of the Suriname Bureau of Planning sighed: "In our country the government and its organizations form a small world of their own with all kinds of irregularities going on constantly.

During the first days after the coup a stifling atmosphere prevailed in Paramaribo's government building, which houses the Bureau of Planning. Decisions about spending millions of guilders made available by the Netherlands to stimulate the Surinam economy are made there on a daily basis. Without being able to do anything about it workers there saw how, under pressure of politicians and civil servants, budgets of development projects were shamelessly modified so that big politicians and their relatives could profit. Shortly after the coup important documents on projects worth tens of millions of guilders were also found to be missing from the files.

The minister of development cooperation, De Koning, who supervises the 2.7 billion guilders pledged by the Netherlands to Surinam at that country's independence in 1975, appears to be very cautious in his assessment of widespread corruption coming to the surface in Surinam.

He says: "The National Military Council has not taken any steps beyond detention of persons for interrogation. I hope that, just as in other cases, judicial decisions concerning the indictments will comply with reasonable standards."

Of the 500 million guilders so far requested by Surinam from the development funds, no approval has been given for 20 million guilders. Two independent Dutch and Surinam accountancy firms have refused to approve the manner in which these funds were used. The minister assumes for the time being that this expenditure of 20 million guilders was made outside the arrangements, or that the deposed Arron government was unable to account for the funds in an acceptable manner. An expenditure of 20 million guilders without approval out of a total of 500 million guilders is considered very high in circles of development experts. Up till now no developing nation which received Dutch aid has scored so badly.

Minister De Koning points out that "the great majority of the treaty funds are covered by statements of accountants. However, this does not mean that there has not been any wrongdoing in Surinam. We control only the payments. What happens thereafter and to what extent corruption exists with materials used in development projects is beyond our control."

The military coup and the government inspired by the National Military Council offers, according to Minister De Koning, a new chance to conquer old problems. "The Dutch government deplores the coup. We would have preferred a new government on the basis of democratic elections. However, now that the coup has taken place we are prepared to cooperate and to look for solutions for improving and broadening the development program."

The first steps in that direction have been made. The Dutch government has made far-reaching proposals to the new persons in charge in Paramaribo to stimulate the return of qualified capable Surinam citizens to their native country. The Surinam government reacted positively. Discussions about these proposals will take some time because Prime Minister Chin A Sen wants to check them out internally.

De Koning says: "Surinam has a great potential of human and natural resources. They should be used in a better manner. This is also true for the Dutch government. We are prepared to give this new Surinam government our full cooperation. It is our impression that priorities in Surinam 's development program will have to be changed. This can all be discussed. It is possible to review the arrangements. Everything is open to discussion. The intentions of the National Military Council and the government of Prime Minister Chin A Sen are good. The question now is: can the government turn these intentions into reality? To achieve this it will have to take some painful steps. It makes me wonder about the government setup of 40,000 civil servants and the size of Surinam 's income. The country has an exceptionally smooth-working tax system. On the other hand, there is hardly any supervision of imports."

Industrialization is hampered by the power of a handful of large import companies; it is in their interest that local production be nipped in the bud. Last year a large import firm had a profit of 40 million guilders. The question is now: could not that have been less in favor of local production?

Minister De Koning is not very happy about the dominating position the Netherlands has in development aid to Surinam. He urges the new government to ask other international assistance funds, such as the development fund of the United Nations, the assistance fund of the European Community, and the Caribbean Fund for help. "Really, the Netherlands is not striving for a monopoly position. I would prefer it is Surinam 's development obtained a broader base. Because of our present dominating position we cannot tell them how their business should be run. When I am in Suriname I go around on my toes and I am very careful. I am very powerful as Surinam 's most important source of finances. Everything I say can be interpreted to be a coercive demand from the man who holds the purse strings.

"It would really clear the atmosphere if Dutch and Surinam ministers felt freer to tell one another the truth. That is only possible if Suriname is less dependent on the Netherlands. Paramaribo should realize that the

Netherlands is not the only chance for help. We, on the other hand, will not shirk our responsibilities if Surinam would call on us to clear the way for further economic expansion. In this respect I think, for instance, of promoting the sale of Surinam products on the European market."

The government leader repudiates the criticism of the Committee of Christian Churches, as expressed by Surinam Bishop Zichem, who says that Dutch trade and industry enjoy privileged positions in the execution of development projects. In this manner development funds would return to the Netherlands while the activities of Surinam enterprises would be hard pressed.

"I find this criticism absolutely wrong and feel very bad about it. Surinam is urging us all the time to make Dutch experts available. It does not want Surinam experts who are available in large numbers in the Netherlands, because the Arron government found that their salaries would be too high as compared to those of local countrymen. This would lead to jealousies and all sorts of nasty situations. However, it was willing to pay such salaries to Dutchmen, Patagonians, and Icelanders. That is a very unsatisfactory situation, which should soon be corrected in cooperation with the new government in Paramaribo.

"The use of Dutch trade and industry is in accordance with the development agreement. Surinam complained all the time that it did not have its own managerial and executive forces and that it was therefore forced to call on our trade and industry.

Dutch trade and industry were at no time forced upon Surinam."

Minister De Koning will visit Surinam at the end of June. He will have to get used to the new situation. The persons he used to confer with, the entire top of the Ministry of Development and most of the members of the Surinam section of the discussion group for development cooperation (CONS) are locked up in the Memre Boekoe Barracks on the outskirts of Paramaribo. The National Military Council says that they are there to be interrogated. However, people in Surinam know better.

10319
CSO: 3105

NORDLI DEFENDS WAGE PACT, SAYS INFLATION FIGHT IS NEXT

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 24 Apr 80 p 6

[Interview with Prime Minister Odvar Nordli by Thor Viksveen]

[Text] "It was necessary to limit the wage drift to get a settlement on the low-wage profile. I approve of the priority assigned. Based on the results of the settlement before us, it cannot be said that freedom of negotiation has been abused. The government is just as secure today as it was immediately after passage of the wage settlement law in the Storting last Christmas, when the opposition tried unsucessfully to bring down the government. Control of inflation is the greatest challenge facing the government in the coming months. The tax reform may be postponed beyond 1 January 1982." These are some of the viewpoints expressed by Prime Minister Nordli in an interview with ARBEIDERBLADET in which he comments on a number of current political questions.

[Question] Has the state's contribution become too high in relation to the current general economic situation in the country?

[Answer] The important thing for the government has been to judge what the effect will be, seen in relation to the goals we had set. By means of agreement between the parties, and the state's contribution, we have accomplished that which the government considered central, namely to protect the advantages we gained by price and wage controls. The wage agreement has contributed to protecting our competitive ability and thereby ensuring full employment. Another goal was to include a low-wage profile in the settlement. That we have done. The settlement lies within the realistic framework which the government had drawn up in advance. Therefore I cannot say that the state's contribution is too high.

[Question] Would the state have been willing to offer an even larger contribution if that had been necessary in order to prevent conflict?

[Answer] That question was never raised during the negotiations and therefore was never raised by the government either.

[Question] But did the government set an upper ceiling of the contribution that it was willing to make, even if this could have led to conflict and a possible wage board?

[Answer] Of course the government had drawn up a framework for the settlement in advance, but today I think it would be incorrect to bring that out. Now we must judge the result as it is presented to us.

[Question] Is the result unexpectedly positive?

[Answer] It was unexpectedly positive on one point, and that was on the low-wage profile. That this result could be reached through arbitration was an impressive accomplishment by the parties and the government arbitrator.

[Question] Another main element in the settlement is the limitation on wage drift. The Norwegian Union of Iron and Metal Workers, among others, claims that this is an attack on the right of freedom of negotiation. Care to comment?

[Answer] That is clearly a union judgment which should be explained by the trade union movement. I do not believe it would have been right or even possible to include a low-wage profile in the settlement without being willing to also include the question of limits on the wage drift. I believe that the entire question will be judged differently when the familiarization discussions are concluded by the unions. Then the entire settlement can be judged at the same time. I am confident that the trade union movement to a man will rally round the principle of solidarity that lies behind the settlement.

[Question] Is the reaction of the Union of Iron and Metal Workers evidence of a lack of solidarity with the low-wage earners?

[Answer] I would not say it that way. It is my inner hope that there will be great support for the settlement in the referendum and in the union groups which traditionally have had wage drift. I believe that the leadership of LO [Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions] deserves that after the important work that they have accomplished.

[Question] You previously said that this settlement must choose between giving priority to the low-wage profile or continuing to have unlimited wage drift. Were the priorities correctly assigned in this settlement?

[Answer] Yes. In addition, however, I will say that the limits placed on wage drift must not be overemphasized. Wage drifts which are based on clear productivity are not harmful, in my opinion. The drifts which go beyond that are, in our economic situation, dangerous.

[Question] But apart from the reasons for wage drift, limitations on it are being seen as an attack on the right of free negotiation.

[Answer] Based on the settlement before us I do not believe that it can be claimed that the right of free negotiation is being abused. The objective was to achieve a settlement within a realistic framework. All the groups covered by the settlement must realize this.

[Question] After the Storting dealt with the wage law before last Christmas, when the opposition was unable to take a unified stand against the government, you said that the government's position was strengthened, and that it was more secure than it had been for a long time. Is the position of the government still as secure?

[Answer] I do not believe that the wage settlement has changed that in any way.

[Question] Which issues will be politically the most difficult in the future?

[Answer] The economic policies still give us the greatest challenges, and again it is the wave of inflation in the western world which creates the greatest problems. The latest forecasts show expected price increases in the OECD area this year of 13 percent, in the European OECD countries of nearly 15 percent. With Norway's open economy it will be a huge task for us to prevent our being hit with corresponding price increases. The wage settlement has given us a reasonable foundation for further work in these areas.

[Question] We will see about the price forecast for the OECD area. Is the government sure that Norway will be successful in holding inflation under the expected average for the OECD countries?

[Answer] It is important for us to adhere to that vital goal, but at the same time we must understand that over half of everything we use we import from areas experiencing high inflation.

[Question] Will a clear signal be given for the development in Alta this summer, assuming that the Storting will complete work on it in the spring session?

[Answer] The government has made it clear that it has found no other suitable alternative for supplying Finnmark with the necessary power. The government has not proposed a starting time. That is up to the Storting.

[Question] The way the tax reform is being dealt with in the Storting indicates that there will not be a majority for the recommended reforms. How important is it to the government that these plans be realized? Will there be any consequences for the government if there is not a majority for tax reform in the Storting?

[Answer] When the government proposes such a comprehensive outline for a new tax reform it is clear that it carries considerable weight. The outline contains many elements which are very important for our entire economic policy. So the government stands on the proposal which it has put forth. The opposition parties have not so far stated their viewpoints, nor any alternatives. Therefore it is too early to talk about the relationship between the government and the Storting on this matter, and also the possible consequences.

[Question] Is it possible that the time for accomplishing the tax reforms may be postponed to 1 January 1982 as the government has recommended?

[Answer] The matter is beginning to get urgent. We have continued to assume, however, that the Storting would take up the matter in the near future. We can not exclude shifting the time for accomplishment.

[Question] Will the resolution of the sports committee on the olympic boycott complicate bilateral political relations between Norway and the Soviet Union?

[Answer] To begin with we must be clear that the sports movement is absolutely the largest people's organization in Norway. It was the spokesmen for the sports movement who made their decision without any form of pressure from the government. I feel rather certain that the Soviet Union clearly understands that. It is unreasonable to claim that a decision by such a broadly based people's organization can have consequences for political relations between the Soviet Union and Norway.

It is the entire chilly atmosphere which has developed between the major powers which gives reason for concern, and not the bilateral relations between Norway and the Soviet Union. It is that chilly atmosphere we must work ourselves out of, and in that work the government intends to make every contribution requested of it.

[Question] But the sports committee's resolution does not exactly contribute to warming up the chilly atmosphere?

[Answer] It is wisest to see that resolution as a reaction of an independent people's organization in the chilly atmosphere which now prevails.

9287
CSO: 3108

LABOR PARTY ORGAN APPLAUDS 'RESPONSIBLE' WAGE PACT

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 23 Apr 80 p 4

[Editorial: "[illegible] Settlement"]

[Text] In the discussions inside the trade union movement before the spring wage settlement, we understood that the low-wage question would be the most important issue. Also, in the discussions about the form of the settlement, whether it should be one coordinated settlement or a settlement by the various unions, it was a question of which served the interests of the low-wage group best. This was the main question on both sides. The LO [Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions] leadership always maintained that the low-wage question could only be solved by a coordinated settlement with solid cooperation from the combined trade union movement. When LO's representatives finally agreed to central negotiations on the outline for the settlement, with union negotiations on the distributions within the trades, it was to ensure that the low-wage profile of the settlement could thus be further strengthened.

Since there is now a recommendation, we do not believe that anyone can say that a union settlement could have better taken care of the interests of the low-wage earners. On the contrary, we have noted that several union leaders who formerly were sceptical about the settlement because of the low-wage earners' situation, now say that it turned out differently than they had feared.

The recommendation for a wage settlement really represents a historic breakthrough for those earning low wages. It is also the first time that the low-wage earners registered such a positive accord with the main settlement. The low-wage earners were about to become a disillusioned group. Year after year everyone has spoken of the righteousness of their demands. Now their demands have finally been recognized.

The guarantee arrangement, which will ensure the groups inside the low-wage unions a pay level which will at least equal 85 percent of the aver[illegible], plays a central role in the solution. Now all the union workers will make their contributions in the form of payments to their own distributi[illegible]

fund. This is an action of solidarity in keeping with the best traditions of the trade union movement.

It is not possible to imagine a settlement where all are equally satisfied. Furthermore, individuals and press organizations have always made it their business to play up the dissatisfactions. Fearing that pleasure over the solution to the low-wage question would be too great, they are now placing exaggerated weight on the other side of the settlement where it is easier to find dissatisfaction.

We do not believe that the low-wage solution in this settlement is purchased at the cost of negotiating justice and wage losses. In any case the cost should give no reason for any great misgivings. The only real reduction is that the negotiations for wage drift will be limited to once a year. On the other hand, there is no ceiling on the wage drift. However, if the wage drift in 1980, as an average for the entire LO-NAF [Norwegian Employers' Association] area increases three percent, there will be negotiations in 1981 for an eventual ceiling for the remainder of the agreement period. In practice this means that the drift can be [illegible] her large for individual businesses and branches without the average for 1980 going up so high that it calls for a ceiling. We believe it most probable that the wage drift will lie under the actual average this year. Therefore the decision to negotiate the drift ceiling next year has no practical significance.

In preparation for this settlement the trade union movement has emphasized that there should be a settlement inside a responsible framework. For industry the settlement means a pay framework of eight percent. In addition there is a contribution from the state of four percent. This is inside a responsible framework. The pay agreement does not weaken competition, the positive operation of price and wage controls will remain with us in the economy, and employment will be maintained at its present level.

We think that a collective judgment of the recommended positions looks overwhelmingly positive. In any case it is difficult to imagine a settlement where the trade union movement could get a better deal for its viewpoints.

9287
CSO: 3108

LABOR PAPER DEFENDS RECORD OF PARTY IN DEFENSE AREA

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 18 Apr 80 p 4

[Editorial: "Unity On Defense"]

[Text] Throughout the entire period since the war there has been remarkably broad political unity concerning the national security and defense policies in our country. This is again a reflection of the attitudes and viewpoints of the Norwegian people toward these questions.

We consider support for national security and defense policies as being of almost incalculable importance. That is the most important element in measuring political credibility.

Yesterday when the Storting took up the report of the Defense Commission, this was naturally one of the central questions. In a dialog between the chairman of the Storting defense committee, Per Hysing-Dahl (conservative) and the deputy chairman, Per A. Utsi (labor), Utsi maintained that the Defense Commission's greatest accomplishment was that it laid the foundation for a continuation of the broad political unity on the main principles of our defense policy.

Seen in this light, it should be of minor interest whether the growth of the defense budgets for the next 5 years should be three percent or four percent. Because this is a matter of a framework for economic planning, not a concrete appropriations program. Each autumn during the budget debates the Storting decides on the annual defense appropriation. It is not right that the bourgeois parties, primarily the Conservative Party, benefit by an attack on the government's and the Labor Party's position of an annual growth of three percent, as opposed to the bourgeois parties' position of four percent.

One of the main arguments of the bourgeois parties is that the Defense Commission recommended four percent growth for the first 5 years, in order to drop down to three and two percent during the following 5 years. We have full respect for the recommendations of the Defense Commission, but we must warn against their report becoming a political bible. In further

discussion of these matters, firm judgments must be made both by the government and the Storting. The recommendations of the Defense Commission have gone almost untouched through the political discussion process. In that connection it is tempting to point to the broad political unity which was also in effect at the time of the vote on the pension report. The economic realities with which we must live have not, in spite of that unity and all the other good intentions, led to the realization of 100 percent of the conclusions of the report in practical politics.

It is often said that defense must be seen in the light of the entire society. That means that defense appropriations must be seen in the light of both actual requirements and capabilities. We also believe that there is a requirement that the defense of a small country such as ours must have as broad a base of support as possible.

The credibility of Norwegian defense these days is certainly not primarily dependent upon the margin of appropriations. Credibility is primarily dependent on our system of alliances. Our greatest guarantee against an attack is that an attack on Norway is the same as an attack on all the NATO countries. This means that Norway is not a very tempting target.

Of course Norway has the primary responsibility for its own defense, but an important part of our defense policy is our contribution to formulating NATO strategy and fulfilling our duties inside NATO. By committing ourselves to a planned growth of three percent per year in the coming 5 years we do not violate any of that. On the contrary. The NATO leadership has appealed to the member countries to plan for an annual budget growth of three percent. Norway is one of the few countries which is complying. We have always, and will always, be willing to make great sacrifices for our defense. This is closely related to our needs. Today West Germany is the only NATO country which spends more money per capita on its defense than Norway. This is primarily because of the defense policies of the Labor Party, as they have been carried out, and as they will continue to be carried out. When the Conservative Party tries to create doubt about our willingness to reach the goals, they are totally incorrect. And furthermore, it is a dangerous attempt to destroy the existing unity on national security and defense policies.

9287
CSO: 3108

GENERAL NOTES 'POSITIVE' STEPS TO 'REESTABLISH' POWER BALANCE

LD2211O1 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 14 May 80 p 8

[Per Nordrum report: "'NATO Entering Risk Period'"]

[Text] Brussels, 12 May--"The Soviet Union's reliance on effective use of its military power, combined with the will to use this power to achieve political ends, as we have seen in the case of Afghanistan, makes it abundantly clear that we are now entering a period of great risk."

Gen Herman Fredrik Zeiner Gundersen painted this dismal picture when, in his capacity as chairman of NATO's military committee, he reported on the troop situation to the Alliance defense ministers on Tuesday. To the press the general, who is leaving his NATO post at the end of the month, said later that a number of positive steps had been taken by NATO in the last few years to reestablish the balance between East and West.

"We are affected by events outside the NATO area, just as we were 20 years ago," Zeiner Gundersen said. On Tuesday everyone said that this was not a new situation and that it certainly does not mean that NATO ought to expand its area of geographical responsibility.

In his report to the defense planning committee the Norwegian general summed up the Soviet Union's military developments in the last 10 years. In 1970 the Soviet Union had 1,300 delivery missiles with 1 warhead each. Now they have the same number of these strategic missiles, but with a total of approximately 5,000, larger nuclear warheads with considerably improved accuracy.

The Soviet Union has also deployed around 150 SS-20 missiles with 3 warheads each. It was because of the deployment of these new medium-range missiles directed against Western Europe that the NATO nations last year decided to build and deploy 572 medium-range missiles in Western Europe from 1983.

The Warsaw Pact countries now have 225 active divisions, of which 170 are Soviet, and troop numbers increased by 20 percent during the seventies. In addition, troops' equipment was modernized and improved in step with rapid technological advances, the report said.

PUBLIC OPINION POLL GIVES EANES ELECTION VICTORY

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 10 May 80 pp 4, 5

[Text] The Reason for the Six Questions of EXPRESSO/NORMA

The questions selected by EXPRESSO to be included in the opinion poll that is being published today have the following underlying reasons:

Following the previous polls, it was still considered important to ascertain the approval rating of Gen Ramalho Eanes and Dr Sa Carneiro in the performance of their positions as president of the republic and prime minister, respectively. As was announced at the appropriate time, EXPRESSO intends to continue gaging these approval ratings in subsequent polls, so that it will be possible to find out how the Portuguese people react to the political activity of Eanes and Sa Carneiro between now and the pre-electoral period.

One of the issues that has been discussed most is that of Portugal's entry into the EEC, and its direct results for the Portuguese people.

Hence, it is considered important to learn how much the Portuguese people know about the EEC and its goals, and with what kind of expectations they are looking forward to the forthcoming membership in the Community.

Also a topic of discussion, to the point that some feel that we are already at the height of the campaign, is the legislative elections next fall.

Are the Portuguese people in a state of mind not to fail to perform their civic obligation to vote?

And which politico-partisan groups have the best chances of winning at the present time?

At least as important as the legislative elections are the presidential elections which are approaching. Some of the candidates are already known, while indications are mounting of the presence of others in the race for Belem.

Of the candidates who are most prominent, which would have the best chances at the present time?

These were the six questions selected by EXPRESSO for the sixth exclusive EXPRESSO/NORMA opinion poll and asked in the districts of Lisbon, Setubal, Braganca and Faro. It will be followed by four more, at the same 2-week intervals, ending in July of this year.

Technical Format

Universe: Portuguese over 18 years of age, residing in the districts of Braganca, Setubal, Faro and Lisbon.

Sample: 100 interviews in each district.

Criterion for selection of the area of study: One district with a predominantly AD [Democratic Alliance] influence (Braganca, 61 percent AD); one district with a predominantly PS [Socialist Party] influence (Faro, with 34 percent PS); one district with a predominantly APU [United People's Alliance] influence (Setubal, with 47 percent APU); and one district with a more equitable distribution of votes (Lisbon: 40 percent AD, 26 percent PS and 26 percent APU).

The four districts represent 32 percent of the total voters.

Questionnaire: Questions supplied by EXPRESSO.

Interviews: Direct, personal, through a structured questionnaire, at the residences of those interviewed.

Selection: Random, using the "random route method" for selecting the household, and the "Kish method" for selecting the individual interviewed.

Sample points: 24 localities selected at random, after a prior stratification based on district and habitat.

Field work: 2 and 3 May 1980.

Maximum margin of error on the total level: $\pm$ 5 percent in an interval of confidence of 95 percent and p = 50 percent.

Maximum margin of error on the district level: $\pm$ 10 percent in an interval of confidence of 95 percent and p = 50 percent.

Institution responsible for the research: NORMA, Portuguese member of Gallup International.

The analysis of the results has been made by EXPRESSO.

Ramalho Eanes: Increasing Approval

The first question in this poll was the usual one: "Personally, do you approve or disapprove of the way in which Gen Ramalho Eanes is performing as president of the republic?" (See Table I.)

That performance is approved by 55 percent (Lisbon), 57 percent (Setubal), 38 percent (Braganca) and 75 percent (Faro); making a total of 57 percent in favor.

The PR's [president of the republic] political performance is disapproved by 26 percent (Lisbon), 10 percent (Setubal), 11 percent (Braganca) and 13 percent (Faro).

In this sixth EXPRESSO/NORMA poll, the districts selected are the same ones used for the third one (published on 29 March); which affords a comparison between the president's losses and gains.

For example, with regard to approval, Eanes reinforced his position very obviously in Lisbon and Setubal (it improved 10 percent in each district, making a total of 20 percent); and he improved spectacularly in Faro, where the president gained 23 percent in a month and a half. However, he declined in the district of Braganca (he lost 8 percent).

As for the percentages of disapproval, Gen Ramalho Eanes maintained an average identical to that in the third poll (he lost only 1 percent in all). The number of those disapproving increased in Lisbon and Faro, and dropped in Setubal and Braganca.

With respect to those who did not know (undecided), the comparison between the two polls allows us to discover that that number declined considerably in three of the four districts (except for Braganca, where the undecided subjects increased from 29 to 44 percent, which could partially explain a reduction in approval).

The percentage of those who did not answer remained the same in Lisbon, dropped in Setubal and Faro and increased in Braganca.

Comparing the percentages for the district of Lisbon in this poll with those published in EXPRESSO's edition 2 weeks ago (the immediately previous one) now, one concludes that there has been an increase in the number of citizens in the capital who approve of the PR's performance (an increase of 12 percent), although the percentage of disapproval has increased (from 11 to 26 percent). The number of individuals who did not know or who did not answer declined.

On the whole, this poll shows that Ramalho Eanes' performance is gaining increased support (57 percent in favor, and 20 percent against); and it appears to indicate that the current president's approval rating is being consolidated.

Table I

	Lisbon	Setubal	Braganca	Faro
Approve	55	57	38	75
Disapprove	26	10	11	13
Don't know	14	28	44	11
No answer	5	5	7	1

Sa Carneiro: Difficult Gains

The second question has also been retained throughout these polls: "Personally, do you approve or disapprove of the way in which Dr Sa Carneiro is performing as prime minister and head of the government?" (See Table II.)

Sa Carneiro's performance has the backing of a total of 39 percent. There is 44 percent approval in Lisbon, 26 percent in Setubal, 46 percent in Braganca and 27 percent in Faro.

Sa Carneiro's performance is disapproved by a total of 36 percent, broken down as follows: 33 percent in Lisbon, 44 percent in Setubal, 6 percent in Braganca and 50 percent in Faro.

Reviewing the poll taken in the same districts and published in EXPRESSO on 29 March, we find that Dr Sa Carneiro's position improved in the districts of Lisbon (the approval increased 16 percent), Braganca (4 percent) and Faro (1 percent). On the other hand, he lost 10 percent in the district of Setubal.

Insofar as the disapprovals are concerned, the number increased markedly in Setubal (10 percent) and spectacularly in Faro (29 percent), but declined in Lisbon (3 percent) and Braganca (19 percent).

The number of undecided persons (those who did not know) dropped in Lisbon, Setubal and Faro. In Braganca, on the other hand, it increased from 34 to 41 percent.

The number of those who did not answer changed considerably (downward) only in the district of Faro.

When we compare the percentages in the district of Lisbon in this poll with those published by EXPRESSO on 24 April (the previous one), we find that the number of those approving of Sa Carneiro's performance rose 11 percent, but that the number of those disapproving also increased by 7 percent.

As a conclusion, it may be said that Sa Carneiro himself is suffering the effects of the bipolarization: he has improved slightly, but he has been unable to shed the throng which disapproves of his political performance.

As a matter of fact, 39 percent approve of Sa Carneiro's performance, while 36 percent disapprove of it.

Table II

	Lisbon	Setubal	Braganca	Faro
Approve	44	26	46	27
Disapprove	33	44	6	50
Don't know	20	22	41	22
No answer	3	8	7	1

EEC: Ignorance Without Indifference

The third question was the following: "In your opinion, what is the EEC, and what is its purpose?" (Table III) To supplement it, this question was also asked: "Do you consider Portugal's entry into the EEC very positive, positive, negative or very negative?"

The first conclusion to be drawn is that the European Economic Community is essentially unknown, despite constant references to it in the news media and in political speeches.

The largest percentage of ignorance is associated with Braganca (92 percent), and the smallest with Setubal (62 percent), while in Lisbon 67 percent do not know what the EEC is and what its purpose is, and in Faro 76 percent are in that category. (See Table III.)

However, in all four districts, the absolute majority of those who claim to know the nature and purpose of the Common Market consider Portugal's entry positive (52 percent), and 17 percent even consider that entry very positive; while only 15 percent consider it negative and 8 percent very negative. The question was of no concern to only 1 percent, and 6 percent claimed that they did not know what would happen (See Table IV.)

Setubal, the district in which the largest number of individuals claimed to be aware of the EEC, together with Faro, are the ones in which no one considers the entry very negative; and Faro is the district in which there are the most positive and very positive opinions (72 and 21 percent, respectively).

Lisbon, which has the maximun number of very negative opinions (10 percent) is the only one in which there is no indifference. The maximum indifference is in Braganca (25 percent), a district which, as we have said, is also the one in which there is maximum ignorance of the question.

Braganca is also the only district in which there were individuals queried (3 percent) who did not answer the question on the effects of the membership; and Faro is the only one in which there was no one without an opinion concerning those effects.

The maximum number of individuals without an opinion concerning the effects was reached in Setubal (13 percent).

Overall, it seems legitimate to conclude that the Portuguese people are to a disturbing degree ignorant of the future associate, while among those who are aware of it the expectations are clearly favorable.

Table III

	Lisbon	Setubal	Braganca	Faro
Know what it is	38	28	8	24
Don't know what it is	62	72	92	76

Table IV

	Lisbon	Setubal	Braganca	Faro
Very positive	19	7	22	21
Positive	47	67	41	72
Negative	18	10	3	3
Very negative	10	-	3	-
Indifferent	-	3	25	4
Don't know	6	13	3	-
No answer	-	-	3	-

Combined Opposition: Less Than AD Vote

The fourth question asked was the following: "As you know, this year elections will be held for the Assembly of the Republic. Suppose they were taking place today. In the first place, can you tell me whether you would vote?"

Next, those queried were asked to vote in the same way as in a normal election (that is, with a secret ballot, signing with a cross the party or front preferred by those mentioned on a ballot which was given them by the pollster).

Based on the response to the question, there is a strong determination to exercise the right to vote, especially in Faro, where 99 percent of those polled would vote; and, in decreasing order, Setubal (94 percent), Lisbon (85 percent) and Braganca (78 percent).

Analyzing the results of the "voting" on the "slate" submitted by the pollster (see Table V), one finds that the Democratic Alliance would win in Lisbon and Braganca, while the United People's Alliance would win in Setubal and the Front for Progress would be the winner in Faro (see Table V).

In second place, APU would win two districts (Braganca and Faro), and Lisbon would go to the Front for Progress, while Setubal would go to the AD.

In third place, two districts (Setubal and Braganca) would go to the Front for Progress, and APU would be third in Lisbon, while AD would have that rank in Faro.

Fourth place would always be held by UDP [Popular Democratic Union], which would accrue its maximum results in Lisbon (4 percent) and minimum results in Setubal (1 percent), receiving intermediate rating in Braganca (2 percent), and Faro (3 percent). With regard to Braganca, it should be noted that the UDP's "score" would be the same as that of the Front for Progress, and half that of the APU (4 percent).

The absolute maximum in the preference for a party group occurred in Faro (49 percent for the Front for Progress); whereas the AD's greatest victory was 48 percent in Lisbon. The APU's victory was 22 percent in Setubal, and the other AD victory was 34 percent in Braganca.

It was in Braganca that the greatest gap occurred between the first and second (34 percent AD and 4 percent APU). The "closest" victory was that of the APU in Setubal (22 percent as compared with 19 percent for AD). In Lisbon and Faro the differences between the first and second were substantial also, in addition to being similar in size: In Lisbon, the vote was 48 percent AD as compared with 25 percent for the Front for Porgress, and in Faro it was 49 percent for the Front for Progress, in comparison with 24 percent for the APU.

It is also noteworthy that a combined vote for the opposition parties would not suffice to unseat the AD from any of the first places that it won; although in Lisbon it would lead to a considerable restoration of balance: the AD's 48 percent would be matched by 42 percent for the opposition.

Table V

	Lisbon	Setubal	Braganca	Faro
Vote	85	94	78	99
Would not vote	14	4	16	1
Don't know	1	2	6	
No answer	-	-	-	-
Voting:				
AD-Democratic Alliance	48	19	34	19
APU-United People's Alliance	13	22	4	24
Front for Progress (PS/UEDS/ASDI)	25	12	2	49
UDP-Popular Democratic Union	4	1	2	3
Others	-	-	-	-
No comment	10	46	58	5

Presidential Elections: Eanes Would Win

The sixth and final question in the EXPRESSO/NORMA poll is related to the presidential elections, and was divided into two parts. First, it was asked: "Elections are going to be held for the presidency of the republic. If they took place today, would you vote?" Then, the persons interviewed were given a list of candidates (see Table VI), and were asked to vote just as they would in the real election (secret ballot, folded in quarters and placed in a ballot box).

The results of the poll show, first of all, that there would be a heavy attendance at the polls: 81 percent in Lisbon, 94 percent in Setubal, 76 percent in Braganca and 99 percent in Faro. The last district holds the record for participation, while in Braganca 16 percent said that they would not vote and 8 percent claimed not to know. The percentage of those in Lisbon who revealed that they would not vote was also 16, while 3 percent proved to be undecided (a figure which also appeared in Setubal).

However, the voting percentages show that, although he has not yet announced that he will be a candidate again, Gen Ramalho Eanes would win the presidential elections, leaving Gen Soares Carneiro far behind. Voting for Eanes would be 48 percent in Lisbon, 30 percent in Setubal, 9 percent in Braganca and 46 percent in Faro.

The AD candidate, Gen Soares Carneiro, would be in second place: 20 percent in Lisbon, 7 percent in Setubal, 23 percent in Braganca (the only district in which he managed to surpass Eanes) and only 3 percent in Faro.

Mario Soares appears in third place: 6 percent in Lisbon, 5 percent in Setubal, 0 percent in Braganca and 33 percent in the district of Faro.

He is followed by Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, with 5 percent in Lisbon, 7 percent in Setubal, 2 percent in Braganca and 3 percent in Faro.

Gen Costa Gomes ranks in fifth place: 5 percent in Lisbon, 3 percent in Setubal and 6 percent in Faro.

Pires Veloso ranks only in sixth place, with 6 percent in Braganca, and 1 percent in Faro; followed only by Gen Galvao de Melo (2 percent in Lisbon and 1 percent in Setubal).

Those not mentioning who their candidate would be numbered 14 percent in Lisbon, 47 percent in Setubal, 60 percent in Braganca and 8 percent in Faro.

The main conclusion to be drawn from these figures is that the current president of the republic, Gen Ramalho Eanes, appears by far the leading favorite in the elections. Noteworthy are the small numbers of votes received by Soares Carneiro and Dr Mario Soares, as well as the homogeneity of the results for Maj Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho.

Table VI

	Lisbon	Setubal	Braganca	Faro
Vote	81	94	76	99
Would not vote	16	3	16	1
Don't know	3	3	8	
No answer	-	-	-	-
Voting:	48	30	9	46
Ramalho Eanes	20	7	23	3
Soares Carneiro	5	3	-	6
Costa Gomes	2	1	-	
Galvao de Melo	6	5	-	33
Mario Soares	5	7	2	3
Otelo S. Carvalho	-	-	6	1
Pires Veloso	14	47	60	8
No comment	-	-	-	-

2909
CSO: 3101

PRIME MINISTER SUAREZ LOSES GROUND IN POPULARITY POLL

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 27 Apr 80 p 17

[Text] According to an ICSA Gallup poll, taken from 11 to 21 March, with a sample consisting of 3,047 interviews, the unpopularity of the head of government, Adolfo Suarez, increased slightly since last December, while at the same time the percentage of the Spanish people approving his performance as head of the executive branch remained unchanged.

The most surprising information from the poll is that, for the first time, the percentage of those disapproving of Suarez' performance (37 percent) is higher than that of those approving of it (35 percent); whereas, in December, they were equal: 35 percent disapproved, and the same percentage approved. The question was phrased as follows: "Personally, do you approve or disapprove of the way in which Mr Suarez is performing his job as head of the government?"

Based upon sectors of those polled, among the group disapproving there was a majority of men (41 percent) as compared with women (32 percent); while equal percentages of both sexes gave their approval, and among those who did not know, the women were in the majority. According to age, those polled were more inclined to approve the prime minister's work the older they were, and vice versa, the young people were for the most part critical: only 19 percent of those queried between the ages of 15 and 17 years expressed a positive opinion, while 49 percent of those over 55 years old had a favorable view. On the other hand, 50 percent of those under 17 years of age disapproved of Suarez' work; and only 22 percent of those over 55 years old expressed opposition to it.

Those polled in the north were very much opposed to the prime minister's performance (55 percent disapproved); while the most favorable opinions occurred among the residents of Galicia, Leon and Asturias (41 percent), followed by those from the Mediterranean shores. At the same time, the prime minister's popularity declined greatly in Andalusia, and among the voters from the left or from nationalist parties, in comparison with other previous polls.

It should also be pointed out that there were many critics of the prime minister among the residents of the Madrid area (50 percent) and that of Barcelona (38 percent); whereas the highest rates of approval occurred among the rural population: 41 percent of those residing in towns with under 10,000 inhabitants had a favorable view of his performance.

Insofar as social classes are concerned, the percentages remained quite similar among those approving, although they were lowest among those on the lower-middle level and highest on the medium middle level. Among those disapproving, the citizens on an upper, and upper-middle level were the most critical, and those of the lower class were least critical.

Practicing Catholics Highly Favorable

When those polled are categorized according to religious belief, the views were highly favorable among very devout Catholics (56 percent of them approved, and only 19 percent disapproved), and highly unfavorable among non-Catholics (only 12 percent approved, and 66 percent disapproved); including non-practicing Catholics, who were evenly divided between those critical and those with favorable opinions.

Based upon the political position of the individual interviewed (using as a reference point the way in which he voted in the last general elections of 1979), it is a noteworthy fact that those polled who voted Communist and Basque Nationalist had the most unfavorable opinions: 76 and 63 percent, respectively; followed by the Socialists, with 47 percent of those polled critical, although the percentage of Socialist voters giving their approval (27 percent) was less than that of the Basque Nationalists: 28 percent.

The highest percentages of approval, excluding the UCD [Democratic Center Union] voters, came from those who voted for the Democratic Coalition, with 47 percent, and those who chose the Catalan Nationalist option, with 37 percent. Among those who did not vote, the number of those disapproving (44 percent) was nearly twice that of those approving (24 percent); although there were in this group many who had doubts ("don't know"), totaling 32 percent.

The poll was taken among Spaniards 15 years of age and older, through personal interviews held in the residence of the person queried, in 151 localities distributed at random, after a prior stratification by region and habitat. Those polled were selected at random, according to the "random route" method for the selection of the residence, and the Kish method for that of the individual interviewed. The margin of error was $\pm$ 1.8 percent, with a level of confidence of 95.4 percent.



The graph shows the progress of Prime Minister Suarez' popularity. The continuous line indicates the percentage of Spaniards who approve of his performance, and the broken line that of those who disapprove of it. For the first time, the latter are starting to outnumber the former.

Key:

1. Popularity of Prime Minister Suarez (July 1976-March 1980)
2. Approve
3. Disapprove
4. Mr Suarez' appointment
5. Referendum for political reform
6. Legalization of the Communist Party
7. General elections
8. One year of term in office
9. Moncloa Pact
10. Two years of term in office
11. Constitutional referendum (6-12-78)
12. General elections
13. Three years of term in office
14. Basque and Catalan referendum
15. Andalusian referendum

2909
CSO: 3110

BRIEFS

AIRCRAFT FOR IBERIA--Iberia, the Spanish airline company, has just signed a contract for a loan of $135 million. This loan granted by an international banking consortium, will finance the purchase of 2 Boeing 747's and one DC 10. [Text] [Paris ELECTRONIQUE ACTUALITES in French 9 May 80 p 10]

CSO: 3100

PANEL DISCUSSES CRISIS IN IRAN-U.S. RELATIONS

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 27 Apr 80 p 9

[Panel discussion; participants are Prof Dr Yilmaz Altug, Istanbul University, Law School teaching staff member; Prof Dr Ilter Turan, Istanbul University, Economics Faculty, Political Science Chair; Docent Dr Sabri Sayari, Bogazici [Bosporous] University, Administrative Sciences faculty teaching staff member, and Ali Gevgilili as the moderator. The panel discussion was prepared for publication by Ayse Urses]

[Text] Gevgilili: Iran has been in the center of the international stage of the eighties. Collapse of Shah Reza Pehlevi's repressive regime and establishment of the Islamic Republic under the leadership of Khomeyni were momentous enough events for Iran, but they also impacted the world through Iran's function in today's global equations. They caused significant shifts and created a series of interrelated consequences.

Occupation of the U.S. Embassy and seizure of a number of embassy personnel as hostages by a group of Iranian students resulted in a new tension in U.S.-Iranian relations. When efforts to gain the release of the hostages proved futile, President Carter, in April 1980, severed diplomatic relations with Tehran and placed an economic embargo against Iran. Mr Carter wants Western Europe and Japan to join the embargo. The United States, reportedly, has made a similar appeal to Turkey also.

The most dramatic point of events came on Friday, 25 April, when President Carter made a public announcement and set off international shock waves. According to the announcement, the United States had carried out a military action against Iran to rescue the hostages; however, the statement explained, the military undertaking had to be aborted because of a "technical" malfunction.

Today, we plan to look at how the U.S.-Iran relations reached the current stage and also what we may expect in the future.

Prof Altug, what was the situation in Iran when the eighties began? What are the events that led to the U.S. sanctions against Iran? What are the

chances of a major military escalation? In your opinion, what are the factors that influence U.S.-Iran relations?

There Is a Situation Against International Laws

Altug: In January, when the Shah was deposed and an Islamic revolution got underway under Khomeyni's leadership, Iran entered into a new era.

After the revolution, a new Islamic constitution was written and a new election law was adopted. The new parliament will probably start functioning in June.

From all appearances, large masses of people under the direction of a number of ayatollahs are in control of events, but from time to time various ethnic minorities make attempts to gain independence. There is also the Tudeh, the communist party. Its influence is not readily discernable, but it obviously has enough strength to challenge now and then those in power.

About 6 months ago, we witnessed in Iran an incident which is a clear violation of international laws. It happened in two stages:

At first, students raided the U.S. Embassy, even though embassies have diplomatic immunity.

Fifty-three people, who had diplomatic status, were taken hostage. This is an illegal act of a very serious nature. In our age, hostage-taking is not permissible even under the law of war. Be that as it may, a number of civilians, who also had diplomatic immunity, were put in a "hostage" status.

Carter Wants To Gain Merit Points for Reelection

What happened next was the United States, perhaps for the lack of a better alternative, initially adopted a moderate policy. It took its case to the UN Security Council. The council condemned Iran, but because of a Soviet veto, the attempt to solve the problem through economic sanctions was frustrated. The United States took its case to the World Court also. The court, over Iran's objections, issued call for the immediate release of the hostages.

Having obtained these two decisions, the United States decided to wait a while. At one point, UN Secretary General Waldheim tried to solve the problem by setting up an international commission. None of the initiatives worked. The only course left open was that of quiet diplomacy. A lawyer--a trusted aide of Peron--and a French colleague of his, also a friend of the Iranian foreign minister, were the next to try their hands at it.

The confusion and the incongruities in Iran were primarily responsible for the failure of these efforts, but it is unfair to put the entire blame on Iran. Internal politics of the United States also played a major role in the direction that the events took.

Hoping to gather merit points on the eve of primaries, President Carter hardened his position. There were rumors at the time, though they were never substantiated one of way or the other, that Khomeyni and Carter secretly corresponded.

While the internal struggle was going on in Iran, Iran and Iraq began to feud and their dispute recently erupted in military clashes.

We should note that the American hostages are in the hands of a group of students who, at the moment, have no political responsibilities. If they were held by, let's say the Revolutionary Council, they would be in safer hands. If that were the case, the tension might not have reached the current stage.

Western-Leaning Bani-Sadr Is Not Strong

The degree of power that Iran's spiritual leader Khomeyni, or the recently elected President Bani-Sadr have is unclear. Mr Carter made several appeals to Bani-Sadr, but could not receive a positive response. Beheshti, head of the Revolutionary Council, has more authority than the head of state. There is friction between the traditionalist Beheshti and the Western-leaning Bani Sadr. Bani-Sadr wanted the American hostages turned over to the government, but could not get an order issued. That's when President Carter decided to sever diplomatic relations with Iran and to put an economic embargo into effect.

Portugal was the first to respond to America's call to its allies for support. EEC gave Iran a mid-May deadline for the release of the hostages. We understand that a similar appeal was made to Turkey also. However, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement underscored Turkey's special relations with Iran and said that Turkey will not join an embargo.

The militant students say they will kill the hostages if the United States uses military force against Iran.

As for rescuing the hostages by an Entebbe-style raid, it is very difficult to carry out such an action against the U.S. Embassy.

The realities before us are the following:

The Iranian revolution, which at the outset was a coherent movement, has become unstable and appears as one thing one day and something else on another day. Iran, in some ways, is a country that the modern age has left behind. That's why, some of the results of the revolution were very harsh.

Students Are Not the Only Cause

Gavgilili: Prof Turan, what is the basic source of the friction between the United States and Iran? What are the power struggles, both on the

national and internation level, that are swirling around Iran? And in this setting, what are the objectives of President Carter's sanctions?

Turan: There have been several instances since the seizure of the hostages by the Iranian students when the release of the U.S. Embassy personnel appeared imminent, but nothing has been resolved yet.

Recent turn of events tend to undermine the hopes of seeing them freed at any time soon, and it is becoming increasingly unclear what needs to be done in the long term to secure their release.

Soon after President Bandi-Sadr announced that the students agreed to transfer the hostages to the government, the Revolutionary Council, and particularly Khomeyni, voiced opposition to the move. It indicates that the source of the problem is not the students alone, people on the administrative level are also contributing to it. Some observers say the students are not receptive to orders from the Revolutionary Council, or from any other authority. Therefore, they say, both the government and the council have to follow a line close to the students' until the security of the hostages is assured. Recent developments, though, raise doubts about the accuracy of this observation. One wing of the Iranian government appears determined to use the hostages as "bargaining chips," but the chances of success in such a move appear to be waning.

President Carter will be a candidate again in the upcoming elections. The election campaign was about to get underway when the Tehran embassy was occupied. Mr Carter thought that he had ample time to solve the problem with a cool-headed approach, and that a peaceful solution would have a far better effect on the U.S. public opinion. He also knew that use of force would endanger the lives of the hostages and would reflect unfavorably on his administration. He was sure a solution will be worked out in time, and so, he decided not to make the Iranian question a campaign issue.

Escalation

What has happened since then, however, made it very difficult for Mr Carter to persevere on his determination to secure the release of the hostages by means of indirect communication and conciliation. Other presidential hopefuls attempted to make the hostage issue a topic of public debate. They failed, but in the meanwhile it became apparent that having Carter do nothing, but wait for things to happen won't do. It has come to a point where Mr Carter can no longer conduct an election campaign from the White House.

Absence of a single authority in Iran today and the continued uncertainty of the conditions whereby the hostages will be released cast doubt over the solubility of the hostage issue. The situation created by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan makes it much easier for the United States to use force in the Middle East.

President Carter, sensing the necessity to take more effective measures, began to escalate the U.S.-Iranian tension.

Other Western Powers Do Not Want to Become Involved

An American embargo by itself obviously will not put much pressure on Iran. That is why, the United States appealed to its allies for support. It is very difficult, next to impossible, for America's NATO allies to support the U.S. move. Therefore, the U.S. appeal must be interpreted largely as a move to satisfy the U.S. public opinion.

The American request is not relevant to any of the situations stipulated within the NATO framework. Consequently, the appeal makes sense only if it is considered in the context of mutual good will and solidarity that exist among friendly nations.

America's allies are dependent on foreign oil much more than America. They don't want to follow a line of action which will lead to a severance of ties with Iran.

Iran's oil revenue has dropped considerably, but Iran is still an attractive "trading partner" for a number of European countries, and trade prospects may increase even further in the future.

America's European allies are concerned about European security rather than America's general global policies. They would rather avoid steps which may drag Europeans into undesirable conflicts, and they do not want to do something which does not have an obvious benefit.

Fomenting Dissent

We cannot predict what other sanctions the U.S. government may decide on. The U.S. military presence near Iran is getting larger, but a large-scale military intervention should not be anticipated since it will greatly reduce the chances of rescuing the hostages alive.

Other than what we have already reviewed, there is also the course of indirect action--fomenting dissent, destabilizing the political situation, among others. We don't have much information on this matter, it is hard to comment on them.

'Detente' Is Shaken

Gevgilili: Docent Sayari, what are the effects of these developments on the power balances in the Middle and Near East? On one side, we have the objectives of regional nations, and on the other, the interests of modern world powers in the regions in question. How do they manifest themselves? How do they act on each other? In a wider perspective, does Iran create an international tension?

Sayari: Political observers used to say that if a third world war broke out, it would start in the Middle East. Their prediction was based on the Arab-Israeli conflict of the 1960-70 era. Today, the Arab-Israeli dispute

has taken a back seat to the Iranian and Afganistan issues as a potential source of a confrontation between superpowers, but we have indications that the latter will be of a different type.

"Detente" suffered a severe blow initially with the events in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the seeds of a confrontation over Iran had already been sown. However, neither country want to get involved in a hot war that the Middle East may cause in the long run. They pursue identical objectives:

Both superpowers want to expand their spheres of influence in the Middle East as much as they can.

Each tries to reduce its rival's sphere of influence as much as possible.

They want to use the natural resources of the Middle East--primarily oil.

On a more general level, they want to increase their strategic power.

I suppose you can see the reason for the concern that a third world conflict may be on the way.

What Did the Shah Do?

We should stress that the regional balance was substantially upset with the fall of the Shah.

1. First of all, Iran's internal balance broke down. The central authority and the army weakened. The field was left open to ethnic conflicts.

2. Iran's foreign policy changed course. The arms and the military technology that the Shah obtained with his oil revenue had made Iran a militarily strong country. In 1970's, Iran purchased from the United States more arms than NATO nations did.

During the Shah regime, the Soviet Union remained on good terms with Iran. Both super powers saw a strong Iran as a positive factor in the stability of the region.

The primary objective of the Shah's stability strategy was to establish Iranian sovereignty over the Persian Gulf, and in that, he had America's support. But it was against Iran's interests. There was considerable tension between Iran and Iraq over the Persian Gulf. They fought several times. The tension drove both countries to behavior harmful to their national interests. Iran's support of the Iraqi Kurds' ethnic movement, and Iraq's support of the ethnic Arab groups in Iran pulled the two neighbors further apart.

The differences were ironed out in 1975 and the reconciliation lasted until Khomeyni's ascent to power. The Saudi Arabian government was also uneasy about Iran's enhancement of its military power under the Shah.

Iran's Military Power Declined

The end of the Shah's regime marks the end of Iran's regional policy. It is highly doubtful that Iran will ever regain its sovereignty in the Persian Gulf area. The country's military strength has declined drastically.

Iran's security is coming under an increasingly severe threat by the two superpowers. Part of that threat is from the Soviet Union who, after the Afghanistan invasion, deployed a large number of soldiers in the Caucasian region, north of Iran. The Marxist groups in Iran are said to be receiving some form of Soviet aid.

Iran's relations with the United States is severely strained over the hostage issue. The radical Shia Moslem group in power today holds America responsible for the Shah's regime. The "America's Shah" slogans, paraded through the streets in the early days of the revolution, should not be forgotten.

Meanwhile, the United States is mad at Iran for the hostages. Some in the U.S. government stress the necessity for a military intervention, while some others insist on using diplomatic channels. If America ultimately takes the military route, it will be a grave threat to Iran's security.

NATO Will Not Intervene

Gevgilili: Prof Altug, what do you think will happen next in the tense situation over Iran and the Middle East? What should we expect after the U.S. presidential elections? Will there really be a large-scale U.S. military intervention in the Middle East? What kind of problems will a military intervention create for Western Europe and Turkey?

Altug: The internal situation in Iran is becoming progressively worse. This is a fact. Not only the economic difficulties, but also the political instability are becoming more acute. There are frequent clashes among ethnic groups. Iran and Iraq are on the verge of a hot war.

During the Shah's regime, Iran had America's support and Iraq had Soviet backing. Now, it is reversed. Iraq, behaving as if it has stepped into America's shoes, is threatening war against Iran.

A war in the Middle East between the United States and Iran is a remote possibility, but the fact is the United States is inflaming the situation by putting pressure on its allies. NATO, however, may not take part in a war in the Middle East. It is outside NATO defense area. Under the circumstances, the chances of an Iran-U.S. war seem very slim; as for a U.S.-Soviet war, that is out of the question.

Turkey Keeps an Eye on Iran

Turkey has special relations with Iran, and this fact was brought to the attention of the United States. Friendly relations with Iran should be maintained. Turkey, regardless of the regime in Iran, will perpetuate the neighborly relations of long-standing between the two countries.

In its 2,500-year history, Iran has never become a powerful military entity. It owes its success to the sensible balances it was able to form in its diplomatic relations and to its wise use of these balances.

Today, Iran is upsetting these balances unnecessarily for a variety of reasons. The Islamic Republic, having announced its support of the guerrillas in Afghanistan, is in no position to expect assistance from the Soviets, and in the meanwhile, it has broken up with the United States. In short, today, Iran pleases "neither Christ, nor Moses."

Vindictive Policies Do Not Work

There was a time in history when vindictive policies against a state did produce results. Nazi, or fascist, regimes were established as a result of such policies. Now, Iran is pursuing a policy of a similar type. From time to time, it puts on an arrogant attitude against America and the Soviet Union. There was an occasion where its arrogance offended Turkey also.

As things stand now the United States cannot succeed with an Entebbe-type action. Most of the hostages will be killed in the event of an assault. Besides, we understand from news reports that the hostages are treated well. Under the circumstances, patience is the best policy. Time is working in America's favor, but against Iran's.

The Drama of an Unorganized Revolution

Gevgilili: We observe significant developments and turbulence within Iran also. Prof Turan, given the effect of international conditions [illegible] the course these developments in Iran may take, what will be the outcome? Should we expect foreign powers to put certain practices into effect in Iran?

Turan: It has been more than a year since the revolution, but Iran is yet to stabilize. A major reason is that the Iranian revolution, unlike many that preceded it, did not rely on an organized base. That is why today no one is sure who holds the political power, or who has how much power.

The secular opposition's failure to perform its proper function during the Shah regime brought the expounders of Islamic laws to the forefront. That is the cadre that appears to have the power now.

Opposition is a traditional trait of the Shia sect. According to tradition, they wait for "the Imam" to come. Therefore, ordinary people's right

to assume and exercise power is not fully accepted. These factors should help explain the reason for the instability in Iran.

What they are trying to do is to build a new order, and yet there has been no major move yet in resolving the question of how and by what process this should be done. The belief that everything is explained in Islam is contributing to the stagnation. The political cadres in power have no political experience. The scene is one of utter confusion.

Turkish and Soviet Revolutions Were Oriented at Internal Reorganization

There may not be an intentional attempt to foment external crises to ensure internal unity. There is, nevertheless, an overemphasis of external crises. A behavioral mode which gives priority to external crises deviates from the experiments of many countries which demanded radical changes and achieved them. Turkey, for example, followed a largely introverted development policy after the founding of the republic. The Soviet Union followed a similar course after the October Revolution of 1918.

We do not know whether an orientation of this type has begun in Iran. What we observe is a preoccupation with the external crises raging around the nation. Meanwhile, there is talk about building "a new economic order," but no one knows what it is.

So far, the only achievement of the revolution has been the Islamic Constitution. There are also preparations to form a parliament. But in sofar as these efforts are undertaken within an Islamic framework, seeds of new tensions are sown.

Fragmentation Should Not be Instigated

To the non-Shia segments in Iran, the ongoing events are giving the impression that a "Shia sovereignty" is in the making, which is provoking a harsh reaction and insurrection. From all appearances Iran's internal struggle will not be over at anytime soon. It is hard to say what shape it will take in the future. It may develop into a struggle fueled by, or including, certain external forces. However, it appears that the Iranian government wants to avoid a strife which would involve major powers also.

From Turkey's point of view, that Iran's territorial integrity has been preserved is the important thing. A divided Iran will create new instabilities in the region. Turkey, more than any other nation, must treat Iran with understanding.

Development models proposed by the West brought Iran to an era of mass explosion and a search. The search should be expected to continue for some time. There must not be any outside interference. We must wait until Iran determines its future on its own. Once this is accomplished, Iran will gain stability, which means a more dependable neighbor and friend for Turkey.

Europe Is Uneasy About the United States

Gevgilili: Latest developments created dilemmas for Western Europe and Japan. Docent Sayari, how would you evaluate the West European attitude vis-a-vis the U.S. appeal which set off a brisk debate in the EEC Ministerial Council? What type of new tensions, or conciliations, will the contingencies in the Iranian situation lead to on the international level? How is Iran impacting the world?

Sayari: What President Carter primarily wants from America's Western friends is their support of the United States against Iran on the hostage issue. For a long time there was neither an affirmative nor a negative response from West European nations.

Carter's appeal to Western Europe to take a series of measures which amount to an economic embargo against Iran came at a time when the Western Europe-U.S. relations were going through a difficult period.

NATO's internal integrity is very much different from what it was in 1960's. Now, each West European nation charters its own foreign policy and external economic relations. Furthermore, some of the West European officials see Carter as a "weak" and "indecisive" leader.

The Afghanistan episode, though, had the West European leaders modify their policies to some degree. The developments in Afghanistan demonstrated that the potential Soviet threat to Western Europe may not necessarily remain on paper.

West Europeans did try to get the American hostages released, but we understand that there was not a full agreement of views among them. They gave Iran a deadline, which is 17 May, after the deadline expires, they may:

*Agree to new U.S. proposals, thereby giving full support to the United States, or

*Give the appearance of responding to the U.S. appeal in order to defuse the explosive situation.

No One Wants War

A military move by the United States is against Western Europe's interests because it raises the possibility of a Soviet countermove, in which case the regional equilibrium will be totally upset.

An economic embargo against Iran may be acceptable to Europe to a degree, but it looks like it will have to be a gradual and phased embargo.

What will be the results of economic sanctions?

1. On the Iranian side, an economic embargo may not have an appreciable effect. There was once a similar type of embargo against Rhodesia, but Rhodesia was able to keep its economy alive. In Iran's case, an economic embargo may even unite the new forces in Iran under the banner of "patriotism."

2. Iran may move closer to Eastern Europe and develop its economic ties with socialist countries.

3. In the event of a military embargo, Iran which, in terms of arms, is completely dependent on America, will be drastically effected, and it already is.

Military embargos declared against Pakistan in 1965, Turkey in 1974 and Jordan in 1975 had a detrimental effect on the military strength of those countries. It will have an equally adverse effect on Iran.

4. As for the West, an embargo against Iran means a cutoff of Iranian oil. However, the cutoff may not hurt the West very much because West European nations have been entering into agreements with other oil producers. The hardest hit may be Japan which depends on Iranian oil more than the others. Time will show what course of action Japan will adopt.

The United States and Military Intervention

If economic sanctions do not succeed, will a large-scale military action by the United States to rescue the hostages enter the picture?

According to one argument, the United States intends to keep its military action very limited. It will mine the oil shipment areas of the Persian Gulf. A large-scale war is difficult to imagine.

From Turkey's vantage point, the events in Iran have taken an undesirable course. A strategic vacuum appeared in Iran after the Shah. It is not clear which of the two major powers will fill the vacuum. The list of nations adversely effected by that vacuum is led by Turkey. An eventual fragmentation of Iran and emergence of several "small Irans" will be still another undesirable development for Turkey.

An Iran-Iraq conflict, meanwhile, will pose a number of security questions for Turkey. Turkey shares a border with both countries. Clashes which may erupt along Turkey's southern border and shift to its eastern border are bound to create a score of new security problems.

Turkey Recommends Understanding

Gevgilili: In our forum on the U.S.-Iran crisis, the following points were made:

1. The U.S. military undertaking in Iran, which Mr Carter stopped shortly after it had begun, has caused a great deal of anxiety worldwide. Nations no longer condone adventures which may turn into a large-scale conflict.

2. Order is slow to come to nations in a process of transformation. It is not easy, it takes time. During Iran's process of change, the dynamics of conflict in the nation might be used in several ways by the outside world.

3. To escalate the tension to a point where the United States and the Soviet Union will be embroiled in a war is against the basic interests of both of those countries. We should expect, not a full-scale war, but something at a much lower level, such as tests of strength and influence. Turkey recommends an understanding attitude toward Iran. Ankara hopes that Iran will soon resolve the crisis it is going through by peaceful means and come out of it socially intact.

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OYMEN INTERVIEWS PLO LEADER YASIR ARAFAT

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[Interview in Damascus with PLO leader Yasir Arafat by MILLIYET correspondent Orsan Oymen: "Turkey Has Very Important Role in Middle East"]

[Text] Yasir Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, said in a private conversation we had with him at a secret PLO headquarters in Syria that pressures on Turkey to join a new defense organization in the Middle East were building and that he had reports on this. "Turkey absolutely must sever its relations with Israel," he said.

Arafat called on Turkey to be careful to stay out of the plots in the region.

Yasir Arafat, in Damascus for the day to meet with Bulgarian Head of State Zhivkov, received us together with members of the PLO executive at a secret headquarters in Damascus and answered our questions.

The interview with Arafat follows:

Question: All Islamic nations, including Turkey, desire the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Do you believe a Palestinian state will be established in the near future? What concrete steps have been taken in this direction?

Answer: I fully believe that we will achieve our ultimate goal and establish our independent state, not soon or in the near future but one day. This is a goal which is not easy to attain, however, because we are confronted by barbaric enemies and the Camp David trap. The Camp David Accords are nothing to us but a new offer of slavery. However, though surrounded by all these difficult conditions, we have lost none of our resolve and persist in our struggle with faith. We are sure that one day we will be victorious and establish our independent state in Palestine, the land of our forebears.

Question: What is your view of Turkey's position and role in the Middle East? In your opinion, has Turkey to date done what the Arab world expected of it?

Answer: Turkey has a very important role in the Middle East crisis and in the Palestinian cause which is the key to this problem. We must remember the relationship between the Turkish people and the Palestinian cause. It must not be forgotten that there was an attempt in the past to get Sultan Abdul-Hamid involved and use him as a tool in the Zionist plans, but Abdul-Hamid stood firm against the Zionist settlement plans. Abdul-Hamid paid the price for his rejection of these plans by finding himself in conflict with European imperialism which was the ally of Zionism. Turkey has a very important role today. Turkey must endorse the resolutions adopted at the Islamic Conference. And must sever its relations with Israel. The Turkish people must remember their historical and moral responsibility to the Palestinian cause. This is not a simple relationship. It is deeper and closer. This is why you, as Turkey, must throw all your weight behind the Palestinian people and must support to the end our just struggle. In my view, this first step must be taken and you must sever your relations with Israel. Only in this way can you help the Palestinians who are deprived of their homeland return to the nest.

What Else Is Expected?

Question: You said that Turkey's first step in carrying out this role is to sever relations with Israel. What other steps do you expect Turkey to take?

Answer: You cannot play any role without first taking this very important step. However, after taking this step, you will be able to support us, in view of the structure of your relations in the international arena and the Middle East, in the international forums in which you participate and are influential. However, before doing this, it is necessary that you demonstrate the courage to sever relations with Israel.

Question: Could Turkey do this and remain in NATO?

Answer: NATO is the enemy of the Palestinian cause. NATO to date has supported the Israeli aggressors and aggressions. Don't forget that NATO is guided by America. Your role in NATO is to prevent these weapons from being pointed at your Palestinian brothers.

Question: Positive steps were taken last year in Turkish-Palestinian relations and a PLO mission was opened in Ankara as a result.

Answer: We are happy about opening the mission. I went to Ankara last year and had very productive talks with my friend Ecevit. Our good relations with the Turkish government are continuing. However, I insist that you must take this first step I mentioned.

Question: Do you perceive any change in the way of looking at the PLO and the Arabs in Turkey with the change of government?

Answer: The opening of the office was a very positive step and our relations are steady. However, I have received reports that there are some Zionist initiatives and pressures to prevent the Turkish government from taking new steps forward in connection with the Palestinian cause.

Question: There are rumors of an attempt to form a new defense organization to include Turkey, Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. How do you interpret this?

Answer: There is already a pact which has been formed and is in effect between America, Israel and Sadat -- not Egypt, Sadat. They are definitely pressuring you to join this pact. This is an extension of the NATO strategy. This is why you have to be very careful...not to be included in this pact, because this pact is contrary to the interests of the Turkish people more than the others in the region.

Intervention in Iran?

Question: Do you think the United States will intervene militarily in Iran? What would be the consequences for the region of such an intervention?

Answer: This is the other side of the plot that is being planned. This may be seen, or understood, from the U.S. military actions in the gulf, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean: they shifted the 7th Fleet from the Philippines to the Persian Gulf. They also built a new fleet. And besides this, they have a nuclear base on the island of Aldio Garcia [as published]. They have military bases in the Sultanate of Oman. And they have just established new bases in Somali, Kenya and Egypt. This may give you an idea of the nature of the Sinai agreement. This is not a solution for the region's problem. On the contrary, it is a solution to ensure that the Americans get new bases in the region. That is why it is necessary for you to be very careful and stay out of these plots.

Question: Do you think that the U.S. presidential elections have any impact on the Middle East, on the Middle East in general and the crisis in the region?

Answer: Unfortunately, they are using the region for their election campaigns. I am sorry to say this. They are exploiting the crisis in the region, the Afghanistan events and the hostage problem in Iran in this way for political purposes. They cause trouble everywhere for their own political campaigns. How this super power can dare to tamper with world security like this is beyond me. Just for these little elections.

Question: If policy has its source in the election campaign, then might a positive change in the U.S. position be expected after the elections are over?

Answer: Definitely not. I have no hope whatsoever in American policy. They have lost their credibility. It is enough if you remember this: in the Security Council, first they cast a positive vote then Carter retracted it later on his own. Another example: the report drawn up by the committee of 20 was discussed in the Security Council. Before the discussions even began, the United States announced that it would use the veto. How could this be? What does this mean? This is not an insult to me, but an insult to all who call themselves pro-American or friends of America, because with this behavior the U.S. administration and presidency have proved that they do not take their influence on the Arab world seriously. Else why accept Begin's blackmail and reject our legitimate rights? How can I believe them? How can I trust them?

Relations with United States

Question: In that case, there are conditions necessary for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the PLO and for the United States to lean toward a more constructive understanding of the problem, are there not?

Answer: We are here and we are furthering our struggle on all fronts, politically, militarily and diplomatically. We are doing this not by ourselves as Palestinians, but with all of our friends, our brothers and allies and together with the Arab world, the Islamic world and with our allies, the socialist nations. In all these ways, we stand against the plots prepared for the Palestinian people. Unfortunately, they do not know what justice means in America. They cannot even comprehend the meaning of this concept. They look out only for their own interests; they do not even serve their own interests, they serve the interests of Israel, because the faits accomplis are also bad for America's interests. No solution will work in this region as long as Palestinian rights are trampled. They have now come to a definite impasse. They are trying to move forward the dates set for the autonomy talks in order to avoid having to announce that they have come to an impasse and thus keep Carter from getting into a difficult position in the election campaign.

Question: It looks as though Carter will win the elections.

Answer: Not yet... He is using all his guns. He is even using wheat as a weapon. He is using every weapon he has, including the Olympics.

Question: Halid al-Hasan, a member of the Al-Fatah executive, announced in Strasbourg last week that the PLO would accept self-determination. Can this be taken as a sign of change in PLO, Palestinian policy?

Answer: What he said reflects a resolution adopted in our national council. And that resolution is what we have said all along, that we are ready to establish our own state in any part of Palestine, provided Israel withdraws. This is our guide; the resolution which the national council adopted is our guide.

Question: Do you wish to say that this announcement introduces nothing new?

Answer: Definitely not.

Question: What do you think about the Iraq-Iran conflict? Does this disagreement affect your relations with Iraq and Iran?

Answer: We are the bridge of trust between Iraq and Iran and between Iraq and Syria, and we perform this duty of ours.

Question: Some time ago, RPP General Chairman Bulent Ecevit proposed PLO intermediation as a solution to the Iraq-Iran dispute. What do you think of this proposal? What is the status of this proposal?

Answer: I received Mr Ecevit's message. I have been working for a solution to the conflict since it began. I was acting as intermediary before I received this message. In the reply I sent to him, I explained this and thanked him for his message.

8349
CSO: 4907

'CUMHURIYET' COMMENTS ON FUTURE OF RPP-JP RELATIONS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 16 May 80 pp 1, 9

[Editorial]

[Text] RPP General Chairman Ecevit's policy toward the JP in recent months has constituted the links in his calls for cooperation. If you look at various speeches of his, it appears that Ecevit is making a careful assessment that encompasses the middle East. The need for the two major parties in Turkey--which is experiencing a monumental economic crisis--to seek rapprochement at least on the basic conditions for government and on the solution to major problems has grown into the RPP's domestic political strategy.

But Prime Minister Demirel is continually denying the RPP's calls for cooperation with the JP. It seems that up to now Mr. Demirel has preferred an administration intimate with the NAP and that he wants to turn the presidential election into an intense political crisis, using this as a pretext for early elections.

It is another question whether the JP General Chairman would put into play an early election scheme at a time of such crisis in the world, the Middle East, and Turkey, or--even if early elections were held--what the results would be.

In spite of this attitude of Demirel's, the RPP's proposals for cooperation have yet another function. So long as these proposals remain abstract, the hesitant value judgments of Turkey's intellectuals against a RPP turned to the right will be reinforced. For this reason, it is necessary that the RPP concretize its policy and strategy in the new period. Is RPP-JP cooperation--excluding the socialist left that manifests itself as terrorist--under consideration? If not, is a means of accord being sought that will encompass the democratic spectrum? What will be the palpable conditions of this cooperation and its immediate program? What is the formula to be proposed as an alternative when the failure of the minority government is manifest more strikingly in the period ahead? The day on which the RPP can provide answers to these questions with concrete proposals, it will have opened a new pathway for a Turkey encumbered by an atmosphere of irresolution and pessimism.

The news coming from Ankara stresses that the RPP is ready to embark on work with this aim.

But it will not be easy to make the transition from a JP government bound and indebted to the NAP to a JP policy amenable to cooperation with the RPP. Such a development may be viewed as breaks for the JP, which is perpetually sliding to the extreme right, and a sign of optimism for government. In fact, might the imperatives push the JP toward new resolutions in the months ahead?

It is all up in the air. But for now it seems that Turkey will be unable to overcome its bottleneck through this minority government and thus that Turkey will be unable to tackle its crisis.

CSO: 4907

NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION UNCOVERS KURDISH SEPARATIST ACTIVITIES

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 23 Apr 80 pp 1, 15

[Article by Murat Culcu: "Political Heroin Smuggling"]

[text] Frankfurt (HURRIYET) -- The trial in the 16-kilogram "Political Heroin Smuggling" case, which has occupied security forces for months and has reverberated throughout the underground world, has begun in the criminal court for major cases in the state of Hessen. In the case, being watched with great interest by the German press and public, the 10 suspects who came from eastern Turkey and requested political asylum in Germany are being defended by "22 lawyers." The hearings, in which 10 interpreters are translating the speech into German, are expected to shed some light on an "armed revolutionary plot" in which one of the "focal points" of anarchy in Turkey has been uncovered.

In the statement released 6 months ago as the investigation launched by Harald Korner, a state's attorney in Hessen, reached the hearing stage, it was pointed out that nearly 100 million liras had been obtained from smuggling heroin and that part of it had been invested in homes and businesses in Turkey, with the rest being put into a secret organization operating in Europe for a separatist revolution being prepared in our country. The mayor of Besiri, a district capital in Siirt, was named in the investigation.

For Revolution

A tighter watch by American experts and narcotics officers in the country had begun when the amount of heroin illegally entering West Germany shot up around the middle of 1978 and 1979, bringing big increases between these dates among young Germans both in use and deaths from overdoses from this highly pure heroin. In fact, hundreds of eastern Turks who had come from Turkey requesting "the right of political asylum" in Germany were arrested during the time of this watch for narcotics smuggling. Clues which were to lead security forces to the source of the stuff were obtained during questioning of some of these suspects who had said, "I am a Kurd. I live in danger of my life in Turkey. I am being pressured."

Narcotics experts, in fact, expanded their investigation on the basis of the asylum seekers' statements and raided Behcet Kizilyel's restaurant in Celle, obtaining quite a bit of evidence here. During investigation of the incident which at first seemed to be an ordinary smuggling operation, Behcet Kizilyel's partner in "obscure businesses," Sabri Sevim, was captured.

While all this was happening, Prosecutor Korner and narcotics experts were studying the statements from different angles and they determined that the incident was not just ordinary smuggling but also had a political nature. In fact, the police were identifying the people to whom some numbers in Behcet Kizilyel's telephone directory belonged and questioned some people who had high positions in political organizations.

Only after obtaining statements from the other eight suspects named in the smuggling incident did it come to light that the money obtained was being spent for "a separatist revolution" being planned in Turkey.

The prosecution and the police organization, proceeding with the investigation through their own intelligence resources, found that Behcet Kizilyel and Sabri Sevim were the key men in a "secret union" working for a possible revolution in Turkey.

It was discovered in this context that the 16 kilograms of heroin had been shipped to Germany by the men of eastern sheiks and aghas, that the drivers bringing the goods to Germany had been paid 10,000-15,000 marks (400,000-600,000 liras), that the dealers had received 30,000-40,000 marks (1.5 million - 2 million liras) and that 1 kilogram of heroin was going on the market for 70,000-12,000 marks (3 million - 5 million liras).

Researching where this money had been spent, security forces found that part of it had been used to purchase property in Turkey and the rest had been spent for "revolutionary organization" purposes.

8349
CSO: 4907

EDITORIAL URGES ATATURKIST RESISTANCE TO SUBVERSIVE EFFORTS

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 5 May 80 p 3

[Editorial by Necati Zincirkiran in the "Pressure Cooker" column: "Formation of Liberated Zones"]

[Text] The easiest way to capture a country without fighting a war is to win over the dissatisfied among its people. The first step entails setting up of well-organized so-called revolutionary associations, societies and unions and, then, of having these organizations issue communiques or statements discrediting the government, the regime and all other state organs. The condemnation campaign is sustained in a most effective manner as part of a war of attrition. Administrative inefficiencies, unfair practices, improprieties, corruption and economic ills are artfully exploited. Everything topical or relevant is utilized.

Enemy propaganda selectes as its target the fiery youth who values action over ideas, and it developes a friendly militant force in the target country, which it plans to attack on a future date. Meanwhile, it forms "liberated zones," which will fit in the military action it expects to launch in the future, and all the while, it emphasizes armed action.

They [presumably recruited militants] attack patriotic individuals who oppose and resist them. They carry out massacres. Eloquent slogans about liberation, equality and welfare of the people are used as these acts are performed.

These operations "to occupy a country from within" constitute the tactics of what can be described as "the imperialist trend of our age." The first phase closes with a rapid purge and elimination of the intermediaries--the militants and their blood-stained tools. Then, comes the "puppets phase," which lasts until the administrators of the new system are brainwashed and adequately trained. These practices and the outcome are natural in such strategies because at that point the target does not need lancing, but dressing.

Whenever the Turkish nation finds itself isolated, as it has occasionally in the past, the dialectic materialism, with its propaganda weapon:

"Deceive, Divide and Put One Against the Other," attacks the human mind. Its strategy is "gain supporters, then, go in and, under the pretext of liberating them, add another ring to the chain of imperialist expansionism." We must, with courage, resist this grave threat by learning, understanding and explaining Ataturk's precepts with all the strength in our minds and hearts.

We must never forget what happened in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, South Vietnam, Cuba, Yemen and Afghanistan.

"To put people at each other's throat with the pretext of making them happy is an inhumane and a very regrettable method." These are Ataturk's words.

Ataturk underlined many times in his speeches that this system is the antithesis of our democratic system and totally against our interests. He set down a number of precepts that are valid today for not only Turkey's, but the whole world's liberation and welfare. These precepts are as fresh today as they were 50 years ago, and they will be just as fresh in 100 years hence, for they defend peace, tolerance and freedom, advocate national unity and cohesion, modernism and universalism as the dynamics of the process, and criticize the opposing trends and doctrines. He warned us about the sort of events we are experiencing today. Everything that he said has, or is about to,come true.

If we had really understood what he meant and had done all that he wanted us to do, we undoubtedly would not have got in the mess we are today. The Turkish nation's future can be secured only through Ataturk's rationalist and dynamic synthesis. We neither know of, or believe in, any other course or process.

7244
CSO: 4907

TEXT OF CRISIS, STATE OF WAR LAW DRAFT

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 16 Apr 80 p 7

[Article: "State of War Laws Would Apply in Peacetime"]

[Text] The "crisis and state of war bill" which has gone to the Council of Ministers will make it possible for personal rights and freedoms to be restricted without proclamation of martial law or declaration of war. The rationale for the law indicates that in time of war the necessary measures may be taken and freedoms may be restricted, but in situations tantamount to war which are called a "crisis" the same measures may not be taken and that a law has been drawn up to rectify this. The general rationale for the law follows.

Within both the national and NATO framework: the general security of our nation, the emergency measures drawn up for the purpose of defense against internal and external threats and certain parts of the special security plans are perforce restrictive of the personal rights and freedoms set forth in articles 17, 18 and 30 of the constitution and have been exercised by practices which to date it has not been possible to implement within the normal order of the law because there is no legal basis.

On the other hand, the constitution, by stating in the final paragraph of article 124, "Which procedures are to be applied under martial law or generally in the event of war and how the procedures are to be carried out and in what way the freedoms will be restricted or suspended are specified by law," defines in one respect the legal means by which to remove the difficulties encountered in the restriction of personal rights and freedoms.

Martial Law Act no 1402, an enactment of the first instance based thereon: its inclusion of some measures to restrict personal rights and freedoms notwithstanding -- fails by far to answer the need for full implementation of emergency measures and security plans. Moreover, according to legal regulations at the present time: in the event of both war and the outbreak of a situation tantamount to war, martial law must first be declared nationwide or in a specific region of the nation in order that any measures

having the intent to restrict personal rights and freedoms may be applied. It is clear that this situation will complicate the armed forces' direction and conduct of crisis and war by reason of the administrative difficulties contained in the structure of martial law.

Article 124 of the Martial Law Act: its permitting implementation in time of war of measures contained in article 3 of the said law even though martial law has not been declared notwithstanding, the measures in the said law neither resolve the deficiencies related to the requirements in a state of emergency and implementation of security plans nor is it possible to apply them in the event of the outbreak of a situation tantamount to war (crisis) because their use is limited to time of war only. However, the placing of many measures into effect at the readiness stage, that is, at the emergency state, for the security of military operations is an unavoidable necessity.

Accordingly, it is necessary that the measures needed for emergency instructions and plans be in place in time of peace. This will also make it possible for a law written for this purpose in accordance with article 11 of the constitution to go into effect quickly and thus avoid creating an unconstitutional situation with the measures needed.

It may be said in conclusion that enactment is needed of a crisis and state of war law envisaging within the framework of article 11 of the constitution the restriction of certain freedoms contained in the emergency measures and special security plans in order to ensure that certain security measures not at present affixed to any legal basis but which are contained in various existing emergency and security plans may be applied in the event of war and in a situation tantamount to war so as to include periods of crisis also.

Crisis and State of War Law Draft

Article 1: This law regulates the authorities and the principles and methods of use of the authorities to restrict, within the framework of article 11 of the constitution, personal rights and freedoms without first declaring martial law in states of war and outbreak of a situation tantamount to war (crisis).

Article 2: The Council of Ministers, upon the proposal of the Office of the Chief of the General Staff, makes the decision to declare or place into effect throughout the entire country or in one or several areas of the country the measures contained in the official emergency system instructions or special security plans.

Decisions to invoke crisis and state of war throughout the entire country are submitted for approval to the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

The Council of Minister's decision is valid until the Turkish Grand National Assembly tenders its approval.

If the clauses necessitating declaration of crisis and state of war abate, it is lifted by the same procedures. The lifting of crisis and state of war instruments throughout the entire country is submitted for information to the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

Article 3: This law does not hinder enforcement of Transportation and Communications Law no 697, National Defense Duties Law no 3634, National Defense Law no 3780, Duties for Armed Defense against Domestic Enemies Law no 4654 and Military Prohibited Zones Law no 1110, Martial Law Act no 1402 and regulations of law no 1324 pertaining to the duties and authorities of the chief of the General Staff.

However: the course of action to be taken in the resolution of seeming conflicting decisions and discrepancies which occur during joint implementation in connection with these laws is decided by the Office of the Prime Minister after hearing as necessary the views of the ministries concerned and the Office of the Chief of the General Staff.

Article 4: The following authorities, given to the Office of the Chief of the General Staff in connection with security of military operations, are contained in the official emergency system instructions or special security plans which are approved by the Council of Ministers. The Chief of the General Staff has the use of these authorities at his disposal and may delegate them when necessary to the subordinate commanders he deems suitable. The authorities are limited to the regions in which measures in the official emergency system instructions or special security plans are to be applied.

A. To designate ground, sea and air, military and administrative prohibited zones, thus:

1. Of foreign nationals, suspicious persons and Turkish citizens not native to the region, to restrict and monitor their movements in these zones, their travel on the roads in the zone or their leaving the zone.

2. Of sea-going vessels under foreign or Turkish flags, to ensure their quick departure if they enter the prohibited zone or zones or are found there for any reason.

3. Of foreign civil aircraft, to prohibit their straying off course, or, if they do, to prohibit their landing or taking off at the airports.

4. To take measures against any enemy intelligence and sabotage activities in the aforementioned zones.

B. To cooperate with civil administrations and the police and to take these forces under operational command if necessary in order to determine the measures necessary to ensure and preserve public order and security, control air and sea ports and borders, prevent subversive activities and pursue and apprehend enemy agents and fugitives.

C. To permit regulation for military purposes of emissions by such means as telecommunications, radio and television.

D. To permit imposition of registration and censorship on all written communications -- newspapers, magazines, books, brochures and others.

E. Of suspicious and objectionable persons, to permit the search of their persons, residences, possessions and papers; their arrest or placement under involuntary house arrest; or their expulsion from the zone if necessary.

F. To place at the disposal of the armed forces according to demonstrated need, communications facilities and channels inclusive of organization and personnel belonging to the public and private sector.

G. At industrial workplaces and establishments belonging to or in support of the armed forces, to require a permit for strike and lockout rights and powers and to prohibit such actions as effective occupation and work slowdowns.

H. To control and require a permit for meetings and demonstrations.

I. To control and attach to permit travel within the zone or passage to and from the zone.

J. To restrict to military purposes the use of highways or to control traffic thereon.

K. To control, if necessary, all public and private health facilities and establishments, including pharmacies, in the zone.

L. If necessary, to request and assist in evacuation of the populace in specificied zones in connection with implementation of emergency measures or special security plans.

M. To control water resources and regulate use by the civilian populace according to military requirements.

N. To ensure the reporting and delivery to the armed forces, directly or through the agency of security forces, of suspicious materials, munitions or equipment found by civilians on land or on shores marking territorial waters and to provide for keeping them under guard where necessary.

O. In regions recovered from the enemy, to act as the government authority in taking the measures necessary to maintain general order and security; exercise law, order and constitutional rights; control and distribute basic necessities; regulate daily life and work; and repair and return to service production resources until such time as the state reestablishes its authority in those regions.

F. In regions abandoned to the enemy, to organize the people, plan and provide leadership and administration of resistance and guerrilla activities.

Article 5. During the execution of the duties of the armed forces; civil administrations and public and private institutions and organizations, as deemed and demonstrated necessary by the officers in command, are responsible for providing all coordination and assistance in implementation of the above measures and for carrying out or having carried out the demands issued by the commanding officers.

Article 6: In the zone or zones under a state of emergency or special security plans, those who act in violation of the measures taken by the officers in command or disobey their orders or collaborate with those who do will be sentenced to imprisonment of from 3 months to 1 year so long as their behavior constitutes no heavier crime. These sentences, however, will be tripled for war crimes.

Those who commit these crimes and collaborate in the commission of these crimes, whatever their capacity, profession or position (provided the terms of Martial Law Act no 1402, article 21 are honored) will be tried in the presence of the authorized commander or in the nearest military court in the zone.

Article 7: In the military courts assigned to deal with the crimes stated in article 6 of this law, the law governing establishment of military courts and trial procedures applies in conjunction with the state of war regulations of this law.

If the crisis and state of war declaration is invoked for reasons other than war, the regulations of the Establishment of Military Courts and Trial Procedures Law having to do with the exercise of recourse to the law in the event of war do not apply.

Article 8: The commander assigned to carry out emergency and special security plans: may hold in detention persons accused of the crimes contained in article 6 of this law until such time as a decision is made as to whether it is necessary to bring them before a court under his command or to the nearest military court in his zone. This period is not to exceed 15 days and may not be used more than once for the same person without just cause such as a charge with the same crime and the introduction of new evidence.

The guarding and housing of those held in detention will, as deemed necessary by the command, be in the custodial facilities of the local security authorities and gendarmerie commands. General prisons may be used for the holding or execution of sentences of detainees and convicts.

8349
CSO: 4907

FRG ASSISTANCE TO TURKISH MILITARY OUTLINED

Paris DEFENSE INTERARMEES in French Apr 1980 p 9

[Text] The destabilization created by the events in Iran and Afghanistan is giving new vigor to the interest placed on Turkey by the "rich" members of the Atlantic Alliance.

Under the influence of Washington, Chancellor Schmidt has asked the West German minister of Finance for a financial assistance plan, both economic and military, as soon as possible, in order to stabilize that country's situation, where the politicians are sinking more and more in the pit of a budget deficit and social disturbances.

FRG assistance to Turkey is nothing new. The latest military assistance dates back to December 1979. It amounted to 130 million DM (financing spread over 18 months).

Therefore, the new plan will be added to this outlay. The minister of Defense, Hans Apel anticipates the following program, primarily:

1. Construction of a jet engine maintenance plant at Eskizak.

2. Increase of the production capacities of the light automatic weapons plant at Kirikkale.

3. Increase of AC missile production in the Elmadagi plant.

4. Increase of the production capacities of an armored equipment and spare parts plant at Arifiye.

5. Modernization of two shipbuilding yards at Golcukuy and Tashizak.

Nevertheless, aside from outlays pertaining to improvement of Turkey's military industry, the German Ministry of Defense will probably consider requests made by the Turkish Army for delivery of German equipment. Thus, Turkey has already been requesting, for some number of years, delivery of Leopard tanks. Now that Leopard-2 is being built in mass production for the Federal German Army, delivery of about 200 Leopard-1A1 tanks would

perfectly feasible. Likewise, delivery of a certain number of Lockheed Starfighter F-104G fighter-bombers is being contemplated. If the whole plan should take concrete shape shortly, overall military assistance furnished to Turkey would then amount to half a billion DM.

It goes without saying that this assistance can only alleviate the main support effort furnished by the United States. The positive reaction by the FRG with regard to the American request gives an indication of an actual strengthening of the Washington-Bonn axis, whose solidity has just been fully put to the test. Moreover, the FRG is certainly going to play a constantly more important role within the Alliance in the 1980's. In view of Turkey's new strategic importance, it is perhaps clever on the part of the United States to intensify German assistance to that country, because it is true that the sympathies of the military and the confidence of the political circles go more toward Germany, "the historical ally," than toward Washington, especially since the cooling of relations accompanied by a freezing of military deliveries after the Greco-Turkish conflict.

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CSO: 4900

POLICEMEN TRAIN WITH MILITARY IN COUNTER-TERRORIST TACTICS

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 26 Apr 80 p 3

[Text] Istanbul: In 36-man units, police officers serving with the Istanbul Directorate of Security have begun to be trained for 15-day periods with military units attached to the Istanbul Martial Law Command.

The activities of the police, given training for "the struggle against illegal terrorist and secessionist organizations," were exhibited to members of the press yesterday in exercises carried out at the Kyup Hasdal installation in Istanbul. In a simulated exercise held yesterday at the completion of the 15-day training course, 36 Deputy Commissioners and other police officers on the Security Directorate staff demonstrated their technical skills and military prowess by firing Smith-Wesson, M-P-5, scoped G-1, and infantry rifles, then acted out "the capture of 6 anarchists, who had killed 3 people and wounded 2 others before hiding out in a cowshed in the Kemerburgas area."

Speaking at the successfully run demonstration exercises, Major-General Mustafa Katircioglu said that the training activities for security officers had been initiated on 7 January 1980, and that they would continue until 1 August 1980, a series of 15 consecutive sessions. He spoke as follows:

"The problem of combatting illegal armed groups, which has become one of the greatest problems in many of the world's nations and which is expected to remain current for some time, has also become one of our nation's most pressing problems as well.

"Within the difficult conditions in which our nation currently finds itself, the armed forces' internal security forces and other police forces simply must become more closely integrated."

9173
CSO: 4907

SPECULATION ON INTERIOR MINISTER CHANGE

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 4 May 80 p 5

[Article by Teoman Erel in the "Situation in Ankara" column: "As We Search for a New Interior Minister"]

[Text] The interior minister's chair is devouring people. Violent incidents have reached such proportions in our country that a minister of interior, regardless of the degree of his capabilities, is worn out in no time. Besides, the ministerial seat is given to politicians who fit in the equations in the head of the prime minister, and not to someone with the proper qualifications.

Oguzhan Asiltürk of the National Salvation Party, who remained in the ministerial chair for a long time in the first [Nationalist] Front government, was followed to that position by, first, Necdet Ugur, then, Korkut Özal, Irfan Özaydinli, Hasan Fehmi Günes, Vecdi Ilhan, Mustafa Gulcugil....

It is inconceivable that all these men were inept, and yet they generally stayed on a short while and were less than effective. Not even the expanded martial law, let alone the minister of interior, could effectively cope with violent incidents.

Now, we are on the threshold of another debate on the Ministry of Interior. Mustafa Gulcugil, reportedly, will step down for health reasons. Also according to reports, his replacement will be either Faruk Sukan or Orhan Eren.

The public is quite familiar with Faruk Sukan, deputy chairman of the Democratic Party. He earned his well-known epiteth "Sharp Detective" when he served as the minister of interior in the pre-1970 era. He used to say that he kept even the breath of the leftists under surveillance. He was an energetic man, but politically speaking, his views on violent incidents were one-sided.

Sukan's appointment to the interior post in Demirel's minority government is, reportedly, conditional on Democratic Party's linking up with the Justice Party.

Another candidate for the interior job is Orhan Eren who has been the acting minister since Mr Gulcugil's trip abroad for medical treatment. Demirel is reported to be in favor of Eren who is a veteran, hence, experienced politician. He was once the mayor of Ankara in the former Democrat Party era.

Recently, Orhan Eren was the focal point of major events. He was on the job during the Tarsus incidents and on 1 May. He made pretty strong, but biased statements when he took over the ministry in an acting capacity, but he gradually toned down his style.

His statement, printed yesterday in GUNAYDIN, creates an image of a Democrat-Justice Party man. "Leftist ideas should not be categorically rejected, leftist ideas can be defended, but not with a gun," he says.

Everyone who believes in democracy, regardless of party affiliation, will sign his name willingly under that statement. Meanwhile, though, in response to a question on torture, Eren, in an effort to defend the police organization, made an unwise remark.

"Do we call it torture when a police officer loses his patience and slaps a person who has shot at him, or done something just as bad?" he asked. "Do you expect the police to toss flowers at people who shoot at them?"

The argument, at first, sounds reasonable enough, but then, a dangerous implication comes through. We certainly do not expect a policeman to throw flowers to his assailant, but to punish a criminal is not his job. His job is to deter crime, to apprehend a criminal and to surrender him to justice. The laws will punish him.

When we step beyond the bounds, no one can predict how far off we may wander. A recent incident, reported in the press with pictures, is a case in point. An activist placed a bomb on the street. Police caught him and ordered him to open the package. If the man opens the package, the bomb will go off, and not only the terrorist, but everyone in the neighborhood--police and civilians--will be blown to pieces. Finally, the terrorist threw himself on the ground and did not activate the bomb. Then, bomb experts arrived and defused the explosive device.

A very grave and also illegal incident was barely averted. Had the terrorist been forced to set off the explosive, his death would have been tantamount to execution by the police. This type of practice has no place in law, justice or democracy. Furthermore, it would have set a precedent, and eventually similar practices would have created a sinister cloud over the entire nation.

There is something else we must mention. The order to have the young terrorist set off the bomb was allegedly transmitted to the police on the scene by a high-level official of the Istanbul security organization.

The incident should be carefully investigated by the authorities, including the acting minister. If the allegation is true, legal action must be taken against the responsible parties. People, whether rightist or leftist, who opt for violence, are committing very serious crimes. They are hurting the nation. They are shedding their brothers' blood. We all want the state to deal with them successfully, but the state, while fighting against violence, must not itself slip into lawlessness and violence. It is one thing for the state to be effective and strict, but it is another thing for state organs to step beyond legal bounds.

We indeed do not expect the state to toss flowers at bandits. However, if the state itself uses repressive means and illegality in order to stop violence, it will, in fact, put the bandit in an advantageous position, because the state's deviation from the path of justice will give the bandit a chance to gain the one thing he very much needs--public support.

Now that the possibility of a change at the Ministry of Interior is a current topic, we wanted to bring these points to attention. If Gulcugil is to be replaced, let it be by someone capable and effective, but also respectful of laws and democracy.

7244
CSO: 4907

BANKS TOUGHEN CREDIT PROCEDURES

Major Banks Freeze Commercial Credit

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 22 Apr 80 p 4

/Article by Kenan Mortan/

/Text/ Izmir: It is reported that three of the largest banks in terms of amounts on deposit have frozen commercial credit, except in certain special cases. It is expected that this decision, taken after the Central Bank virtually froze rediscount credit, will soon be discussed in the Turkish Banks Association.

As a result of the freeze in the rediscount policy for commercial paper applied by the Central Bank, which supplies a great deal of credit to commercial banks, the commercial banks tightened their credit limits about a month-and-a-half ago; last week, they put a total freeze on this credit. In accord with the new policy, parties applying to the banks for credit are being turned down. However, in cases defined as involving special circumstances, limited credit is being advanced to the banks' good customers. In these loans, the banks utilize their own resources. It is reported, however, that this type of policy will produce new distortions in the market. As the authority to award credit in this manner rests with the managers of the branch banks, the awarding of credit has begun to be carried out in new forms. According to what has been learned, some bank directors have attempted to raise the interest rates on credit extended by deducting the amount of the interest in advance. Within this practice, it is also observed that banking institutions set up as holding companies are given an advantage. Following the limitations placed on credit, the fact that banks have tended to channel their limited credit resources to participating concerns has constituted a new advantage for banks structured as holding companies.

The banks' decision to freeze credit has given rise to varying interpretations. While some circles have noted that, by this credit cutback, the banks have demonstrated that they approve of the government's anti-inflationist policy, those who hold to this view have stated that the freeze on credit has only affected the market, and that the banks' own subsidiaries will obtain credit just as before, saying that "Thus the banks kill two birds with one stone."

Another interpretation has been that the freeze is merely temporary, and that this decision could be suspended in conjunction with the Central Bank's raising the rediscount limits. Those who adhere to this second viewpoint point out that these types of policy have been the normal policies implemented in certain periods.

It is expected that this latest decision by the commercial banks to freeze credit will be discussed at the Turkish Banks Association, the banks' umbrella organization. However, the Turkish Banks' Association has no executive authority beyond that of making statements of principle.

It is expected that, following the IMF delegation's contacts in Turkey, the relationship of the Central Bank with the commercial banks will be reformulated. It is believed that, after the IMF's request that bank credits be frozen, the Central Bank will come forth with a new conception of credit awarding. According to this view, the Central Bank will either restrict its rediscount policy, or else will increase its collateral reserve requirements. However, in the event that neither of these two monetary policies should produce effective results, credit ceilings could be applied, which would mean directly limiting the banks' capacity to extend credit.

Central Bank Cuts Back Credit

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 22 Apr 80 p 4

[Text] Ankara: Between 4 and 11 April, Central Bank credit was reduced by 6.6 billion lira. The cutback in Central Bank credits especially affected credit for banks and Agricultural Cooperatives. As for the decrease in credit supplied to public enterprises, this figure amounted to 930 million lira.

While the credit from Central Bank funds available to banks fell by 3.9 billion lira, to a level of 104.8 billion lira during the second half of April, credit for Agricultural Cooperatives fell by 1.7 billion lira to the 56.8 billion lira level.

The decreases in Central Bank credits led to some 4.5 billion lira in paper currency being withdrawn from the market in the week 4 - 11 April. Consequently, the currency supply decreased from 202.3 billion lira to 197.9 billion lira.

The 893.5 million lira decrease registered in short-term advances to the Treasury for payment of wages and salaries constituted the largest portion of the decrease in public-sector credits. Meanwhile, a decrease of 36.2 million lira in KIT /State Economic Enterprises/ credit was also observed. Accordingly, Treasury advances as of 11 April stood at 198.6 billion lira, while KIT credits were at the 195.4 billion lira level.

While credit secured by the banks from the Central Bank in exchange for debentures stood at 12.2 billion lira as of 4 April, it declined by 2.7 billion lira to 9.5 billion lira as of 11 April. Moreover, the decline in credits obtained in exchange for commercial paper submitted to the Central Bank for rediscounting also affected the cutback in bank credit; credit utilized in this manner decreased by 1.1 billion lira to 65.5 billion lira.

In parallel with the cutback in credit, a decline has also come about in the deposits which both official and private banks hold in the Central Bank. However, increases have been observed in the deposits of official enterprises and international concerns; these increases amounted to 693 million lira and 3.2 billion lira, respectively.

9173
CSO: 4907

IMPACT OF DEVALUATION ON CENTRAL BANK DISCUSSED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 21 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Ziya Kayla]

[Text] Devaluation is a multifaceted procedure having conflicting economic effects. While it intensifies the inequities in income distribution and puts the low income groups in an untenable position, it provides, on the other hand, great benefits to those with commodity stocks in inventory and to foreign exchange creditors of the state. For this reason, it must be considered natural that the majority of society is weighed down by the effects of devaluation, while some people welcome it. This is why the devaluation of 25 January 1980 is commended both by profit-taking circles and by the Western industrialized nations which are Turkey's foreign exchange creditors.

Doubtless it would be of great benefit to know in detail how this devaluation affects Turkey's economic situation. However, it is also true that it would be impossible to compress such information into a newspaper article. Therefore, this article will examine an aspect of this procedure which is least often mentioned and will look into the interesting effects of devaluation on Central Bank accounts.

Central Bank Accounts

The Central Bank status schedules which are published every week show the bank's debits and credits in separate tables. One section deals with Turkish liras, another with foreign exchange operations. Since the Central Bank's accounts are kept in Turkish liras, the foreign exchange debits and credits are also shown in the accounts in Turkish liras, at that day's exchange rate. Computations are done according to the gold equivalency of the dollar, bearing in mind the value of the Turkish lira. Therefore, since devaluation results in raising the Turkish lira equivalency of the dollar, it raises both the gold and foreign exchange debit and credit accounts, and though the Central Bank's foreign exchange debit total for that day is higher than the gold and foreign exchange credits total, the Central Bank takes a loss of the amount by which net foreign exchange debits increase.

According to Central Bank Law no 1211, article 61, the plus or minus differences resulting from the revaluation of gold and foreign exchange in the bank's assets and liabilities if the value of Turkish currency changes are not taken into profit and loss accounting but are put into a special account. The debits in this account are transferred to "redeemable accounts" in accordance with agreements between the Central Bank and the Finance Ministry, and this debit is assumed by the treasury and remains in this account until paid.

In the agreements concluded between the Central Bank and the Finance Ministry, there has been no question to date of the treasury's paying immediately or in a short time the losses suffered by the Central Bank because of devaluation. This allows the losses stemming from devaluation to accumulate in the redeemable accounts. According to the 1979 balance sheet, these debits reached 91.2 billion liras. The losses entailed by devaluation, even if assumed by the treasury, continue to be a heavy burden on the Central Bank balance sheet because they are an interest-free credit and payment is spread out over a long period of time.

131 Billion Liras in Losses

Devaluation losses assumed by the treasury and shown on Central Bank accounts have not remained at 91.2 billion liras. The devaluation on 25 January 1980 added 131 billion liras more. Let me explain:

At the end of the week prior to the 25 January date on which the devaluation went into effect, the sum of the Central Bank's net foreign exchange debits was a total of $3.899 billion. Since the dollar which had been valued at 35 liras in Central Bank accounting rose to 70 liras with this devaluation, the net foreign exchange debit in Turkish liras rose by 35 liras to the dollar, to equal an increase of 136.465 billion liras (3890 x 35 = 136465). On the other hand, a profit of 5.4 billion liras was realized as the result of recomputing the value of existing gold stocks at the new exchange rate. The difference between the two is 131 billion liras, which is the approximate total of the Central Bank's losses entailed by the devaluation.

Losses suffered during devaluation depend as much on the size of increases in the value of the dollar as on the net total of the Central Bank's foreign exchange debits. Setting the dollar equivalency at 70 liras instead of 55 Turkish liras, which was the free market value at that time, raised the losses suffered by 56 billion liras. This is very important from the standpoint of showing that the authorities who made the devaluation failed to bear in mind as important a point as this.

The total of the interest-free credits stemming from the Central Bank's devaluation losses which will be accumulating in the redeemable accounts will raise the consequences of this devaluation to 222 billion liras. Th

account goes in the assets column of the Central Bank balance sheet and, together with the other accounts in this column, forms the equivalent of banknotes in circulation and the Central Bank's other debits. For the status among total assets of this account, which is semi-frozen in nature and non-income-producing, to rise from year to year is a negative development.

Post-Devlauation

What has been the result of this steep devaluation, accomplished by taking on this great a burden of losses? It is difficult to answer this question right now. It is necessary to wait for quite a long time to find out whether a devaluation has been successful in the full sense. However, it is possible to see from the outset how well or poorly things are going.

As is known, there are foreign exchange accounts in the Central Bank's weekly status schedules in which all foreign exchange operations are reflected. One can get an idea of the effects of devaluation by looking at how they develop. There are two ways of doing this. The first has to do with what kind of development net gold and foreign exchange reserves demonstrate during devaluation. To find out, one has only to compare the status schedules of the week before and the week before and the week after devaluation. Research using this method has shown that there was a $3 million drop in net reserves after the 1970 devaluation but an increase of $54 million after the 1978 devaluation and $1 million after the 1979 devaluation. In contrast, a drop of $59 million is seen in net reserves after the devaluation of 25 January 1980. This drop may be the result of a prior intensification of foreign exchange transfers in anticipation of devaluation.

The second point to be dwelled on is whether or not there is an increase in the net reserves amount in the weeks following devaluation. Since the purpose of devaluation is to raise foreign exchange inputs and reduce the outflow, if the operation is to succeed, the drop in foreign exchange reserves must stop and a steady rise become apparent. For example, the net reserve amount of $139.6 million after the 1970 devaluation showed a steady climb and within 2 months reached $301.3 million. Increases which could be called steady were also seen after the 1978 and 1979 devaluations. There has been no such development, however, after 25 January 1980; foreign exchange reserves have continued to fluctuate wildly. This shows that reserves rise only briefly when loan money is obtained from abroad, dropping immediately after transfers are made and not being kept at a specific level.

Conclusion

The Central Bank's net reserves as of the end of the week preceding Monday, 12 November, when the present government took office, were $835.6 million. This amount has been seen to decline gradually and dropped to $570.7 million at the end of the week in which the devaluation went into effect. It may be considered natural that the 25 January devaluation was seen as a

measure to stop this steady descent. However, the timing and scale of this operation will always be debatable. Another point which bears emphasis is the failure to take the measures necessary to prevent damaging consequences, either during formulation of the devaluation or immediately after. This rapid and big a surge in the cost of living as well as a pronounced increase in the inequities of income distribution are the consequences of this irresponsible behavior.

Economic measures must be devised with meticulous attention by the persons in authority to what the effects will be and must be applied with great care. Seeing foreign exchange resources dwindling and jumping into a haphazard devaluation to bring them up is an inexcusable mistake. Yet that is all this recent operation was. The Turkish economy has been left, at a most sensitive time, in the hands of an apprentice magician who does not know how to stop what he has begun. The tendency of certain international organizations to use Turkey for a guinea pig, constantly changing the measures taken, must be stopped at once.

There is no doubt but that the responsibility for the harm Turkey has suffered and will suffer because of the last devaluation lies with the administrators who failed to take the necessary measures in this regard. The time has long since arrived for the application of an energetic economic policy and its conduct by competent people.

8349
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TIR ROUTES IN ISTANBUL REORGANIZED BY MARTIAL LAW COMMAND

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 23 Apr 80 p 5

/Text/ Publishing a communique yesterday, the First Army and the Istanbul Martial Law Command announced that the routes within the Istanbul Martial Law Region of the Transport International Routiere /International Road Transport/ vehicles, which engage in international overland transport, have been changed.

Communique number 41, which stated that the Transport International Routiere (TIR) vehicles are no longer permitted to cross the Straits of the Bosporous on ferry boats, reads as follows:

"The Governor's Office and the Istanbul Martial Law Command have jointly drawn up a set of directives which reformulates the rules to which the domestic and foreign "TIR" vehicles carrying international cargoes must adhere in entering and exiting the Istanbul Martial Law Command region, in their control and inspection, in the routes which they take and the places where they park, and in their obtaining fuel, all in accordance with the relevant laws, directives, and agreements. According to this set of directives, which will go into effect as of 28 April 1980:

1. Entrance and exit controls and inspections for both domestic and foreign TIR vehicles which will enter Istanbul or transit the region will be carried out at the checkpoints which have been in operation since the first period of Martial Law; that is, at Silivri in Thrace, and at Tuzla on the Kocaeli Peninsula.

At these checkpoints, each driver's license, permit, and other documents, as well as the special labels attached on the inside of the vehicle's windshield and the seal provided by customs authorities will all be inspected; TIR vehicles of which there is some suspicion will be directly transferred under guard to the customs facilities at either Salipazari or Haydarpasa, where the requisite procedures will be applied.

2. After the necessary checks have been carried out at the Silivri or Tuzla control points, TIR trucks which merely transit the Istanbul region will pass out of the Istanbul Martial Law Command Region via the Silivri - Kucukcekmece - Cevre Yolu beltway - Bosporous Bridge - Ankara Highway route, or the reverse if travelling in the opposite direction, without entering into the city, unless there are pressing needs for refueling, or else an accident, health emergency, etc. occurs.

3. TIR trucks coming from either Thrace or Anatolia which will enter one of Istanbul's customs facilities will follow the following routes from either the Silivri or Tuzla checkpoints:

a. From the Silivri checkpoint:

1. To reach the Yesilkoy Customs Post: Kucukcekmece - Londra Highway - Cobancesme entrance - Yesilkoy Airport road.

2. To reach the Karakoy Salipazari Customs Post: Kucukcekmece - Cevre Yolu beltway - Barbaros Boulevard - Dolmabahce - Salipazari.

3. To reach the Haydarpasa Customs Post: Kucukcekmece - Cevre Yolu beltway - Bosporous Bridge - Uzuncayir Junction - Harem.

4. To reach the Kartal Customs Post: Kucukcekmece - Cevre Yolu beltway - Bosporous Bridge - Ankara Highway - Kartal.

b. From the Tuzla checkpoint:

1. To reach the Yesilkoy Customs Post: Ankara Highway - Cevre Yolu beltway - Londra Highway - Cobancesme entrance - Yesilkoy Airport.

2. To reach the Karakoy-Salipazari Customs Post: Cevre Yolu beltway - Bosporous Bridge - Barbaros Boulevard - Dolmabahce - Salipazari.

3. To reach the Haydarpasa Customs Post: Directly via the Ankara Highway - Uzuncayir - Harem.

4. To reach the Kartal Customs Post: Ankara Highway - Kartal entrance - Customs unloading area.

4. TIR trucks transporting export products from Istanbul to foreign countries will, after receiving their cargoes and complying with the requisite procedures, proceed to the Cevre Yolu beltway by the shortest route, without entering the city, and from there will exit the Martial Law region.

5. Domestic and foreign TIR trucks are prohibited from crossing the Bosporous by ferry for as long as Martial Law is in force.

6. TIR trucks arriving from abroad which will enter via the Salipazari and Haydarpasa Customs Posts will utilize only the parking areas at Harem and behind the Dolmabahce Stadium.

7. After unloading their cargoes either inside or outside the boundaries of the province of Istanbul, TIR trucks bound for foreign destinations may park only at the parking areas listed below, and they will depart the Istanbul Martial Law Command Region within three days at the most:

a. [They may park] for the time-being at the Londra camping area, until such time as the parking spaces to be prepared by the municipality at Cobancesme may be completed,

b. or at the Harem Docks parking area and the Erenkoy Municipal Market parking area, both of which are on the eastern side of the Bosporous.

8. Domestic and foreign TIR vehicles transiting the region may halt at the assigned fuel stations along the route between the traffic checkpoints at Silivri and Tuzla only for the time necessary to refuel. Foreign TIR trucks with permission to enter Istanbul will be able to refuel at the assigned fuel stations within Istanbul.

9. Private firms in Istanbul which engage in international overland transport will, by 30 April 1980, provide the Istanbul Security Directorate with a document approved by the authorized officers of the firm and listing the license numbers of the TIR trucks belonging to the firm, as well as the name, address, and capacity of all the parking areas used by the firm.

10. Action will be taken within the framework of the general statutes by the Istanbul Security Directorate and other relevant civil and judicial authorities against all who do not adhere to the above directives.

The above is to be duly noted by all those to whom it pertains.

Necdet UHUC, Commander of the First Army and of the Istanbul Martial Law Command"

9173
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USE OF WOMEN IN GUNRUNNING REPORTED

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 2 May 80 p 3

[Text] Erzurum (hha [HURRIYET News Agency]), Kadir Sabuncuoglu reporting--"I married the young man I love 5 months ago. He paid 150,000 liras [to my family] to marry me. His income is not enough to pay back the debt. He went away and I fell into the trap of arms merchants." The story came from the lips of an 18-year-old woman. Melahat, renowned as the prettiest bride in Kesap, was apprehended, along with three of her family members, while attempting to smuggle 104 guns.

The turbulence in our neighbor Iran has been a boon especially for arms merchants who have set up a virtual shuttle between Iran and Turkey's Black Sea region, and they are using women as couriers.

Melahat Kabacioglu, whose good looks would be the envy of any movie star, was caught, along with three of her kins, as they were traveling from the district of Hamsikoy in Trabzon to Erzurum by a bus with the license plate number 34 PS 318. The women were wearing specially cut vests which held 104 handguns. Melahat Kabacioglu, who was tearful as she gave her account of the events, made the following statement:

"I am from the village of Karabulduk in the Kesap County of Giresun. I married Emin 5 months ago. He paid 150,000 liras to marry me. We were heavily in debt. My husband went to Bursa to work, so that we can pay off our debt as soon as possible. Meanwhile, I heard that merchants were paying good money to women willing to transport arms. My mother Emine, my sister Kerban, my sister-in-law Zohre and I decided to act as middlemen in arms-running.

"We made an agreement with Mustafa and Bekir Akcora from the Espiye County for 20,000 liras per shipment. We made special vests for ourselves and put the 104 guns given to us in these vests. We were also given tickets for the Trabzon-Erzurum bus. They put us in a van and brought us, by a short-cut, to Hamsikoy where we took the bus.

"We were very uneasy as we approached Erzurum. We were looking forward to checking into the bus terminal where we were to turn over the guns to

Yusuf and relieving ourselves of a very heavy mental burden. However, our bus was halted at the entrance to the city. We were searched and and caught."

The police was acting on a tip when they stopped and searched the bus. An unidentified caller informed the Giresun Security Directorate that four women would be taking a large number of handguns to Erzurum. He, then, identified the women and added, "If Melahat won't be mine, she will not be anyone else's either."

7244
CSO: 4907

INADEQUACIES OF PENAL SYSTEM EXAMINED

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 5 May 80 p 2

[Article by Mehmet Ali Sebuk, lawyer and criminologist: "Prison Breakouts and The Vulnerable Point"]

[Text] The public attention is on the nation's prisons these days. A series of successful escapes from the country's prisons have become a source of public anxiety and concern. The breakouts were initially solo attempts, but soon we were hearing of mass jailbreaks; and now, we have people escaping from prison vehicles. These incidents indicate that terrorism, which permeates the country, has also spread to the jails. It is a virtual "race" among inmates to get out of jail. It seems no one wants to stay there too long.

Escaping from prison is a crime, but one aspect of it makes it somewhat different from other crimes. When a person is murdered and the murderer escapes, the incident frightens and saddens the dead man's family.

Public Concern

When a murderer, or a thief, escape from the jail, however, a large number of people become apprehensive. The escape concerns and worries, first of all, the members of the state forces who captured and surrendered him to justice, then, the prosecutor who indicted him and demanded that he be punished, judges who sentenced him, and witnesses who testified against him. As you see, an escape ruins many people's sleep. They never know when the culprit will materialize before them, or knock on their door, rob them or hurt them. That's why the public concern will not abate until the escaped convicts are found. Mass breakouts are carried out primarily by political prisoners. Their escape and disappearance into the community open the wounds, inflame the blood feuds and fan the winds of terrorism.

How do we explain the unbelievable ease with which these jailbreaks are accomplished? A major factor is the inadequacy of the prison buildings. The prisons that the Republic inherited from the earlier regime were dilapidated buildings originally constructed as mosques, shrines, churches or

stables. A few, which were built later, hardly came up to the standards of modern prison buildings. The guard posts, situated on the surrounding walls to house the gendarmes on duty, will not deter a jailbreak. Therefore, a prisoner does not really accomplish an extraordinary feat when he breaks out of a Turkish prison. The director general of prisons,who boasted that "not a bird can escape from the Sagmalcilar Prison," must have been very embarrassed in the face of the high number of recent escapes from the Sagmalcilar.

Evenhanded Enforcement

Another factor that contributes to the relative ease of escapes from prison is the cultural inadequacy of prison administrators and other personnel. Political prisoners in particular have no difficulty manipulating these people.

In Turkey, the basis of the enforcement system is the "devre" [term] method. Here, the objective is to educate and rehabilitate. To reach that objective, we must take the internal management of our prisons from the hands of the Ministry of Justice and place it in the unbiased hands of "enforcement judges." This is the way it is done in Western nations. Enforcement has been freed from the unfair and arbitrary attitude of the ruling political force. Prisoners are placed under the supervision and direction of these judges. They are assisted in the performance of this function by administrators who are also expert criminologists, and sociologists and psychologists who know about criminals. In Turkey, however, this function is performed by wardens with an intermediate-school diploma, who know nothing about psychology or prison administration, and underpaid, undereducated guards. Then, there are also the "prosecutor's agents," who have no legal capacity whatsoever.

To sum up, our prisons, which apparently can keep in no one except those who ought to be released, do not have administrators in the correct sense of the word. You don't see such things in Western nations. There, prisons and palaces of justice are built next to each other and are connected by a covered passage 4 to 5 meters in length. When an arrested person leaves the prison cell, walks through the passage and enters the next building, he finds himself in a trial court. He is not paraded before the public. He enters the court and sits at a chair facing the judges. This is how refined the justice system which respects human dignity has become. In Turkey, people under arrest are either driven to court in unsanitary vehicles, or are handcuffed and walked to court. About 10 days ago, 23 political prisoners escaped,with relative facility,from a prison van.

The reasons for jailbreaks generally fall in one of five categories. I made such a classification in my book "Hapishanelerde Islenen Suclar ve Firar Hadiseleri" [Crimes Committed in Prisons and Jailbreak Incidents], which I published 35 years ago when serving as the prosecutor of the republic in Ordu. The book also included a report on my successful reforms at the Ordu Prison. There were no escapes, no wounding or killing incidents in

the Ordu Prison during those 5 years. The book was very critical of Turkish prisons and aroused the wrath of the minister of justice. It was a normal reaction. We have not had a single justice minister since the declaration of the Republic who knows something about enforcement laws. That is why, Turkish prisons today are in a shameful state, a disgrace for humanity and an object of ridicule in the West. Remember the memoirs of the convicted British boy Timothy, and the slanderous film "Midnight Express" [based on a book] by Billy Hayes, an American smuggler who escaped from the Imrali Prison? These books are attacks on Turkey's honor, as well as its prisons.

What's To Be Done?

When the Italian Penal Code of the monarchy era was adopted without any modifications, it was not followed by a renovation of the primitive prison system inherited from the Turkish monarchy. The new laws were placed at the disposal of one of the worst enforcement systems in the world. Adoption of a new code should have been accompanied by a prison reform. That's what Italy did. When its new penal code went into effect, Italy also laid the cornerstone for a modern enforcement system. Today, it has an up-to-date enforcement system and very modern prisons, all which account for content prisoners.

In today's anarchic atmosphere, and while Turkey is in the midst of a life and death struggle, the state is barely able to protect itself. As long as the reasons for prison breaks are left untackled, there should be no doubt that escape incidents will assume graver dimensions and effect the dispensation of justice.

Prison breaks generally stem from the following: Inadequate food, poor sanitary conditions, disruption of family ties, lack of a proper labor system and a lack of respect for human rights in the enforcement of sentences.

Food given to prisoners and people under arrest has never received adequate attention. Prisoners are half-fed, half-starved. If you have money, you eat well, if you don't, you go to bed hungry. There is no concern about the health of prisoners. As a result, every year hundreds of prisoners leave the prison in a casket. When there is a prison riot, inmates are exiled to other prisons, their family ties are severed.

Every Western nation has a labor system in its prisons. It is the foundation of a good enforcement system. In Turkey, only 10 percent of the prison population works, the rest stays idle and turns the prison dormitories into crime labs. Any condition you can think of which may drive a prisoner to break out of jail exists in Turkish prisons.

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